North Korea: Something might just happen
By Donald Kirk
SEOUL - Raise the topic of the upcoming round of six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons, and responses may range from "not again" to "what else is new?"
Forecasts of abject failure, while understandable in view of the prior record of rhetoric, disappointment and breakdown, may be premature. It's just possible - even probable, in the view of some but hardly all experts - that something substantive will emerge from all the yakking across the table and on the sidelines when
the protagonists cross swords yet again in Beijing beginning next Thursday.
No, that's not just because Christopher Hill, the US envoy to the talks, has been dropping upbeat remarks ever since he met his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, two weeks ago in Berlin. One might expect Hill, after all, to say, as he did in Washington before taking off for talks-before-talks in Seoul this weekend, "We believe we can make progress."
And Hill might also be expected to qualify that remark, as he carefully remembered to do, with the footnote that he was "very mindful of the fact that I expected progress in December, and it didn't happen".
But now things are different, really different, in the view of some of the experts. Now, they say, North Korea is going to Beijing to negotiate seriously, to drop a few bones for the Americans to chew on, to make an offer the US side just can't refuse - and then return to Pyongyang and await the next stage in the great bargaining game.
The logic here is that Kim Kye-gwan took the initiative in asking to see Hill, not the other way around, and specified that they should meet not in China but in Berlin, where Hill was scheduled to give a talk at a local college. Away from Chinese pressures, they engaged in intensive discussion for three days, after which North Korea came out with the extraordinary announcement that they had reached "a certain agreement" after talking in "a sincere atmosphere".
No one here is confusing "a certain agreement" with anything like final agreement on how the two sides are going to live up to the word of the joint statement of September 19, 2005, in which everyone - China, Japan, Russia, the US, and the two Koreas - agreed on providing huge amounts of aid to North Korea, and North Korea agreed to give up its nukes.
There is the sense, however, that Kim Kye-gwan, having returned to Pyongyang for final instructions, presumably handed down from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, is not going to go back to Beijing with nothing to offer.
"It looks like there will be a piecemeal agreement," said Han Sung-joo, who was the South Korean foreign minister when the US engineered the 1994 Geneva Framework Agreement under which North Korea was promised twin light-water nuclear reactors in return for locking up its 5-megawatt reactor at its nuclear complex at Yongbyon and ceasing development of nuclear warheads.
"The United States needs a modicum of success after the debacle in Iraq," Han reasoned. "North Korea has a handful of piecemeal concessions to satisfy the political needs - without giving up [its] nuclear program."
No way, of course, does Han think North Korea is about to abandon its nuclear program until extracting much more from the US and others at the table. "They're keeping the weapons to the last stage," he said, playing "the good-boy role" all the while "weakening the rationale" for a strong alliance between the United States and South Korea.
Han offered this Machiavellian estimate of North Korea's strategy for negotiations at a conference staged in Seoul by the Korea Society and the Security Management Institute, a local think-tank, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Korea Society, a prestigious organization, led by retired senior US diplomats and funded in large part by Korean donations. Although Han believed North Korea would make an offer at the talks, he seemed to believe the purpose might well be to deepen fissures that are already evident in the US-South Korean relationship.
"We are at the point as to whether the alliance is pulled apart or stays together," said Han, who returned to public office as South Korea's ambassador to the US several years ago. "South Korean views on the alliance are quite polarized," he noted, with debate focusing on such issues as the extent of the North Korean threat, human rights in North Korea and, eventually, what kind of structure will emerge if North and South Korea move to reunification.
Don Oberdorfer, author of The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History and professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, offered more details on what he believed Kim Kye-gwan might bring to the table.
"The North Koreans are very likely to slow down Yongbyon and bring back [inspectors]," he said, an allusion to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency whom North Korea expelled at the end of 2002 after the breakdown of the 1994 Geneva agreement.
