ビル･エモット批判
エモット氏が書いた本は、「日はまた昇る」ではなかった。しかし、「来るべき黄金時代ー日本経済復活の条件」というのは、:よいしょ本だし、最近のeconomistの社説を立ち読みしたら、失われた１０年は、変革の時期であり、これから、すばらしい時代が来るというようなことが書いてあった。
私は、憤激やるかたなく、不愉快な記事を読んでしまったという後悔でいっぱいだった。
エモット氏が編集長になったころから、economistの記事に面白みがなくなったような気がする。それに、ファイナンシャル・タイムスと同じような記事が、少し遅れてeconomistにのるのことにも気がついた。
今月号の潮（創価学会系の雑誌）の社内広告にも、顔写真入で登場していた。
いったい何を考えているんだろうか。日本人の総資産が激減し、住宅ローンの金額以下にまで住宅が値下がりし、給料やボーナスカット、倒産、破産と悲惨な生活だらけになってしまった日本に、よくもそんなことがいえるものだ。しかし、勝ち組といわれる人は、さらに勝ち続けられる条件がそろっているらしい。高額所得者に対する税率は、世界で最も低いらしいから。
確かに、日経平均は上昇しているし、上昇するだろうといわれているが、アメリカに比べれば割安という理由からだ。アメリカのバブル相場を売り逃げて、日本に投資するのが、正しい選択だろう。もし私がアメリカの投資家だったらそうすると思うから。
アメリカバブル崩壊、ドル暴落がきたとき、そうしておけば安全だろう。
しかし、日本の不良債権処理のプロセスで、外資は日本の資産を４００兆円もぼろ値で手に入れてきたという日刊現代の記事を読んだが、この先いったいどうなることやら、考えるだけで憂鬱だ。
ビル・エモット氏について
英国エコノミスト誌編集長ビル・エモット氏
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ビル・エモット氏・基調講演内
演題：“Does Japan’s Sun Also Rise ? ” 日本の陽はまた昇るのか？
副題：“How sustainable is the economic recovery and how far have the changes in Japan gone in recent years, in politics, entrepreneurship and business.”
※講演及びディスカッションは英語で行われます。（同時通訳有）
日時： 平成１７年１０月６日（木）１８：００～２０：００（17:30受付開始）
場所： 丸ビルホール東京都千代田区丸の内２－４－１ 丸ビル７Ｆ
※ＪＲ東京駅丸の内南口より徒歩1分/丸の内地下中央口より地下道にて直結
主催： ㈱イーアイエス、丸の内ブランドフォーラム、三菱地所㈱
後援： ニフティ㈱、アウディジャパン㈱
協力：(財)国際ビジネスコミュニケーション協会（TOEICテスト運営団体）、日経ビジネス アソシエ、 ストックホルム商科大学 欧州日本研究所
プログラム
- 基調講演 (18:00～18：50)
英国エコノミスト誌編集長 ビル・エモット氏
- パネルディスカッション (19:00～20:00)
ビル・エモット氏
コーン･フェリー･インターナショナル日本代表取締役社長 橘・フクシマ・咲江氏
東京大学大学院経済学研究科教授 経済諮問会議議員 吉川洋氏丸の内ブランドフォーラム代表 片平秀貴氏
economistの社説記事から
economist誌の信じられないちょうちん記事
日本がかめで、ちゅうごくがうさぎなんだそうだ！！！！！
これから、日本は繁栄するんだと？？？？？
まさか、と思うのが不通だろう。
ビル・エモット氏は、昔economist誌の東京支局長をやったあと、ロンドンに栄転していたはずだったけれど。彼が、「日はまた昇る」という日本礼賛本を書いたが、まったくのはずれだった。
どういうつもりだろう。
The sun also rises
From The Economist print edition
IT HAS taken an extraordinarily long time, but Japan really is now recovering from its debt- and deflation-ridden stagnation of the past 15 years. Proper jobs are being created, wages are rising and economists are raising their forecasts of economic growth—all despite worries about high oil prices and an American slowdown. The prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, grabbed the world's attention last month by calling and winning a snap general election, as a referendum on economic reform. Foreign investors are rushing to Tokyo so as not to miss the fun. There is a spring in the step of Japanese politicians and diplomats, relieved that they no longer have to apologise for Japan's weakness, pleased that they might now be better placed to deal with those bumptious Chinese. They have to pinch themselves to be sure it isn't all a dream.
