Economist記事から:アメリカの不動産価格下落の兆し
From The Economist Global Agenda
The air is coming out of America’s property-price bubble. Will it pop or go quietly?
Get article background
ON CHESTNUT STREET in a leafy, middle-class suburb of Baltimore, signs declaring that “War is NOT the Answer” outnumber the For Sale notices. But local property agents are in no doubt that prices are levelling off or rolling back.
In prosperous Annapolis to the south, houses priced at $1.5m or more are taking longer to sell than they did a couple of months ago. A large, modernised Victorian house in a close-in city neighbourhood “went like a firecracker” on three previous occasions but its owner had to cut his asking price by 10% to sell it for a fourth time this autumn, says Barbara Tower of Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage. “With all the talk that the bubble can’t go on forever and other uncertainties in the world, people are afraid of overpaying,” she says.
This isn’t the stuff of which dramatic crashes are made. But Buttonwood, on a visit to her esteemed pa in this neck of the woods, is struck by how precarious America’s housing market is beginning to feel. It has been powering along mightily for the past four years on super-low interest rates and ever-higher house prices. Homeowners have borrowed against their paper wealth and spent it, fuelling economic growth. But none of that now looks likely to continue at remotely the same pace.
The first reason is that the Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening is beginning to bite. With yields on ten-year Treasury bonds finally rising a bit, the interest rate on the average fixed 30-year mortgage hit 6.31% last week, its highest in 16 months. The cost of an adjustable-rate mortgage linked to one-year Treasury notes has risen even more steeply: to 5.09% last week, up from 4.91% a week earlier. It is now at its highest level since 2002.
Neither rate is the end of the world. They are still relatively low, and most Americans have fixed-rate mortgages or variable-rate ones that do not reprice every year anyway. But house prices have risen faster than both income and inflation for years, and houses are distinctly less affordable than they were. Enthusiasm is cooling.
Mortgage applications were down by about 5% in October compared with September, and were lower than the same month a year earlier. The stock of unsold new houses is rising. The only bullish sign is that homeowners continue to take equity out of their homes at a healthy clip: in the third quarter, they withdrew more than $60 billion, on figures from Freddie Mac—about the same as the previous three-month period.
Interest rates and related woes are one problem. Tax reform is another. The rather odd clutch of recommendations that George Bush’s tax-reform commission came out with last week goes a little way towards a flat tax, a little way towards a consumption-based tax and quite a long way towards roiling the housing market. The commission suggests replacing the current deduction for mortgage interest, which in America’s progressive tax system benefits rich borrowers more than poorer ones, with a flat 15% tax credit on mortgages up to a certain limit. The credit would be worth the same whatever the borrower’s tax bracket, and the cap on mortgages to which it would apply limits the tax hand-out for the rich.
Not a bad plan, in its modest way, if the goal is partly to let the hot air out of house prices and partly to redistribute benefits. The National Association of Realtors reckons it would knock 15% off house prices across the country, about the amount by which they have appreciated over the past year, economists at Merrill Lynch point out. And it would likely do so by lowering the price of top-end houses and raising the price of more ordinary dwellings. (Fine for ordinary folk who are looking to sell; not so fine for ordinary first-time buyers.)
But before the housing industry’s lobbyists get their knickers in a twist, there are the politics to consider. It would be madness for an unpopular president to try to force through an unpopular tax change in an election year. And this is a president whose most heeded constituents are among those who stand to lose from the proposal. The reform is most likely going nowhere in anything approaching its current form.
Leaving aside possible changes in mortgage-interest deductibility, are house prices set to fall or just to rise less quickly? The latter looks more likely, but even that would be bad news for the economy. Consumer spending accounts for 70% of growth these days, so closing down even part way the home-equity cash machine that has fed consumption would put the economic brakes on sharpish. And the construction sector provided half of the (disappointing) total of new jobs last month. Bill Gross, boss of bond house PIMCO, reckons that if house-price appreciation merely slows to a more rational number, economic growth will drop to 1-2% next year, down from an annual rate of 3.8% in the third quarter.