The deal might depend, said Oberdorfer - for many years a diplomatic and foreign correspondent for the Washington Post - on the US acting "to modify the Treasury Department sanctions that seem so painful to them". The inference was that Hill might be ready to offer to remove some of the restraints imposed by the Treasury Department in September 2005, shortly before the Statement of Principles was issued, on financial institutions dealings with Banco Delta Asia, the Macau bank through which Treasury officials accuse North Korea of channeling counterfeit US$100 bills.
Oberdorfer seemed surprisingly optimistic about the talks. "It appears there's going to be new life breathed into diplomacy," he said. All the participants "will have more of an opportunity to work positively" as all sides weigh the alternative of North Korea "continuing to make nuclear materials" and moving "toward war".
Nor was Oberdorfer pessimistic about the outlook for US-South Korean relations. "South Korea is going to move closer to the center," he said, suggesting that the South would pull back from policies viewed by the White House, as well as South Korean conservatives, as too soft toward North Korea. At the same time, he predicted, "The US is going to move closer to the center" with "an opportunity for both governments to work together" - but "not with such discrepancies".
Others were not nearly so sanguine about the upcoming talks.
Kim Sung-han, professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, affiliated with South Korea's Foreign Ministry, said only when the two allies, the US and South Korea, resolve their own differences "can we move closer to resolving the North Korea nuclear problem".
David Steinberg, director of the Asian studies program at Georgetown University, noted "an intensive rivalry as to which country", the US or South Korea, "will take the lead in dealing with North Korea". As for the alliance, he said it was in its present state "very tenuous indeed" with problems in the relationship "attributed to differences in policies toward North Korea".
Some observers believed the six-party talks were not likely to go anywhere until after the 2008 presidential election in the United States. A South Korean military officer was heard to murmur, "We're screwed," when asked what he thought of the six-party talks - and the likelihood of a serious deal emerging from them. The inference was that any agreement acceptable to North Korea would undermine the US-Korean alliance - and South Korea's determination to stand up against North Korea's demands.