In a way, it is. The turnaround in perceptions of Japan has been so sudden that it risks being overdone. The immediate road ahead for the economy still looks bumpy, with prices continuing to fall, albeit slowly, overall lending contracting and a big budget deficit of 6.4% of GDP making tax rises look probable. With their wages rising and jobs feeling more secure, consumers may soon start to spend more, allowing economic growth to be led by domestic demand rather than by exports and capital investment. But that process too is likely to be gradual, as households may well also rebuild their savings, which have been depleted during the past decade.
Gloomy old hands then turn to the longer term to prove that after autumnal optimism will come winter. Japan's population is starting to shrink, and so is its labour force. With productivity growth meagre in recent years, that implies a bleak future: the OECD recently calculated the country's potential growth rate till 2010 at a mere 1.3% a year. Mr Koizumi is a radical only by Japanese standards, and his party rules give him but one more year in power. And China, surely, is the real star of Asia, destined to out-sprint the sluggish, over-rigid Japanese and eventually to dominate the region's politics as well as its economy.
In the short term, it is right to be cautious. Japan's immediate prospects matter greatly for a world worried about slowdowns elsewhere, and forever depressed about reform and recovery in the other great has-been economy, Germany. But, better though they look, they could be prey to both external shocks and the vagaries of the economic cycle. The longer term is much more important, for both economic and political reasons. If the world's second-biggest economy is doomed to a genteel decline, then East Asia in future will have one great economic power rather than two and no one to balance China's rise except India, way over to the west, or an over-extended America, across the ocean.
Yet Japan is not doomed to decline. The slow and steady really do win races, and not just in fables. As our survey in this issue argues, Japan has been going through a long wave of incremental reforms, which together have changed politics, the economy and financial markets far more than most people realise, promising the country a bright long-term future. September's election result confirmed that that process is now accepted and that it will continue, with a steady slimming of the state's role in the economy. Until the corporate debt burden had been shed, and until deflation has ended, those reforms always looked beside the point, too weak to counter the ever-present risk of economic meltdown. With that risk gone, the pile of incremental reforms now has a chance to make a difference. And the crucial difference they will make is to the incentives governing corporate, political and financial behaviour.
The slow growth in productivity that makes OECD forecasters gloomy about Japan's potential was a consequence of the country's astonishing waste of capital during the 1990s, combined with a reluctance to cut jobs. Money was misallocated during the great stock and property bubble of the 1980s, but then even more was wasted in the next decade, as banks kept “zombie” companies alive and politicians raided the biggest pork barrel in history. Now that is past, even a modest improvement in the allocation of capital and the use of labour would boost returns and productivity. Reforms in corporate law and changes in the capital markets make it likely that the improvement will be better than modest. And, as workers become scarce again, further investment in information technology and other sorts of automation should boost productivity.
The ageing and shrinking of Japan's population over the next 10-15 years could thus raise productivity, not reduce it. With labour short, sentiment and social concern will not impede efficiency, as they did in the over-manned 1990s. And the strengths that made Japan rich in the 1970s and 1980s—good education, advanced technology and smooth co-ordination within companies—will again come to the fore.
There is plenty more to be done if Japan is to achieve this brighter, high-productivity future. Pension and health costs need to be cut; Japan's universities need to be revamped; antitrust policy needs to be reinforced in order to foster more competition. Above all, the politicians need to avoid messing up macroeconomic policy by raising taxes too sharply.
If all that is done, however, great prizes are within reach: rising productivity, rising living standards, a rising international reputation and, above all, a rising chance to face up to China on equal, or even superior, terms. Japan's relationship with China is a scratchy, tense affair; the latest dispute concerns gas and gunboats ( see article ). If conflict—diplomatic or military—is to be avoided, Japan needs to become stronger, but also to foster other Asian alliances, perhaps through European-style regional institutions. To its Asian neighbours, the Chinese hare is impressive but also worrying. A Japan that showed itself to be a steady, prosperous and reliable tortoise would be an appealing counterweight. In Japanese fables tortoises do win races, but they are also something else: they are symbols of potency.