What could give this scenario an uglier twist is the sharp increase in funny loans to funny borrowers over the past few years. “Subprime lending” to people who would not normally be able to make the grade is running at about $500 billion a year. Much of it takes the form of variable-rate, interest-only and negative-amortisation loans. Both debtors and creditors are now more exposed to interest-rate changes.
Banks have been happy to lend to marginal debtors, safe in the knowledge that they could unload many of the loans either on one of the quasi-governmental housing agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) or to private investors in asset-backed securities. Many of these loans end up in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs, which slice up bundles of referenced loans into tranches of different riskiness for different investors). Japanese and European investors have been especially enthusiastic buyers of this sort of paper, but there are signs of battle fatigue now: spreads have widened sharply over the past couple of weeks.
Delinquencies have been very low too, thanks to low interest rates and fast-rising prices, but they may not remain so for much longer. In mid-2005, less than 5% of borrowers had loans worth more than 90% of their property’s value. If a dodgy debtor ran into trouble repaying his loan, the bank would let him withdraw equity from his upwardly-mobile house and refinance the rest, terming it “voluntary pre-payment”. That will become less practicable as interest rates rise and the value of the equity remaining in a property approaches its market value.
So it all comes back to interest rates, and to how determined the central bank is to keep raising them until house prices retreat. Alan Greenspan clearly has housing “froth” in his sights, but his designated successor, Ben Bernanke, may be made of different stuff. In any event, the housing market reacts to monetary tightening after a lag of one to two years, it seems, so the temptation will be to overshoot. In which case the Fedsters will bring down house prices and the economy itself not with a whimper but a bang.
ファーストクレジット買収の裏話ってなんだ？
以前、ファーストクレジット買収の記事をブログにコピーしておいたら、今回またこんな記事が出た。
10月14日の記事には、ローンスターが1000億円超で買収したと書いてある。
しかし今回の記事では、ローンスターが１７０億円で買収したと書いてある。どちらが本当なのだろうか。
ファーストクレジット買収の裏話を想像してみる。
裏話があったとすれば、ファーストクレジットの貸出債権の中に、ある企業があった。その企業は、経営悪化しつつあり、返済も滞り、債務超過である。それなのに、倒産処理も、債権回収もうまくいかない。もしかすると、やばい系だったりして。そして、その債権をもてあまして、ローンスターが、転売したくなり、買収先を探した。
なんてことなのだろうか？
日刊現代の記事
住友信託高値買収の深謀 |
ファーストクレジットを１３００億円！で 「あのシタタカで、渋チンの住信がこんな高値で買収するとは……絶対に何か裏があるよ」 １０月１４日に発表された住友信託銀行による不動産担保ローン大手「ファーストクレジット」買収をめぐって憶測がくすぶっている。１３００億円という買収金額が高すぎるからだ。 不良債権問題が峠を越し、メガバンクは過酷な収益競争にさらされている。不良債権処理ではライバル行の一歩先を行った住信だったが、投資家の評価対象は収益性に移行。そこで、大型買収に打って出たというわけだが……。 「ファーストクレジットは、２００１年１２月末、メーンバンクの新生銀行に会社更生法を申請されるという異例の事態で話題になりました。当時は、新生銀行の株主であるリップルウッドが会社更生法申請後に、買い叩くという噂もあったほどです。実際には、ローンスターが約１７０億円で買収。それを１３００億円で売ったのだから、実に１０００億円強という強烈なハイリターンです」（外資系証券幹部） 住信側には早く今後の収益力向上につながる投資をしなければならないという事情があった。 昨年４月、一度決まった「ＵＦＪ信託銀行」買収がその後、白紙撤回され、買収資金として用意された３０００億円が宙に浮いた格好となっていたからだ。 売り手のローンスターも、ただ高値で売り抜ければいいというわけでもなかったようだ。 「実は、住信よりも高値を提示する買収希望者が他にもあった。が、買収先が銀行というほうが、投資家の受けがよく、今後、資金集めする場合にも効果がある」（関係者）という。 住信は今回の買収をきっかけに、ローンスターとのビジネスを検討しているのではないかといった観測も一部に流れている。 メガバンクにとって、収益力に定評のあるノンバンク囲い込みは大きな関心事。外資にボロ儲けさせたことは間違いないが、それで終わらないのが住信のたくましい商魂。「何かまだ、裏がありそうだ」とライバル行は警戒する。【上村覚】 |
ファイナンシャルタイムズ：アメリカ対中国貿易保護法案提出
|
ファイナンシャルタイムズ：ＦＲＢ0.25％利上げ発表について
>By Richard Beales in New York and Joanna Chung in London
>Published: November 3 2005 14:13 | Last updated: November 3 2005 18:39
>
>US Treasury yields jumped on Thursday, pushed higher by a warning on inflation from Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, and data showing robust services activity.