Journalist Donald Kirk has been covering Korea - and the confrontation of forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30 years.
Asia Times Online :: Korea News - Koreas: A return to diplomacy
北朝鮮 重油50万トン要求へ
北朝鮮の核問題をめぐる6か国協議が8日から再開されるのを前に、3日まで北朝鮮を訪れていたアメリカの専門家は、NHKの取材に対し、北朝鮮が、核施設を停止する見返りに50万トン以上の重油を要求する方針であることを明らかにしました。
アメリカのクリントン前政権の国務省で北朝鮮の核問題を担当していたジョエル・ウィット氏は、先月30日から3日まで北朝鮮を訪れ、6か国協議の代表を務めるキム・ケグァン外務次官らと会談しました。ウィット氏は、4日、NHKの取材に対し、キム外務次官らは、次の6か国協議で、▽ニョンビョンにある核施設の稼働停止や▽IAEA・国際原子力機関の査察の受け入れに応じる見返りとして、アメリカ側に対し▽50万トン以上の重油か、それに値する電力の支援や、▽経済制裁やテロ支援国家としての指定の解除を文書で表明することを要求する方針を明らかにしたということです。また、ウィット氏によりますと、北朝鮮はこうした要求をすでにアメリカ側に伝えたもようだということで、6か国協議では、まずは核の放棄が必要だと強く主張するアメリカなどと北朝鮮と の間で立場の隔たりが浮き彫りになる可能性を指摘しました。
NHKニュース
めぐみさん拉致 実名公表10年 葛藤超えた父の決意
横田めぐみさん=拉致当時(13)=の“拉致疑惑”について、初めて産経新聞と週刊誌「AERA」が報じたのは平成9年2月3日だった。めぐみさんの家族は当初、実名を公表するかどうかで揺れた。あの日から3日で丸10年。家族会の活動、金正日総書記に拉致を認めさせたこと、拉致被害者5人の帰国…。覚悟を決めての「めぐみ」の公表が、戦いの始まりと、世論を動かすきっかけになった。(住井亨介)
≪情報≫
「お宅のお嬢さんは北朝鮮の工作員に拉致された。平壌で生きているという情報がある」
平成9年1月下旬、参院議員秘書(当時)からめぐみさんの父、滋さん(74)と、母、早紀江さん(71)にこんな連絡が入った。詳しい事情を聴くため、滋さんは東京・永田町の議員会館に向かった。
めったに涙をみせない滋さんは、情報を聞き、涙ぐんだという。失跡から20年。「ああ、これで解決した。帰ってくる」と思う半面、疑問が次々とわいた。「本当なのか。何で北朝鮮にいるのか」
情報は一部のマスコミにも漏れ始めていた。めぐみさんや家族の実名が公表されたらどうなるのか。大きな問題が突きつけられた。
早紀江さんは「(めぐみさんの)顔写真を出したりしたら、本当に大変なことになるって思った。『命がなくなる』って」と振り返る。
滋さんは違った。「(実名を出さないと)信憑(しんぴょう)性が疑われ、すぐに(話が)立ち消えになってしまう。安全は図られるかもしれないが、これまでの20年間と同じで、何もないままわれわれも死んでしまうかもしれない。めぐみも帰れないままになるかもしれない」
≪覚悟≫
早紀江さんは何度も、めぐみさんの双子の弟、拓也さん(38)と哲也さん(38)に電話をかけ、「お父さん、(実名を)出すって言っているよ。どうする?」と相談した。2人の答えは、「名前を出せば危ない。絶対出しちゃだめだ。お父さんの言っていることは正しいけれど、父親としての観点が欠けている。安全を重視すべきだ」だった。
公表によって、自分たちにも降りかかるかもしれない危害。不安と悩みで眠れない日々が続いた。
報道当日の衆院予算委員会で、めぐみさん失跡について質問した西村真悟議員は事前に、政府に質問主意書を提出していたが、そこにはめぐみさんの実名が書かれていた。早紀江さんらは、滋さんの固い決意に押される形で、「本当の覚悟」を決め、一歩を踏み出した。弟らは「玄関は二重鍵にして」などと、父母を気遣った。
≪変化≫
「やってよかったんですよね、今にして思えば」。早紀江さんはそう言う。めぐみさんの実名公表で、少しずつ動きだした。9年3月には各地のほかの拉致被害者家族らが実名を挙げて、「家族会」を結成。集会に加え、真夏の暑い日も、雪降る寒い日も街頭で署名活動を繰り返した。それを取り上げるマスコミはほんの一部だったが、家族は地道に続けた。
この10年間で集めた署名は約562万人分。この一部を首相や外相に直接、手渡したこともあった。そして、14年9月、山は動いた。一貫して「拉致はでっちあげ」と主張していた北が拉致を認めた。そして、5人が帰国。北にいた家族も取り戻し、5人は永住を決めた。実名の公表が、また家族の地道な活動、悲痛な叫びが、ここまで政治を動かした。
だが、めぐみさんをはじめ、残りの政府認定の被害者12人について、北は「偽遺骨」に象徴されるように何の根拠も示さないまま、「解決済み」との態度を続ける。
滋さんは「(いろいろと)話はあるが、めぐみについては何の進展もない」と言い、早紀江さんも「家族には何も分からない。本当のことが分からない。それがつらいんです」と話す。
「今年こそ、何かが動くことを祈っています」。その思いが、10年たっても変わっていないことが、あまりにむごい。
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【用語解説】横田めぐみさん拉致事件
昭和52年11月15日、中学1年だった横田めぐみさんがバドミントンの部活動を終えて下校中、新潟市内の自宅近くで拉致された。北朝鮮側は、平成14年の日朝首脳会談で日本人拉致を認めたが、めぐみさんは「死亡」と説明。その後、めぐみさんの娘、キム・ヘギョンさんの存在が判明し、めぐみさんの夫が韓国の拉致被害者、金英男さんであることがほぼ確実となった。北朝鮮側が16年11月の日朝実務者協議で、めぐみさんのものとして提供した「遺骨」は、DNA鑑定で別人2人のものと判明している。
(2007/02/04 08:20)
めぐみさん拉致 実名公表10年 葛藤超えた父の決意|拉致|社会|Sankei WEB