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Japan's chances of prosperity and influence look surprisingly bright
ファイナンシャル･タイムズの中国に関する記事
| John Dizard: Don’t bank on China >By John Dizard >Published: August 3 2005 15:31 | Last updated: August 3 2005 15:31 >  >
All the really smart people I know in the American investment world believe that the recent change in China’s exchange rate regime is only the beginning of a pretty dramatic move over the next couple of years. A recent Bridgewater Associates Daily Observation, a pretty good proxy for serious fundamental analysis, said: “Market discounting (of future dollar devaluation) is as if nothing has really changed last week in terms of a likelihood of a rise in the yuan. We don’t think that’s the case.” There followed a typically data-intensive Bridgewater case for how the 2 per cent rise in the value of the renminbi is too small in comparison with past Asian currency revaluations. “These are the countries that, in many respects, created the model the Chinese would like to follow.” Besides, how can a mere 2 per cent move, or a further 1 per cent move during the next year, noticeably change the relative competitiveness of the two economies? It can’t. “None of my friends in the market think the move so far is sufficient,” says a very smart woman who manages a whole bunch of money. Where there’s a tip there’s a tap, as they say in London, and Asian currency funds for the common man are on offer for only a few keystrokes of effort. I think they’re all wrong. Not on the facts or on the integrity and cohesiveness of their analysis. Over time, yes, the renminbi and other emerging market currencies will rise in relation to the dollar. Not for the next couple of years, though. And if I’m right, and you renminbi bulls are wrong, you’re going to be paying some pretty significant negative carry while you’re waiting for your pay-off. The Chinese government can keep buying dollars with renminbi, and the deflationary impact of productivity increases will let them do so without creating a domestic disaster. So it doesn’t matter so much what we think is important, such as Senator Charles Schumer’s opinion on the “undervalued” renminbi, or lines on charts that wildly diverge from each other. It doesn’t even matter that there’s no immediate use for the $711bn in low-coupon foreign exchange reserves in Chinese accounts. What matters is what the Chinese leadership thinks is important. Appalling as the thought of another Schumer press conference may be to many of us, the Chinese leadership’s thoughts are concentrated by another prospect: more rural people moving to the city. According to the Chinese, 73 per cent of their population live in rural areas, and a very large number of them want to move to the city. The country needs to add at least 20m jobs a year, largely to accommodate this migration. Chinese agriculture’s prices are, for the most part, set in the world markets; dollar-priced in other words. Let’s say there’s a 10 per cent devaluation of the dollar against the renminbi during the course of the next year. That would mean there would also be a 10 per cent cut in Chinese farmers’ incomes relative to the cost of renminbi-priced goods and services. Would that mean 5m more people moving to the cities? What about a 20 per cent dollar devaluation? Would that mean another 10m or 20m newly impoverished job seekers? Bernard Connolly, the global strategist at Banque AIG, says: “Investment growth in China has been so fast, that even if it slows to the trend rate of growth, say 10 per cent annually, that leaves a hole in the economy that has to be filled by other demand. That means there will be some increase in consumption, but there will be a significant rise in net exports. They have to keep growth above the perceived limit of political risk, which may be around 7 per cent annually.” His colleague, Steve Gilmore, says: “Being short the dollar against the RMB (renminbi) has been one of the most consistently losing trades. The only people who would have made any money would have been those who put it on in the past two to three months. Even if the day before the revaluation, somebody who had taken the one-year short dollar view would have made only 0.7 per cent on their money.” The real losers from China’s trade and currency policy in the next few years will be the middle-income Asian countries, such as Thailand or Malaysia. Some of their exports will be displaced by the goods produced with China’s new industrial capital. If that means China piles up more dollar savings, the leadership will probably go along with it, for the next couple of years. It gives them leverage against the superpower, always fun to have. When China’s working population ages, they’ll need those offshore savings. So don’t sell Treasury bonds based on renminbi revaluation prospects. |
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economistの記事からフレッド・バーグステンの寄稿文
世界経済には、現在、５つの重大リスクがある。
３つはアメリカに関するものである。ドル暴落につながる経常赤字の再急増、コントロール不可能な財政状況、貿易保護主義ムードの高まりである。残りの２つは、中国経済の過熱がハードランディングする危険性と、石油価格の急上昇だ。
The world economy
The risks ahead for the world economy
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Fred Bergsten explains why policymakers need to act now in order to avert the danger of serious damage to the world economy
FIVE major risks threaten the world economy. Three centre on the United States: renewed sharp increases in the current-account deficit leading to a crash of the dollar; a budget profile that is out of control; and an outbreak of trade protectionism. A fourth relates to China, which faces a possible hard landing from its recent overheating. The fifth is that oil prices could rise to $60-70 per barrel even without a major political or terrorist disruption, and much higher with one.
