チェイニー米副大統領、横田夫妻と面会へ

　２０日午後に来日するチェイニー米副大統領が２２日朝、東京都内で、北朝鮮による拉致被害者家族会の横田滋さん・早紀江さん夫妻と面会することが分かった。関係者によると、早紀江さんは昨年４月に訪米した際にブッシュ米大統領と面会しており、そのお礼のため日本側から働きかけたという。

　先の６者協議の合意を受けた米朝関係の進展により、拉致問題が置き去りにされる懸念もあることから、横田さん夫妻側から拉致問題解決のための支援も要請する。

asahi.com：チェイニー米副大統領、横田夫妻と面会へ?-?国際

Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 ― To win approval of a deal with North Korea that has been assailed by conservatives inside and outside the administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice bypassed layers of government policy review that had derailed past efforts to negotiate an agreement, several senior administration officials said this week.

After a meeting in Berlin in mid-January with her top negotiator on North Korea, Christopher R. Hill, who had just held lengthy sessions with his North Korean counterparts, Ms. Rice called back to Washington to describe the outlines of the deal to Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, and then to President Bush.

But to some, it seemed the usual procedures were cut short ― vetting the details though an interagency process that ordinarily would have brought in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, the Defense Department and aides at the White House and other agencies who had previously objected to rewarding North Korea before it gives up its weapons.

“There was no process here,” said an official who has been deeply involved in the issue. “Nothing. There was no airing of whether this is the way to deal with the North Koreans.”

White House and other administration officials dispute that, saying that all relevant agencies were consulted.

In lieu of the formal meetings where objections to such accords were usually voiced during the president’s first term, Mr. Hadley “walked it through with concerned people,” a senior administration official said. The official acknowledged that the process was much more informal, and rapid, than usual, although much of Mr. Hill’s work was built upon previous negotiations at the talks that had been widely vetted across the administration.

The result has been an unusual attack on the agreement from the right, starting with John R. Bolton, the former ambassador to the United Nations who takes a tough stance on North Korea issues. He said bluntly that it was a “bad deal,” and expressed the hope that it would fall apart before being carried out.

State Department officials said that Robert Joseph, the under secretary of state for arms control and disarmament, vehemently disagreed with the approach, telling associates privately what Mr. Bolton has said in public: that the new agreement was no better, and perhaps worse, than one signed by President Clinton in 1994. Mr. Joseph, who announced last month that he would resign soon, declined to comment Thursday.

Ms. Rice on Thursday sternly played down the significance of any internal dissent, making it clear that she would not entertain dissent after the president had made up his mind.

“First of all, the U.S. government is the U.S. government,” she said. “And so the decision has been taken. And since people are loyal to decisions that are taken, I think that everybody expects there to be loyalty to this decision.”

Mr. Bush, asked at a news conference on Wednesday about Mr. Bolton’s critique, was succinct: “I strongly disagree ― strongly disagree with his assessment.”

But in Mr. Bush’s first term, the decision-making process worked very differently.

State Department negotiators almost never dealt with the North Koreans without officials from the Defense Department and the vice president’s office coming along, and reporting back. In one instance, Mr. Cheney stepped into the Oval Office to put an end to a discussion under way in Beijing, when he feared an agreement setting out steps for resolving the nuclear standoff lacked the tough language on disarmament that he believed Mr. Bush wanted. Colin L. Powell, then the secretary of state, learned of the decision after a black-tie dinner.

In this deal, North Korea has agreed in principle to disarmament, but all discussion about actually giving up weapons ― and what the North might receive in return ― has been deferred.

Senior administration officials said they had been concerned that this deal, unlike the 1994 accord, should not “front-load” benefits to North Korea, and they said that instead it would reward the country bit by bit, as it carried out a freeze, and the “disablement,” of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

“What’s different this time is that it is clear that both the president and Condi wanted a deal,” said an official peripherally involved in the debate. Several officials acknowledge that as the Bush presidency enters its final years, two foreign policy goals have risen higher on the agenda: peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and disarming North Korea.

Others said that the rapidly shifting terrain beneath the negotiations allowed Ms. Rice to press her case with Mr. Hadley and directly to the president. Another senior administration official said that the North Korean response to Mr. Hill in Berlin was circulated, but on a “relatively limited” basis as it was one of the most delicate national security issues facing the Bush administration.

Immediately after Mr. Hill’s meeting with his North Korean counterpart in Berlin, Mr. Hill briefed Ms. Rice as she stopped in the German capital on the way home from the Middle East. She called the president from Berlin, and also spoke with Mr. Hadley, who was reviewing a copy of the document presented to Mr. Hill by the North Koreans, a senior administration official said.

“Chris signed on to it in Berlin,” said a senior administration official, although a full six-party session was required to formalize the deal because the Bush administration was insisting on a multilateral format to better enforce any agreement with the North.

Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal - New York Times

6カ国協議：チェイニー米副大統領、交渉から排除か

　米国のライス国務長官が6カ国協議で北朝鮮との合意を導き出すため、北朝鮮との交渉に反対してきたチェイニー副大統領ら一部強硬派を排除してブッシュ大統領に直接報告していたようだとニューヨーク・タイムズが16日付で報じた。

　同紙は「ライス長官が1月にベルリンで北朝鮮の金桂寛（キム・ゲグァン）外務次官と交渉していた米国のヒル国務次官補に会い、交渉の概要をホワイトハウスのハドリー大統領補佐官（国家安全保障問題担当）とブッシュ大統領に報告して交渉の妥結につながった。この過程でチェイニー副大統領や国防省、ホワイトハウス補佐官や他の機関が加わって具体的な内容を検討する通常の手続はなかったとされている」と報じた。

　同紙はまたある政府関係者の言葉として、「ベルリンでヒル次官補の提案に対する北朝鮮の反応について、その内容の一部が政府部内に伝えられた。しかし伝えられた内容は非常に敏感な国家安保の懸案であるため制限されていた」とし、「今回の交渉の意思決定の手順はこれまでとは異なり非常に非公式的で素早く行われた」と説明している。

　とりわけ交渉の合意の過程は、国務省が国防省や副大統領室関係者との協議なしに交渉を行うことはなかった1期目のブッシュ政権の政策決定過程とも非常に異なると同紙は分析している。これはブッシュ大統領が任期末を迎えて北朝鮮との交渉を望んだからだというのだ。

　同紙はさらに他の政府高官の発言として、「交渉を公式化するために6カ国協議が必要だったが、ヒル次官補はベルリンですでに北朝鮮が提示した書類にサインした」と報じ、今回の核交渉について1月のベルリンでの米朝対話の時点ですでに多くの合意があったことを示唆した。

ワシントン＝ 崔宇晢（チェ・ウソク）特派員

朝鮮日報／朝鮮日報JNS

朝鮮日報 Chosunilbo (Japanese Edition)