In his first Congressional testimony since June, Mr Greenspan warned “uncertainty” surrounded the inflation outlook, saying “global forces” that had subdued inflation and interest rates in spite of firm US economic growth would weaken.
“[There was] still no signal from the Fed that rates are close to or at neutral, that the Fed is getting ready to stop, or any such hint,” said Stephen Stanley, chief economist at RBS Greenwich Capital.
The Institute for Supply Management’s non-manufacturing index for October rose to 60, an unexpectedly big gain from the hurricane-hit level of 53.3 in September. As with the manufacturing index earlier in the week, the high prices paid component indicated building inflationary pressures.
The combined news led to selling of Treasuries, pushing 10-year yields to 4.63 per cent yesterday morning, up 2 basis points. Two-year yields rose 1.3bp to 4.445 per cent.
The bearish sentiment further weighed on eurozone government bonds, which were already subdued by fears that interest rates in the region may rise sooner than previously expected.
The European Central Bank on Thursday kept rates on hold at 2 per cent – for the 29th consecutive month – and comments by Jean-Claude Trichet, the central bank president, were less hawkish than expected.
However, he said “rates could move at any time”, compounding hawkish statements by a string of policymakers who indicated they were ready to act to head off inflationary pressures.
“The ECB definitely sounds uncomfortable about rising inflation risks and are champing at the bit for higher rates,” said David Brown, chief European economist at Bear Stearns.
In late afternoon trading, the yield on the two-year Schatz was up 0.7bp to 2.680 per cent while the 10-year Bund yield added 2.4bp to 3.469 per cent.
Meanwhile, gilts in the UK followed the other markets lower. Growing speculation that the Bank of England was unlikely to lower rates again this year put further pressure on prices.
As prices fell, the two-year gilt yield rose 3.1bp to 4.387 per cent and the 10-year gilt was yielding 4.445 per cent, up 3.7bp.
The Japanese bond market was closed on Thursday.
ファイナンシャルタイムズ:グリーンスパン議長がインフレ警告
>By Andrew Balls in Washington
>Published: November 3 2005 15:30 | Last updated: November 3 2005 23:43
>
>
Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, gave an upbeat assessment yesterday of the outlook for growth in the US economy but warned of an “uncertain” outlook for inflation.
In his last scheduled appearance before Congress as Fed chairman, Mr Greenspan stressed the economy’s strong momentum, in spite of the setbacks from the hurricanes on the Gulf coast, in comments that gave no indication that the central bank was close to the end of its rate-tightening cycle.
“The economic fundamentals remain firm, and the US economy appears to retain important forward momentum,” Mr Greenspan said in testimony before Congress’s joint economic committee. “Except for the hurricane effects, readings on the economy indicate a continued solid expansion of aggregate demand and production.”
Investors expect further rate increases in December and January before Mr Greenspan steps down. Ben Bernanke, the administration’s nominee to replace Mr Greenspan, is set to take over at a difficult time – monetary policy may no longer be stimulating growth in the economy. Treasuries were sold off following Mr Greenspan’s comments and data suggesting that the economy was shrugging off the impact of high energy prices. The Institute for Supply Management reported strong service sector activity in September, following its upbeat assessment of the manufacturing sector earlier in the week.
The Labor Department reported on Thursday that productivity grew at a 4.1 per cent rate in the third quarter, the biggest quarterly increase in more than a year. Unit labour costs declined 0.5 per cent, though some economists pointed to distortions in the data because of the hurricanes.