Most of these risks reinforce each other. A further oil shock, a dollar collapse and a soaring American budget deficit would all generate much higher inflation and interest rates. A sharp dollar decline would increase the likelihood of further oil price rises. Larger budget deficits will produce larger American trade deficits, and thus more protectionism and dollar vulnerability. Realisation of any one of the five risks could substantially reduce world growth. If two or three, let alone all five, were to occur in combination then they would radically reverse the global outlook.
There is still time to head off each of these risks. Decisions made in America immediately after this year's elections will be pivotal. China, the new growth locomotive, is key to resolving the global trade imbalances and must play a central role in future. Action by a number of other countries will be essential to maintain global growth and to avoid deeper oil shocks and new trade restrictions.
The most alarming new prospect is another sharp deterioration in America's current-account deficit. It has already reached an annual rate of $600 billion, well above 5% of the economy. New projections by my colleague Catherine Mann (see chart 1) suggest it will now be rising again by a full percentage point of GDP per year, as actually occurred in 1997-2000. On such a trajectory, the deficit would exceed $1 trillion per year by 2010.
There are three reasons for this dismal prospect. First, American merchandise imports are now almost twice as large as exports; hence exports would have to grow twice as fast as imports merely to halt the deterioration. (In the past, such a relationship occurred only after the massive fall experienced by the dollar in 1985-87.) Second, economic growth is likely to remain faster in America than in its major markets and higher incomes there increase demand for imports much faster than income growth elsewhere increases demand for American exports. Third, America's large debtor position (it currently is in the red by more than $2.5 trillion) means that its net investment income payments to foreigners will escalate steadily, especially as interest rates rise.
Of course, it is virtually inconceivable that the markets will permit such deficits to eventuate. The only issue is how they are to be averted. An immediate resumption of the gradual decline of the dollar, as in the period 2002-03, cumulating in a fall of at least another 20%, is needed to reduce the deficits to sustainable levels.
If delayed much longer, the dollar's inevitable fall is likely to be much larger and much faster. Moreover, much of the slack in America's product and labour markets will probably have disappeared in a year or so. Sharp dollar depreciation at that stage would push up inflation and macroeconomic models suggest that American interest rates could even hit double digits.
The situation would be still worse if future increases in energy prices and the budget deficit compound such developments, as they surely could. The negative impact would also be much greater in other countries because of their need to generate larger and faster domestic demand increases in order to offset declining trade surpluses.
Fears of a hard landing for the dollar and the world economy are of course not new. The situation is much more ominous today, however, because of the record current-account deficits and international debt, and the high probability of further rapid increases in both. The potential escalation of oil prices suggests a parallel with the dollar declines of the 1970s, which were associated with stagflation, rather than the 1980s when a sharp fall in energy costs and inflation cushioned dollar depreciation (but still produced higher interest rates and Black Monday for the stockmarket). Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, predicts with 75% probability a sharp fall in the dollar within five years.
The prospects for the budget deficit and trade protectionism further darken the picture. Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade, but exclude probable increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures, extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases proposed by both presidential candidates. This deficit could also approach $1 trillion per year (see chart 2), yet there is no serious discussion of how to restore fiscal responsibility, let alone an agreed strategy for reining in runaway entitlement programmes (especially Medicare).
The budget and current-account deficits are not “twin”. The budget in fact moved from large deficit in the early 1990s into surplus in 1999-2001, while the external imbalance soared anew. But increased fiscal shortfalls, especially with the economy nearing full employment, will intensify the need for foreign capital. The external deficit would almost certainly rise further as a result.
