Daily Press Briefing 5/8

QUESTION: Sorry, on North Korea, there is an editorial in The Washington Post which highlights the fact that it's been 24 days since the April 14th deadline. There's been no movement by the North Koreans. They claim that all North Korea has managed to do is to draw more concessions from the U.S. Are you still confident that North Korea intends to abide by its denuclearization commitments? You said yourself that you're not willing to wait an infinite amount of time, so --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: How much longer are you willing to wait on that?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we'll let you know. For the time being, we are willing to give this process a little more time. Everybody shares the sense that we wish that we had been able to move beyond this point, but we haven't been up until now. And the North Korean Government has reassured us multiple times throughout this entire period that they are, in fact, committed not only to the September '05 agreement, but the February 13th agreement as well.

And there are indications that they are actively working to resolve the BDA issue. We have said that we're going to give them a little time and space to do that. It's incredibly complicated and arcane, so it has taken much longer than anybody would have expected. What we want to do is get past this particular issue so we can return to the six-party talks, regain some of that momentum, and actually get down to the business of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, because that's ultimately what this is all about.

QUESTION: And just to follow up what you were saying about they're actively working to resolve the BDA issue, is the U.S. pushing for them to start shutting down Yongbyon while they're trying to resolve the BDA issue or are you willing to wait until the BDA issue is resolved?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, obviously, the North Korean Government can take steps on its own volition to begin shutting down the Yongbyon reactor and sealing the Yongbyon reactor. I know that they have had some contacts with the IAEA, so there hasn't been a total absence of action in that regard on the issue of Yongbyon.

What we would like to see is the BDA issue in everybody's rearview mirror so I don't have to answer these questions every single day -- that's just from a purely parochial standpoint -- and really get down to the serious matter of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and plus, Chris Hill hasn't been to Beijing for a while, so I'm sure he's itching to get back.

QUESTION: Same subject?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: On the same subject?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, we'll go back here and we'll come up.

QUESTION: Just one follow-up on what you said to her question, then I have another question. The IAEA, has there been any contact since the initial contact back in February?

MR. MCCORMACK: I think there -- you can check with the IAEA, but I think there has been some subsequent contact.

QUESTION: There has been some?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, yeah.

QUESTION: Okay. And secondly, are you --

MR. MCCORMACK: I think they would describe it more as informal in its manner, but yeah -- some contact, yeah.

QUESTION: Okay. And on the Washington Post article once again --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: It keeps on saying that there are -- the Administration has made concessions after concession after concession in giving back all of the money, unfreezing the accounts, working to help transfer. Do you look at these -- does the Administration look at these as concessions or is this part of your obligation as your commitment to resolve the BDA issue?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it's worth stepping back for a second. The -- let's remember what was -- the issue for the United States Government was the behavior of Banco Delta Asia and its ultimate -- it was ultimately determined that it was a -- part of an ongoing money laundering concern in contravention of U.S. law as well as inter -- customary practices of the international financial system.

So the action was against the Banco Delta Asia. The idea was never to "seize the assets" of Banco Delta Asia. How those -- once the Treasury issued its rule regarding BDA, it was up to the account holders as well as the regulatory authorities in Macau and China how to dispense of the assets that were in BDA. So that -- it ceased to become a U.S. Government issue at that point, as we talked about.

Now since then, we have tried to offer our advice to the various parties in as much as it's asked for regarding any potential transfer of funds out of BDA to some other financial institutions. So that, I expect, is something that the Treasury Department will be involved in as this process unfolds and as appropriate. But beyond that, it is not -- it hasn't been the U.S. Government that has been in charge of how these assets are dispensed out of BDA.

Yeah.

QUESTION: The president of BDA published a statement today saying that actually, they had known for a while, since 1994, that the North Koreans were laundering money in their bank. And so they alerted you that -- they alerted the U.S. and the U.S. asked them to keep the North Koreans as customers to be able to keep an eye on them, but now they feel cheated.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right. No, I saw that and what I have been told is that this particular allegation has been made as part of a filing with the Treasury Department by Mr. Au and -- or his representatives. And it's -- I further understand that it's going to be reviewed in due course, in an appropriate manner by officials at Treasury and wherever else they might review those things. So, inasmuch as it's part of an official filing, I really can't offer any further comment, other than to say people are going to look at it.

QUESTION: But you don't deny.

MR. MCCORMACK: I -- yeah, people are going to look at it. I can't vouch for the accuracy of what he said, I'm not trying to, you know, I'm not trying to turn you away from it, but I can't vouch for the accuracy and people are going to be reviewing it.

Daily Press Briefing -- May 8

Waiting on North Korea

The regime promised to take the first steps toward nuclear disarmament by April 14. It has not moved.

Tuesday, May 8, 2007; Page A24

ON FEB. 13, the North Korean government formally pledged to shut down in 60 days the nuclear reactor it has been using to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, to accept the return of international inspectors to monitor the facility and to "discuss a list of all its nuclear programs" with the United States and the four other participants in the six-party talks. The agreement set up a concrete test of whether the regime of Kim Jong Il was prepared to give up its nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic aid and security guarantees.