The Fed this week raised interest rates to 4 per cent – its 12th consecutive rate increase – and highlighted inflation risks. It said it expected to continue raising rates. A series of Fed policymakers have stressed cyclical risks to the inflation outlook and the danger that high energy prices will lead to a rise in core inflation and inflation expectations.
Mr Greenspan on Thursday took a step back and focused on longer-term developments. He said the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of China and India had led to the integration of large educated workforces into the global economy, helping restrain inflation over the past decade. This had suppressed wage growth, lowered inflation expectations and made it easier for central banks to achieve price stability.
“The suppression of cost growth and world inflation, at some point, will begin to abate,” he said. “Where the global economy is currently in this dynamic process remains open to question. But going forward, these trends will need to be monitored carefully by the world’s central banks.”
At a time when the Fed is focused on inflation risks, it sees more rate increases as necessary to slow the economy’s growth to its trend rate or below next year. Overall the economy grew at a 3.8 per cent rate in the third quarter, the 10th consecutive quarter of growth above 3 per cent. The long-run potential growth rate is often put at 3.25-3.5 per cent.
Mr Greenspan pointed to the uncertain effect of high natural gas prices on consumer spending but overall there was little discussion of downside risks to the outlook.
economist記事：ボラティリィ上昇とその影響
ボラティリティが上昇している。
その結果、投資リスクが高まる。
Waking the dogs
From The Economist Global Agenda
Financial markets have been eerily calm for most of the past two years. No longer
|
Get article background
IT’S not easy sleeping in the Buttonwood family home. The problem is not so much the traffic as the dogs: two affectionate spaniels who begin the night with the daughters and end it with the parents. There they lie, pinning your columnist under one-tenth of a duvet, until, suddenly heeding the call of nature, they stir, stretch, leap off the bed and tug her out the front door for an urgent visit to other parts.
In much the same way, volatility in financial markets is stirring from the mat again. On Monday October 31st, British equities had their biggest day in two-and-a-half years, rising by 2% thanks to some big takeover bids. Across the water, the week of Ben Bernanke’s nomination to replace Alan Greenspan as head of the Federal Reserve saw a steepish sell-off in bonds. The week before that, there was troubled trading in equities as central bankers bombarded the public with inflation warnings. In Japan, too, equity markets have moved relatively sharply of late. So too in emerging Asia.
Is all this just “noise”— in response to specific bits of news, such as better-than-expected personal-income figures or worse-than-expected earnings at Amazon and Boeing? Have investors been treading warily simply because it was October, a month haunted by the ghosts of crashes past? Or is volatility definitely on the increase? And why does it matter?
Volatility is the amount by which asset prices bounce about: the more they bounce, the more uncertainty, or risk, there is. It is “the probability of outlier outcomes”, as Howard Simons, a strategist at Bianco Research, puts it. One way to measure volatility is to look at how prices have fluctuated historically—their “realised” volatility. Spreads on credit-default swaps (insurance contracts against the possibility that debtors will default) provide another indicator. The most commonly followed measure, and one which often moves before the other two, is the implied volatility in options contracts. Equities are generally more volatile than bonds and currencies. And it is here that volatility is stirring most noticeably now.
The Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index (VIX) is based on a basket of widely traded options on the S&P 500. The more turbulence investors expect in the underlying shares, the more they are prepared to pay for options. The VIX is nowhere near the 45 that it hit in August of 2002 but, as the chart shows, it has been slowly rising since mid-July. Germany’s VDAX, an options contract on the DAX index’s 30 companies, has been trending higher too.
|
|
|
Volatility is important for several reasons. Many reckon that it can help to predict returns, though just how remains a subject of hot debate. Much academic work suggests that markets tend to go down when volatility goes sharply up, and vice versa. It doesn’t always work that way, though: during much of the 1990s, for example, both volatility and stockmarkets rose. But higher volatility definitely favours certain kinds of investors: it gives a fair wind to those who target volatility as a strategy, and it offers more opportunities to those who hedge their bets in other grand investment designs. (So why did hedge funds have such a terrible October, by all accounts? Could it be that most of them weren’t actually hedged?)
More broadly, expected volatility has a lot to do with how attractive financial assets are. It is the main parameter in pricing options, so it determines the cost of insuring against uncertain outcomes. When options are cheap, investors are happier to take the plunge in financial markets. When they are expensive—ie, when it costs more to hedge a bet—investors think twice. They tend to commit less capital to “risky” investment and for shorter periods.