Robert Rubin, former secretary of the Treasury, also stresses the psychological importance for financial markets of expectations concerning the American budget position. If that deficit is viewed as likely to rise substantially, without any correction in sight, confidence in America's financial instruments and currency could crack. The dollar could fall sharply as it did in 1971-73, 1978-79, 1985-87 and 1994-95. Market interest rates would rise substantially and the Federal Reserve would probably have to push them still higher to limit the acceleration of inflation.
These risks could be intensified by the change in leadership that will presumably take place at the Federal Reserve Board in less than two years, inevitably creating new uncertainties after 25 years of superb stewardship by Mr Volcker and Alan Greenspan. A very hard landing is not inevitable but neither is it unlikely.
The third component of the “America problem” is trade protectionism. The leading indicator of American protection is not the unemployment rate, but rather overvaluation of the dollar and its attendant external deficits, which sharply alter the politics of trade policy. It was domestic political, rather than international financial, pressure that forced previous administrations (Nixon in 1971, Reagan in 1985) aggressively to seek dollar depreciation. The hubbub over outsourcing and the launching of a spate of trade actions against China are the latest cases in point. The current-account, and related budget, imbalances may not be sustainable for much longer, even if foreign investors and central banks prove willing to continue funding them for a while.
The fourth big risk centres on China, which has accounted for over 20% of world trade growth for the past three years. Fuelled by runaway credit expansion and unsustainable levels of investment, which recently approached half of GDP, Chinese growth must slow. The leadership that took office in early 2003 ignored the problem for a year. It has finally adopted a peculiar mix of market-related policies, such as higher reserve requirements for the banks, and traditional command-and-control directives, such as cessation of lending to certain sectors. The ultimate success of these measures is highly uncertain.
Under the best of circumstances, China's expansion will decelerate gradually but substantially from its recent 9-10% pace. When the country cooled its last excessive boom after 1992, growth declined for seven straight years. A truly hard landing could be much more abrupt and severe. Either outcome will, to a degree, counter the inflationary and interest-rate consequences of the other global risks. But a slowdown, and especially a hard landing, in China would sharply reinforce their dampening effects on world growth.
The fifth threat is energy prices. In the short run, the rapid growth of world demand, low private inventories, shortages of refining and other infrastructure (particularly in America), continued American purchases for its strategic reserve and fears of supply disruptions have outstripped the possibilities for increased production. Hence prices have recently hit record highs in nominal terms. The impact is extremely significant since every sustained rise of $10 per barrel in the world price takes $250 billion-300 billion (equivalent to about half a percentage point) off annual global growth for several years. Mr Greenspan frequently notes that all three major post-war recessions have been triggered by sharp increases in the price of oil.
My colleague Philip Verleger concludes that this lethal combination could push the price to $60-70 per barrel over the next year or two, perhaps exceeding the record high of 1980 in real terms. Gasoline prices per gallon in America would rise from under $2 now to $2.60 in 2006. Prices would climb even more if political or terrorist events were further to unsettle production in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.
The more fundamental energy problem is the oligopolistic nature of the market. The OPEC cartel in general, and dominant supplier Saudi Arabia in particular, restrict supply in the short run and output capacity in the long run to maintain prices far above what a competitive market would generate. They do not always succeed and indeed have suffered several sharp price falls over the past three decades. They are often unable to counter excessive price escalation when they want to, as at present.
Primarily due to the cartel, however, the world price has averaged about twice the cost of production over the past three decades. The recent price above $40 per barrel compares with production charges of $15-20 per barrel in the highest-cost locales and much lower marginal costs in many OPEC countries. This underlying problem also looks likely to get worse, as the Saudis have talked openly about increasing their target range from the traditional $22-28 per barrel to $30-40.
There is a high probability that one or more of these risks to global prosperity and stability will eventuate. The consequences for the world economy of several of them reinforcing each other are potentially disastrous. All five risks can be avoided, however, or their adverse effects at least substantially dampened, by timely policy actions. The most important single step is for the president of the United States to present and aggressively pursue a credible programme to cut the federal budget deficit at least in half over the coming four years and to sustain the improvement thereafter. This will require a combination of spending cuts, revenue increases and procedural changes (including the restoration of “PAYGO” rules in Congress), as well as rapid economic growth.