Eighty-four days have passed since then -- and North Korea has fulfilled none of its pledges. In response, the Bush administration has remained largely silent, nursing the hope that Pyongyang will in the end comply. State Department officials say they still expect the Yongbyon reactor to be shut down, and we hope they're right. Still, it would be foolish for North Korea's negotiating partners not to take notice of how its behavior since Feb. 13 compares with the commitments it made.

nstead of shutting down its reactor or welcoming inspectors, North Korea has been focused entirely on extracting the maximum possible financial advantage from the United States. Alongside the Feb. 13 accord, the Bush administration said it would "resolve" the question of $25 million in North Korean funds that had been frozen in a Macau bank. The administration didn't say how it would resolve the matter; at the time, officials said they might be willing to release that part of the frozen funds that was not directly linked to criminal activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting of U.S. currency.

North Korea first made clear that it would take no action until the banking issue was settled by the unfreezing of its accounts. The administration conceded that. Then Pyongyang demanded all of its money back, including that linked to criminal activity. Again, the administration gave in; on April 10, it made all $25 million available for withdrawal. But that, too, failed to resolve the issue: Now the North is insisting that it be able to transfer the money to bank accounts in South Korea, Italy or Russia -- and thereby formally break the taboo the U.S. Treasury had managed to create on its use of the international banking system. Guess what? The Bush administration is once again going along.

Administration officials say all this, along with the breaking of the deadline by (so far) 24 days, will be worth it if the reactor is shut down. That's true. But it should be remembered that the commitments on which Pyongyang is currently in default are the first and easiest in what is supposed to be a three-stage process. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in February, only if Kim Jong Il complied with the second stage -- by disclosing and disabling all nuclear facilities -- would it be possible to conclude that he had made a "strategic choice" to give up nuclear weapons. State Department negotiator Christopher Hill said last week that he still believed that that could happen by the end of this year. Again, we hope he's right. But so far, the record is this: In 84 days, North Korea has done nothing but extract concessions from the United States.

Waiting on North Korea - washingtonpost.com

北朝鮮、金塊売って外貨稼ぐ ＢＤＡオーナー文書に実態

　マカオの金融機関は、北朝鮮が国際金融社会とつながる窓口――。マカオの銀行バンコ・デルタ・アジア（ＢＤＡ）のオーナーが出した文書から、北朝鮮がＢＤＡなどをいかに利用してきたかが浮き彫りになった。北朝鮮が資金の全額返還よりも送金ルートの確保に重点を置くのは、今後の金融取引に支障が出ることを警戒しているためとみられる。

　ＢＤＡオーナーの区宗傑会長は７日、ＢＤＡと米国の金融機関との取引を禁じた制裁の解除を米財務省に文書で求めたことを明らかにした。

　文書によると、ＢＤＡと北朝鮮との関係は７０年代半ばにさかのぼる。中国政府と深い関係のあったマカオ財界の有力者の紹介で取引が開始。北朝鮮の銀行は国際システムに組み込まれておらず、外貨を保有したり送金したりする能力がないため「北朝鮮の運び屋が米ドルやほかの外貨を現金でマカオなどの銀行に持ち込んだ」という。

　在日朝鮮人や韓国の同胞からの送金、貿易や観光業などで北朝鮮が「相当額の米ドルを保有していた」ことも明らかにした。当時、北朝鮮と取引をしていた銀行は「国際的な大銀行を含め２０以上あった」という。区会長は、ＢＤＡが９０年代末、英国の銀行から北朝鮮産の金塊の取引を引き継ぎ、北京経由でマカオに運ばれた金塊を延べ棒にして香港の市場で販売したことも認めた。

　北朝鮮にとってＢＤＡなどマカオの金融機関は国際金融システムに接続するための重要な窓口の役回りを担っていたことになる。香港の金融関係者は「マカオへの現金の持ち込みはほとんどノーチェック。金塊を売って稼いだ外貨をマカオの銀行に預け、国際決済に使っていたことは十分考えられる」と指摘する。

　韓国政府関係者によると、北朝鮮はマカオのほか、香港やスイスを秘密口座の拠点に利用してきた。統治資金や対外活動資金が表に出ることを嫌う北朝鮮にとって、マカオや香港は、海外工作の拠点としても利用価値が高かったという。特にかつて平壌との直行便があり、金融管理も緩かったマカオは、資金の運用拠点として重要だった。

　だが、米財務省のＢＤＡへの制裁を受け、他の銀行も北朝鮮との取引を一斉に停止した。北朝鮮がＢＤＡ問題に強くこだわるのは「凍結された関連資金２５００万ドル自体ではなく、国際取引を続けるルートの確保が重要」（中朝貿易関係筋）なためとみられる。

　米政府はマカオ当局による凍結全面解除の支持などを表明しているが、米ドルの国際送金は米国の金融機関を経由させる必要があり、ＢＤＡ制裁が障害になっている。米国が一時的に制裁を解除する方法もあるが、地元の金融関係者は「それでは国際金融システムへの復帰という北朝鮮の目的は達成できない」と指摘する。

asahi.com：北朝鮮、金塊売って外貨稼ぐ　ＢＤＡオーナー文書に実態 - 国際