So volatility has a bearing on economic growth, and rising uncertainty is not good news for future output. It may seem strange to worry about this now, when America’s third-quarter GDP figures have just come in stronger than expected, Britain’s housing meltdown seems to be on hold and Europe’s company bosses are raiding their cash hoards to acquire other businesses. But there are big question marks ahead. It is no accident that the VIX, often called the “fear gauge”, is rising. In October, State Street’s investor-confidence index hit its lowest since its launch two years ago.
Volatility was uncannily low until recently in large part because inflation and interest rates were too. A tide of liquidity swept through financial markets, exploiting anomalies, arbitraging opportunities and dampening volatility. Long investors saw little need to buy options against the chance that things might take a nasty turn in this best of all possible worlds, while others were all too happy to make a buck selling them. There was plenty of supply and not all that much demand, so the VIX snoozed in the teens.
Defter monetary management also played a role. Investors got used to trusting central banks to keep the financial-market show on the road, as they showed they could and would after the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, a big hedge fund, in 1998 and the bursting of the stockmarket bubble in 2000-01. And the Fed’s new policy of giving forward-looking statements on interest rates also soothed the markets: since August 2003, the expected volatility of Treasury notes has fallen by a third, on one measure.
But low inflation, low interest rates and untroubled confidence in safe hands at the helm are fast becoming things of the past. Oil-price hikes have helped to push up inflation around the world. The Fed raised short-term rates again on Tuesday, to 4%—its 12th quarter-point hike since the middle of last year—and looks likely to do so at least once more in the next three months. The European Central Bank may soon follow its tough talk on inflation with some tough action. Japan is more likely to raise rates than to cut them. Alex Ypsilanti, a strategist at Merrill Lynch, points out that over the past ten years the troughs in volatility have come one-and-a-half to two years after the low points in three-month dollar LIBOR (interbank) rates. The Fed started raising rates 16 months ago.
Add to this equation a new Fed chairman, especially one who may tighten just that bit too much in order to live down a reputation of being soft on inflation, and increased volatility looks virtually assured. Indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise. Looking into previous Fed handovers, Goldman Sachs found that financial markets were more unsettled in the first year than in almost all the rest of the new chairman’s time in office.
And finally, while the outlook is not all bleak—far from it—there are risks out there that neither central bankers nor financial markets nor politicians know how to handle yet. These include huge global trade imbalances and the shift in the balance of economic power that these imply; the rapid proliferation of financial instruments (mainly credit derivatives) whose valuation and ownership are not always clear; and the rising indebtedness of households, particularly in America and Britain. Given all that, it is hardly surprising that volatility is stirring again. What is amazing is that it’s not racing down the road and barking.
economist誌記事から
From The Economist print edition
But trade liberalisation and other forms of openness are needed more than ever
FREDERIC BASTIAT, who was that rarest of creatures, a French free-market economist, wrote to this newspaper in 1846 to express a noble and romantic hope: “May all the nations soon throw down the barriers which separate them.” Those words were echoed 125 years later by the call of John Lennon, who was not an economist but a rather successful global capitalist, to “imagine there's no countries”. As he said in his 1971 song, it isn't hard to do. But despite the spectacular rise in living standards that has occurred as barriers between nations have fallen, and despite the resulting escape from poverty by hundreds of millions of people in those places that have joined the world economy, it is still hard to convince publics and politicians of the merits of openness. Now, once again, a queue is forming to denounce openness—ie, globalisation. It is putting at risk the next big advance in trade liberalisation and the next big reduction in poverty in the developing countries.