Such a programme would maximise the prospects for maintaining solid growth in America and the world by avoiding the crowding out of private-sector investment and by reducing the likelihood of higher interest rates. It would represent the best insurance against a hard landing via the dollar, by buttressing global confidence in the American economy. It should be feasible, having been more than accomplished during the 1990s. Its absence would virtually assure realisation of at least some of the inter-related global risks within the next presidential term.
America and its allies must also move decisively on energy. Sales from their strategic reserves, which total about 1.3 billion barrels (including 700m in the United States), would reverse the recent price increases for at least a while and demonstrate a willingness to counter OPEC. For the longer run, America must expand production (including in Alaska) and increase conservation (especially for motor vehicles). Democrats and Republicans must together take the political heat of establishing a gasoline, carbon or energy tax that will limit consumption, help protect the environment and reduce the need for future military interventions abroad.
All three major post-war recessions have been triggered by sharp increases in the price of oil |
The most effective “jobs programme” for any American administration and the world as a whole, however, would be an initiative to align the global oil price with levels that would result from market forces. America should therefore seek agreement among importing countries (including China, India and other large developing importers as well as industrialised members of the International Energy Agency) to offer the producers an agreement to stabilise prices within a fairly wide range centred at about $20 per barrel.
Consumers would buy for their reserves to avoid declines below the floor of the range and sell from those reserves to preserve its ceiling. A sustained cut of $20 per barrel in the world price could add a full percentage point to annual global growth for at least several years. The resultant stabilisation of price swings would avoid the periodic spikes (in both directions) that tend to trigger huge economic disruption. Producers would benefit from these global economic gains, from their new protection against sharp price falls and from trade concessions that could be included in the compact to help them diversify their economies.
China must also play a central role in protecting the global outlook. Fortunately, it can resolve its internal overheating problem and contribute substantially to the needed global rebalancing through the single step of revaluing the renminbi by 20-25%. Such a currency adjustment would simultaneously address all of China's domestic troubles: dampening demand (for its exports) by enough to cut economic growth to the official target of 7%; countering inflation (now approaching double digits for inter-company transactions) directly by cutting prices of imports; and checking the inflow of speculative capital that fuels monetary expansion.
A sizeable renminbi revaluation is also crucial for global adjustment because much of the further fall of the dollar needs to take place against the East Asian currencies. These have risen little if at all, although their countries run the bulk of the world's trade surpluses. China has greatly intensified the problem by maintaining its dollar peg and riding the dollar down against most other currencies, further improving its competitiveness. Other Asian countries, from Japan through India, have thus intervened massively to keep their currencies from appreciating against the dollar (and, with it, against the renminbi). This has severely limited correction of the American deficit and thrown the corresponding surplus reduction on to Europe and a few others with freely flexible exchange rates. China should reject the US/G-7/IMF advice to float its currency, which is far too risky in light of its weak banking system and could even produce a weaker renminbi, and opt instead for a substantial one-shot revaluation. It should in fact take the lead in working out an “Asian Plaza Agreement” to ensure that all the major Asian countries make their necessary contributions to global adjustment.
Countries that undergo currency appreciation, and thus face reductions in their trade surpluses, will need to expand domestic demand to sustain global growth. China need not do so now because it must cool its overheated economy. But the other surplus countries, including Japan and the euro area, will have to implement structural reforms and new macroeconomic policies to pick up the slack. America and the surplus countries should also work together to forge a successful Doha round, renewing the momentum of trade liberalisation and reducing the risks of protectionist backsliding.
The global economy faces a number of major risks that, especially in combination, could throw it back into rapid inflation, high interest rates, much slower growth or even recession, rising unemployment, currency conflict and protectionism. Even worse contingencies could of course be envisaged: a terrorist attack with far larger economic repercussions than September 11th or a sharp slowdown in American productivity growth, as occurred after the oil shocks of the 1970s, that would further undermine the outlook for both economic expansion and the dollar.
Fortunately, policy initiatives are available that would avoid or minimise the costs of the most evident risks. America will be central to achieving such an outcome and the president and Congress will have to decide in early 2005 whether to address these problems aggressively or simply avert their eyes and hope for the best, taking major risks with their own political futures as well as with the world economy. China will have to play a new and decisive leadership role. The major oil producers and the other large economies must do their part. The outlook for the global economy for at least the next few years hangs in the balance.
