田原総一朗が北朝鮮入り

かねて噂されていたとおり、ジャーナリストの田原総一朗氏（73）が、テレビ朝日の取材も兼ねて、北朝鮮に向かった。北京経由で31日にも平壌に入る。
　今回の訪朝の目的は何なのか。ある北朝鮮事情通が語る。
「田原氏は2度目の訪朝。今回はジャーナリスト人生の集大成として、一向に進展しない日朝間のパイプ役を買って出る決意のようです」
　金正日は、南北会談で韓国の盧武鉉大統領に対し『拉致日本人はもういない』と発言。先日も高村外相の「何人か帰国すれば進展であることは間違いない」という発言がヒンシュクを買うなど、膠着状態が続くのが日朝交渉の現状だ。
「今回は宋日昊・日朝国交正常化交渉担当大使か、金桂冠・外務次官あたりとの面会を狙っている。で、日本人の帰国問題一本に絞って交渉するようです。残された12人の拉致被害者の帰国は、金正日が否定する以上は無理だとしても、日本人妻や在朝日本人数人の帰国に道筋をつけて、それを日朝交渉の突破口にしたいのでしょう」（事情通＝前出）
　ひょっとしたら福田首相にとって思わぬ“切り札”になるかもしれないが、拉致被害者家族会や救う会から袋叩きにあわなければいいが……。

田原総一朗が北朝鮮入り（日刊ゲンダイ） - Yahoo!ニュース

ヒル次官補「核を持った北朝鮮とは平和協定結ばない」

　クリストファー・ヒル米国務省次官補は2日、「われわれは核を持った北朝鮮とは平和協定を結ばないだろう」と語った。

　ヒル次官補はこの日、千英宇（チョン・ヨンウ）韓半島平和交渉本部長と会談した後、「われわれは、非核化の前に平和協定を結論付けることはないという考えの下、平和体制の形成を準備している」と話した。彼は「米国は核無能力化の後、北朝鮮が核廃棄の段階に移るとき、平和体制に関する論議に加わる準備がある。さまざまなアイデアがあることは知っているが、これがわれわれの立場だ」と語った。

　またヒル次官補は、北朝鮮のテロ支援国家指定の解除について、「われわれは北朝鮮がテロ支援国家のリストから除外されることを望んでいる。ただし、北朝鮮がいかなる形態のテロ活動にも関与せず、テロ団体を支援しないことと、テロ関連の国連規約・国際反テロ基準を満たすことを確実にする方向で行わなければならない」と述べた。

　一方、韓国と北朝鮮両国はこの日の夜、北京で6カ国協議の首席代表による会合を持ち、今後の非核化の日程を議論した。

キム・ミンチョル記者

ヒル次官補「核を持った北朝鮮とは平和協定結ばない」 | Chosun Online | 朝鮮日報

Bush's North Korea Meltdown

ohn Bolton, Wall Street Journal (hat tip Ed Lasky)

Facts about Israel's Sept. 6 raid on a suspected nuclear facility in Syria continue to emerge -- albeit still incompletely, especially regarding the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea. Important questions remain, such as whether its personnel were present when the attack occurred, and whether they had been working to clone the Yongbyon nuclear facility in the Syrian desert since the North Korean commitment in February (the latest in a long series) to give up its nuclear programs.

Seemingly unperturbed, however, the Bush administration apparently believes North Korea is serious this time, unlike all the others. The concessions continue to flow in essentially only one direction, crossing repeated "red lines" Washington had drawn.

These include: (1) the humiliating U.S. collapse on North Korea's access to international financial markets; (2) accepting a mere "freeze" of Yongbyon (misleadingly called "disablement" by the administration) rather than real dismantlement; (3) failing to ensure enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718's sanctions, imposed after Pyongyang's nuclear test; and (4) the State Department's palpable hunger to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and the Trading With the Enemy Act's prohibitions, and re-establish full diplomatic relations.

The Bush administration's most serious concession is forthcoming, in which the U.S. will accept, with little or no concrete verification, Pyongyang's imminent declaration that it actually has very little nuclear activity other than what we have long known about at Yongbyon.