In Washington, DC, home of a fabled “consensus” about poor countries' economic policies, a bill before Congress devised by one of New York's senators, Charles Schumer, threatens a 27.5% tariff on imports from China if that country does not revalue its currency by an equivalent amount. In Mr Schumer's view, presumably, far too many Chinese peasants are escaping poverty. On November 4th George Bush will escape the febrile atmosphere along Pennsylvania Avenue by visiting Argentina to attend the 34-country Summit of the Americas. There he will be greeted by a rally against “imperialism”, by which is meant him personally, the Iraq war and the Free Trade Area of the Americas which he espouses. Among the hoped-for 50,000 demonstrators will be Diego Maradona, who as a footballer became rich through the game's global market and as a cocaine-addict was dependent on barrier-busting international trade; and naturally his fellow-summiteer, Hugo Chávez, who is using trade in high-priced oil to finance his “21st-century socialism” in Venezuela.
All, perhaps, the normal fun of a Latin American visit. Last week's Latinobarómetro opinion poll revealed that whatever the protesters may say, a clear majority in all the region's countries favour a market economy rather than a closed, state-directed one—even in Venezuela (see article ). This is, however, a difficult moment for the market economy and for relations between rich countries and poorer ones, for the Doha round of trade-liberalisation talks under the World Trade Organisation are in trouble. When it began in 2001, the round was billed as a big effort to boost growth in poor countries, and the lowering of barriers to food trade was placed at its centre. In the past few weeks, however, a fairly bold American proposal for reducing its farm protection has been greeted by a much weaker response from the European Union and none at all from Japan. And ministers from Bastiat's own country, France, have vied with one another to denounce all talk of further reform to the EU's common agricultural policy. Europe must, they say, remain an “agricultural power” even at the expense of the taxpayer and the poor, and, according to President Jacques Chirac, must fight back “liberalism”. Whatever happened to Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité?
The world will find out, to some extent, next month when ministers from the 148 countries in the WTO meet in Hong Kong. The last time they gathered for such a crucial meeting was in September 2003 in Cancún, and the result was a shambles. There was a bitter row between rich countries and poor ones, and the meeting broke up in acrimony. At that stage, however, there was still plenty of time to repair the damage. For in effect the deadline for the Doha round comes in June 2007, when the trade-negotiating authority granted by Congress to President Bush expires. But, although that leaves more than a year and a half after Hong Kong, the complexity of a negotiation involving 148 countries and scores of highly technical issues means that the deal really needs to be done during 2006, with the political framework for it set early on—which essentially means in Hong Kong.
Trade-liberalisation rounds are arcane affairs about which free-traders are often thought to cry wolf. The previous talks, known as the Uruguay round, went through lots of brinkmanship and delays before they were completed. The result was still disappointing in many ways, especially to developing countries, and yet since the round's completion in 1993 the world economy has grown lustily and the biggest developing countries, China, India and Brazil, have all burst on to the global trading scene. Would the world really be hurt if the EU merely refuses to expose its farmers to more competition?
The likeliest outcome both from the Hong Kong meeting and the eventual Doha agreement is a compromise—as always. The European position is feeble but not risible, for it has offered an overall average cut in its farm tariffs of 39%, up from 25% only a month ago, though with rather a lot of loopholes that could severely limit the benefits. France, and other European farm protectionists, may prove more flexible than they currently imply: this is hardly the first time they have promised to man the barricades shortly before striking a deal. Yet though some sort of fudge in Hong Kong must be likely, with the Americans lowering their ambition and the Europeans raising theirs a little, such an outcome would still represent both a missed opportunity and a risk.
The missed opportunity is that Doha has offered the first proper chance to involve developing countries in trade negotiations—they now make up two-thirds of the WTO members—but also thereby to use a full exchange of agricultural, industrial and service liberalisations to make a big advance in free trade that could benefit a wide range of countries. Some of that progress may still be made, even in a fudged deal: Brazil, for example, stands to benefit hugely from freer trade in agriculture (see article ), so it should be willing to promote other concessions in return. India is reluctant to cut its own farm tariffs but has a big interest in liberalising trade in services, wanting more freedom in everything from finance to health care to entertainment. But if the rich world could gird itself to be more ambitious on agriculture the gains would be even greater: help for the poorest countries, making the rich look generous; better access to the biggest and richest developing countries for western companies; and a rise in global income in a decade's time of $300 billion a year (says the World Bank), which would thus help everyone.