From The Economist print edition
ファイナンシャルタイムズの記事Ｊ－ＲＥＩＴについて
| Crowded market for Japan property trusts >By David Turner >Published: August 3 2005 15:51 | Last updated: August 3 2005 15:51 > >
The Shibuya district of central Tokyo boasts one of the world’s busiest pedestrian crossings. Shopaholics thronging the large square facing Shibuya station are confronted with a sight to fulfil even their most extreme fantasies: a cluster of huge buildings packed with stores selling everything under the sun. Every so often the image of a dinosaur crosses a huge television screen. It seems an appropriate mascot for the district. The crowds of consumers who flock to Shibuya testify to the value of its real estate market. The busy Q-Front building lying just off the square may also provide some hope for the future of Japan’s Y2,400bn ($21bn) market in listed real estate investment trusts (J-Reits), whose average` dividend yields have shrunk from a peak of more than 6 per cent in 2002 to about 3.5 per cent. Much of the rental income from Q-Front’s retail outlets goes to Tokyu Reit. The trust, listed in September 2003, draws income from the high rents for office and retail property close to the Tokyu railway line, running from Shibuya to Yokohama, Tokyo’s sister city. The traditional assets for J-Reits were upmarket Tokyo office buildings. But faced with the sight of too much money chasing too few properties - which provoked moderate asset price inflation in central Tokyo for the first time in many years - J-Reits expanded into the area’s desirable residential property sector. Now, even this market has become crowded. “Opportunities for buying competitive properties at a bargain rate have decreased,” says one official at Pacific Investment Advisors, which runs the Nippon Residential Investment Corporation J-Reit. J-Reits have been looking further afield in their bid to keep yields up. Retail properties provide one possible solution. The Japan Logistics Fund, listed in May, struck a first by specialising in industrial property. The Fukuoka Reit, listed in June, invests in properties on Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands. Tomoyoshi Omuro, a J-Reit specialist at Standard & Poor’s, says: “Whenever there is a sales transaction [in upmarket office and residential properties in central Tokyo] a lot of managers rush to the bidding party.” In their hunt for good properties, listed J-Reits are facing competition from privately placed institutional property funds, which boast Y2,000bn of assets under management. “I think differentiation will be key to success in the future,” Mr Omuro says. When the J-Reit market began in 2001, the first investors were foreign institutions that had observed the success of the US and Australian Reit markets first hand, according to one expert at Nomura, Japan’s biggest securities group. He says foreigners still account for about 10 per cent of investment in J-Reits. Growing demand, he adds, has come from domestic institutional investors after a dip in the Japanese government 10-year bond yield to below 1 per cent in 2003. Regional banks and company pension funds have also shown strong interest in J-Reits, according to Hiroshi Torii of the Daiwa Institute of Research. The launch in 2003 of the first funds of funds aimed at J-Reits and overseas Reits brought in many retail investors. J-Reit dividend yields have fallen partly because investor interest has sent the average