Even critics from the left now worry that State is conceding far more than it should. Jack Pritchard, the special envoy for negotiations with North Korea who resigned during Secretary of State Colin Powell's tenure because our policy was too unyielding, said recently that North Korean officials think "they can ask for and get what they want from the Bush administration because [it] is so eager to demonstrate a diplomatic achievement." Mr. Pritchard concluded, "The North Koreans are rubbing their hands together with glee."

Our current Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and other partisans of the six-party talks respond to all internal administration complaints or criticisms by asking, "What is your alternative? What would you have us do otherwise, risk war on the Peninsula?" Herewith, some responses:

First, it is simply inapposite to judge every tactical decision -- to accede or stand firm on this or that subsidiary point -- by forecasting the complete demise of the entire six-party process if North Korean sensibilities are ruffled by occasionally saying "no." Indeed, showing tactical toughness can frequently enhance the long-term prospects for success, not reduce them. Sadly, however, toughness at the tactical or strategic level is no longer the hallmark of our North Korea policy. Weakness is the watchword.

Second, before it is too late, President Bush has to draw a deep line in the sand on verification. The State Department has yet to say anything publicly about how verification will be accomplished, especially on the North's uranium-enrichment efforts, giving rise to the suspicion that our negotiators don't really have a clue what they mean. The idea of North Korea for years engaged in cloning Yongbyon in Syria (or anywhere else -- Burma, for instance) should be a fire bell in the night. President Reagan's mantra of "trust but verify" in the Cold War days didn't offend anyone, and if it offends Kim Jong Il, that should tell us something. If anything, however, with North Korea, President Bush should reverse Reagan's order: Let's see real verification, and leave trust until later.

Third, consider the severely negative effect these repeated concessions have on our relations with Japan and South Korea. President Bush used to stress that this was a "six-party" process, but now all of the action is bilateral. The State Department's lust to remove North Korea from the terrorism list is having a profoundly negative impact on our treaty ally, Japan, the nation most directly threatened by Pyongyang's nuclear capability. Thomas Schieffer, the Bush administration's ambassador to Japan, reportedly complained recently to the president that he was "cut out of the process." State should explain why it trusts North Korea more than our ambassador to Tokyo, and why we ignore Tokyo's concerns over North Korea's kidnappings of Japanese citizens.

South Korea is facing a critical presidential election in December. The last thing Washington should do is pursue concessionary policies that might enhance the prospects for a new president who follows the same appeasement line as incumbent President Roh Moo-hyun. If South Korea can discard Mr. Roh's rose-colored glasses, our overall prospects will improve considerably, but our unquestioning embrace of North Korea could have exactly the wrong impact in the South's volatile politics.

Fourth, and most importantly, the right response to the North Korean threat is to apply pressure steadily and consistently, rather than hastily releasing it. After its nuclear test, Pyongyang faced growing pressure from the cumulative impact of Chinese anger, U.N. Security Council sanctions, ongoing implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the U.S. Treasury's continuing financial squeeze.

There was a plan, of sorts, and it was producing some evidence of success. Instead of squeezing harder, such as by encouraging refugee flows out of the North, the administration did a U-turn. It let a desperate North Korea up off the mat, provided tangible economic support for this appallingly authoritarian regime, allowed Kim Jong Il to relegitimize himself, and undercut the PSI world-wide.

The icing on Kim's cake is that for years -- before, during and after the 2005 and 2007 "agreements" -- North Korea was happily violating its commitments. Instead of focusing China on solving the problem of the regime it has propped up for so long, we absolved China, sidelined Japan, inserted ourselves and started life-support for the administrators of the world's largest prison camp.

This will perpetuate the North Korean problem, not solve it. Any by perpetuating Kim Jong Il's regime, and its continuing threat, it is actually the State Department's policy that poses the greater risk to international peace and security. This is true not only for Pyongyang, but for other would-be proliferators watching our ongoing failure to stop North Korea.

The debate within the Bush administration is not yet over, although time is short before irreparable harm is done. Growing restiveness in Congress among Republicans and Democrats may increasingly become a factor. For President Bush, I can only hope he re-reads his first term speeches on North Korea.

Free Article - WSJ.com