The risk is that failure to agree on a new wave of openness during a period (the past two years) in which the world economy has been growing at its fastest for three decades, with more countries sharing in that growth than ever before, will set a sour political note for what may well be tougher times ahead. A turn away from trade liberalisation just ahead of an American recession, say, or a Chinese economic slowdown, could open up a chance not just for a slowdown in progress but for a rollback. Currently, for example, the Schumer bill to put a penal tariff on Chinese goods looks unlikely to pass. If American unemployment were rising and world trade talks had turned acrimonious, that might change. So might the political wind in many developing countries.
If so, that would be a tragedy for the whole world. Although the case for reducing poverty by sending more aid to the poorest countries has some merit, the experience of China, South Korea, Chile and India shows that the much better and more powerful way to deal with poverty is to use the solution that worked in the past in America, western Europe and Japan: open, trading economies, exploiting the full infrastructure of capitalism (including financial services—see our survey on microfinance) amid a rule of law provided by government. In other words, globalisation. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, anyone who is tired of that is tired of life.
昨日のライナー券売り出し
昨日のことなのだが、毎月1日は、次の月のライナー券の売出しである。国鉄の駅周辺は、行列を作って、整理券をもらう人で、いつもいっぱいだった。
ところが、昨日の11月1日は、まったく行列がなかった。売出しが変更になったのではなかった。通路の真ん中で駅員さん数人が、売り出し用のテーブルの周りで、「ライナー券購入はこちらでどうぞ」
と声を張り上げていた。
どうしたんだろう。一月約一万円のライナーセット券。希望の時間のライナー券を買うために、早くから行列していたのに。
考えられる理由としては、ただひとつ。節約だ。ライナー券を節約しようと思うほど、みなさんは生活が厳しくなったのだろうか。しかもたった一月で。先月は、長い行列があったと思う。
ボーナス前で家計が苦しいのだろうか。それとも、増税の話が浮上して、生活防衛のための節約をさっそく開始したのだろうか。
いずれにしろ、蛇のようにくねくねとうねるほどの長い行列がきれいさっぱりなくなってしまったのには驚いた。
ファイナンシャルタイムズ組閣情報続き
Mr Koizumi's reluctance to stay in office for more than five years - he says he wants to listen to music and dine out - contrasts admirably with the tendency of his peers in other countries to overstay their welcome. Even so, his planned departure raises the question of who will take charge of his political legacy, particularly the privatisation of the giant postal savings bank, and manage Japan's imminent emergence from deflation and stagnation.
Yesterday's cabinet reshuffle went some way towards providing an answer. By choosing Shinzo Abe as his chief cabinet secretary, a prominent post in Japan, Mr Koizumi has put Mr Abe in a strong position to succeed him when the LDP makes its choice in 2006. Taro Aso, appointed foreign minister, is another possible contender. So is Sadakazu Tanigaki, who remains finance minister. Heizo Takenaka, Mr Koizumi's enforcer on financial reform, was made minister of internal affairs and communications and will remain responsible for the sale of Japan Post.
Mr Abe was a logical choice for Mr Koizumi. At 51, he is one of the youngest of the LDP's front runners. He is also the most popular. In a recent opinion poll, 55 per cent of voters said they wanted Mr Abe to be the next prime minister. Yasuo Fukuda, once seen as a possible successor to Mr Koizumi, scored only 9 per cent. Mr Fukuda was not included in the cabinet yesterday.
However, neither Mr Abe nor his rivals have said anything very revealing about their attitude to reform. Mr Koizumi's biggest achievement was to implement reforms in the face of a distinct lack of enthusiasm from his own party. It would be comforting to know that his successor intends to pull off the same trick, but there is no evidence for such a belief other than formulaic statements from all cabinet ministers in support of Mr Koizumi's reforms.
Where Mr Abe differs - especially from the dovish and now sidelined Mr Fukuda - is in his hawkish approach to foreign policy. He has been an outspoken critic of China, has supported official visits to the nationalist Yasukuni shrine that commemorates Japanese war criminals as well as other soldiers and has called for economic sanctions against North Korea over its past abductions of Japanese citizens.
If Mr Abe does eventually become prime minister following yesterday's reshuffle, he would certainly make an impact on Japanese foreign policy. Unfortunately, it is not so obvious that he would eagerly advance the economic reforms begun by Mr Koizumi