premium to net asset value from zero four years ago to about 40 per cent. Another factor weighing on dividends is supply of Reit-friendly properties. J-Reit managers are reluctant to invest in buildings that lack a track record of cashflow, which excludes many properties. Some analysts are sceptical about J-Reit investments outside Tokyo. Yoji Otani, property analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston, describes this market as “high risk, high return”, with lower purchase prices but lower rents and a greater risk of vacancies. However, such worries have failed to stem the continuing growth in the J-Reit market. In July, four funds were listed on the stock exchanges, lifting the total to 22. Mr Omuro of S&P expects five or six more funds to list by the end of the year. While there may be cause for concern there is no cause for panic, says S&P, whose ratings for J-Reits have been stable. The current average yield of about 3.5 per cent is still more than 2 percentage points above the benchmark 10-year Japanese government bond yield. J-Reits enjoy a similar spread above average dividend yields for conventional stocks and look better compared with the virtually zero per cent interest offered by bank savings deposits. However interest rates and bond yields will not remain low forever. There is already growing speculation about a possible end to the Bank of Japan’s zero interest rate policy as the economy continues to improve. Experts say investors are always likely to demand a return on J-Reits at least 2 percentage points above the risk free rate of return, and if necessary J-Reit prices would have to fall accordingly. |
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少し古い記事である。
日本の不動産投資信託についての分析である。
現在約2兆4000億円。
22本の信託があり、利回りは2002年の６％がピークだった。現在は３．５％程度に落ちているらしい。
約１０％が外国人による投資だそうだ。
最後の部分に、シリアスなことが書いてある。
リスクフリーな利回りに２％くらい上乗せした金利を、投資家は、不動産投資信託に求めているが、金利が上昇すれば、不動産投資信託の価格も急落するだろうと。
新生銀行
新生銀行って、しゃくだけど、すごく便利だ。
24時間手数料なしで、出し入れできる。引き出し、預け入れが24時間可能でしかも、手数料が要らないのだ。
セブンイレブンと郵貯のＡＴＭで引き出せる。
しかし、いつまでこのサービスが続くかは、わからない。
そのように規約に書いてある。
この条件だけを見れば、圧倒的に都銀や地銀よりも有利だ。
しかし、郵貯が民営化されて、大量の資金が流出した後、それをいただいたあとに、
手数料を取るとか、口座維持手数料を取るとかするのだろうか。
チラッと読んだ話では、アメリカの銀行は、貧乏人には口座を作らせないらしい。
そのために、デビットカードが必要なのだそうだ。
郵貯の危ない話
日刊現代のメールマガジンから引用
郵便局 危ない投信販売 |
| 郵政公社がきのう３日から窓口販売した投資信託がバカ売れだ。初日だけで１０億８０００万円も売ったというから驚き。このままいくと、今年度の販売目標を軽く突破する勢いだが、証券業界ではそんなに売りまくって大丈夫かの声も。売る方が投信のシロウトなら、買う方も郵貯一辺倒のウブな人ばかり。勧められるままに投資したお金が半分以下になってしまうこともあるから要注意だ。 |
しばらくお休みしました
風邪をひいてダウンしていました。
扁桃腺がはれやすいので、いくのはいつも耳鼻科です。
今回も、耳鼻科に行き、薬をもらいました。
解熱剤と抗生物質、胃腸薬、を処方されました。
頭痛がひどいので、以前銀座の耳鼻科でもらっていたケイガイレンギョウトウがほしいといったらくれました。
しか～し、・・・・・・。
次の日、ひどい寒気と頭痛で、死ぬかと思うほどの苦しみ。
風邪薬が合わなかったみたい。
とりあえず、ウイルス性の風邪にきかないとされている、解熱剤をやめると少し楽になりました。
そして、手持ちのギンショウサンという漢方薬をのむことにして、抗生物質も胃腸薬もやめました。
テレビを見る気力もなく、ずっと寝ていました。
一日寝ていたら、だんだん楽になりました。
結局連休とその次の週と、2週間近く寝込んでしまいました。
風邪薬が合わないことってけっこうよくあります。
抗生物質を出してもらえなかったとき、やっぱりよくならなくて、苦しいので、そのときはカンゾウトウを飲んでよくなりました。
そして、職場の医務室に行き、そのことを話したら、
「漢方薬を飲むならここにこなくてもいいでしょ」と暴言を吐かれました。
こんな銀行法改正案ってありか？
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この日の自民党の財務金融部会・金融調査会合同会議では、地方銀行や農林中央金庫の代表者らが、顧客の利便性向上や低コストでの出店に役立つとして、改正支持を表明。一方、信用金庫からは一般事業と兼業になる代理店の顧客情報管理の問題や、代理店を使った出店攻勢への懸念の声も出た。
改正法案は、現行で銀行の１００％出資子会社などに限定されている銀行代理店の業務をコンビニや旅行代理店、自動車ディーラーなど一般企業にも許可制で解禁。預金や為替、融資といった業務ごとに許可する。代理店が本業の取引先に有利に融資することや抱き合わせ販売を禁止し、金融庁は代理店に立ち入り検査できるようにした。
法案は先の通常国会で提出する予定だったが、自民党の郵政民営化反対派の反発で調整がつかず、提出できなかった。衆院選で与党が圧勝し、特別国会で郵政民営化関連法案の成立が確実な情勢となったこともあり、自民党内の手続きが２７日から再開していた。（共同）
(09/29 22:24)