Opening Keynote: Gen B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations (2024)
Gen David Deptula: [00:00:00] Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to Mitchell Institute's third annual Space Power Security Forum. For those of you I haven't had the good pleasure of meeting yet, I'm Dave Deptula, Dean of the Mitchell Institute, for Aerospace Studies. Now, we here at Mitchell Institute are committed to informing the national security debate, educating about theessential roles of air po wer and space power, and advocating for the policies and resources necessary to improve our nation's defense. Bear with me, if you will, and take a look at the screens. We have a little bit of a background presentation for you.
Mitchell Video: Everyone looks up at the same sky. But not everyone sees what we see. Threats, [00:01:00] challenges, and opportunities all hang in the balance. That's why at the Mitchell Institute, we're devoted to pushing the envelope to ensure America's continued dominance in the air and in space. Our team of experts have created the strategies, flown the aircraft, and operated the space systems that have prevailed in battle.
We never stopped thinking about the issues central to aerospace and national security. From air power, space power, strategy and deterrence to acquisition and budgeting and nuclear modernization. We inform and educate policymakers about the aerospace issues facing America.
We're proud to chart the course to a new vector. When you look up, look up to the Mitchell Institute.
Gen David Deptula: Okay, now everyone in this room knows that space is absolutely integral to modern life and crucial to military operations.
[00:02:00] As a result, our adversaries are fielding weapons to deny us the benefits of space.
As the Department of the Air Force focuses on great power competition, the importance of capitalizing on and maintaining our space advantage is greatly magnified. This is precisely why The Mitchell Institute created its Space Power Advantage Center of Excellence, or MISpace, to inform the American public, Congress, and the Department of Defense about the emerging challenges and opportunities facing the Space Force and our nation.
Now heading up this effort, Mitchell Institute is very proud to have my good friend and partner, General Kevin "Chilly" Chilton, as MI Space's Explorer Chair. And by the way, it's kind of an opportune time because yesterday Explorer 3 was launched in 1958. So, it's very [00:03:00] appropriate timing today.
Now, beyond being an incredible space professional, having served as a former commander of Strategic Command and Air Force Space Command, General Chilton's also one of the people lucky enough, to have visited as well as worked in space as an astronaut, and to do that three times. So General Chilton, it's my pleasure to introduce you to the stage who will be introducing our guest speaker.
Thanks very much.
Gen Kevin "Chili" Chilton: Thank you. Well, good morning, everybody. It's a pleasure for me to kick off the forum this morning and introduce our, our first and I think most important speaker of the day. General Saltzman is a true space power pioneer. As the second Chief of Space Operations he's focused on transitioning the Space Force into a service prepared for the reality of space as a war fighting domain.
As part of this effort, a little over a year ago, General Saltzman [00:04:00] laid out his theory of success called competitive endurance. Aimed at deterring conflict and controlling escalation. Competitive endurance includes three linesof effort, denying mover advantage, avoiding operational surprise, and responsible space campaigning.
When General Saltzman put out his, this theory of success, he also challenged the Space Force and the broader national security space community to engage in a debate on how to continue refining this theory of success to make US space power as strong as possible. And that's what we're all about at the Mitchell Institute is providing a platform for debate and discussion. And a platform for education.
And s o General Saltzman, we here at Mitchell heard your challenge and areexcited to host this event today. And without further ado, sir, I want to welcomeyou to the stage and thank you for kicking off this forum today. [00:05:00]
Gen. B. Chance Saltzman: Thank you, General Chilton. It's a kind introduction. In fact, I think it's the about the third time you've introduced me in the last couple of weeks, which happens to be the same number of times that General Chilton's gone to space. And one of those is, is so much cooler and more distinguished than the other.
But I do appreciate that you went to space also.
Thanks to General Deptula as well. The Mitchell Institute, has been putting on this space superiority security forum. And with this current theme of competitive endurance, uh, it's near and dear to my heart. And so I really appreciate it, all the effort and the opportunity to have this debate and discussion. It's so critical to what we're doing.
Before I get started today, I want to draw your attention to the fact that it is International Whiskey Day [00:06:00] and I, it's a little early in the morning and I don't have anything up here, I don't think, but there is a distillery in North Carolina that is looking to age their bourbon for three years on earth followed by one year in space.
It's true. They're gonna launch the barrel enclosed in a titanium shell and then de orbit it after a year. And you can get a bottle of it for the low, low price of $75,000 per bottle. And if you've seen the 24 Budget, you know I will not be, or the Space Force will not be purchasing one. Uh, but this is not the first time whiskey's been aged in space.
Ardbeg in 2011 aged a scotch whiskey on the ISS. And while some said it tasted like throat lozenges and rubbery smoke. Others said the taste was out of this world. All right,, since we rolled out the working theory of success called competitive
[00:07:00] endurance, a little over a year ago, I'm amazed at the dialogue, the discourse from the field, from academia, from our partners and allies. And actually the genesis of the topic today, the logic of space superiority stemmed from a conversation I had with Chili at the AFA's Warfighting Symposium back in February, when we were talking about competitive endurance.
And so today I wanted to spend a little bit of time, uh, level setting this forum by introducing the logic of space superiority through our idea of domain control, which falls in line with all the other military services. And then I want to open it up to questions because I really want to hear what's on your mind.
My hope is that the discussion will be a nice tie into the three panels later today centered around each of the tenets of competitive endurance.
So to start, all measurable metrics continue to show dramatic growth in the use of space from 2008 to the end of this year. The projected number of launches worldwide is up almost 400 percent.[00:08:00]
The number of active satellites up more than 700 percent. The number of satellites launched per rockets up a whopping 2, 100 percent. And more concerningly, we see a dramatic rise in man made debris and a corresponding increase in the hazard of on orbit collisions. To punctuate that point, the number of conjunctions to the International Space Station are up over 1, 000 percent in the last four years, resulting in multiple shelter in place warnings for the astronauts.
Now, the increasing use of space is not the only driving of change here either.
Two decades ago, threats were localized, temporary, and mostly minor inconveniences. Fast forward to today, and we see an incredibly sophisticated array of threats from the traditional SATCOM and GPS jammers, to more destabilizing direct to anti satellite weapons across almost [00:09:00] every orbital regime, to on orbit grapplers, optical dazzlers, directed energy weapons, and increasingly cyber attacks, both to our ground stations and the satellites themselves.
It has become increasingly apparent over the past decade that the Russians and the PRC are coupling space based ISR, with SATNAV aided, precision guided munitions, that can receive SATCOM updated targeting. Specifically, the PRC has more than 470 ISR satellites, that are feeding a robust sensor shooter kill web, part of the fabled A2AD problem that most of us are familiar with.
This new sensor to shooter kill web creates an unacceptable risk to our forward deployed forces. This is something most of us are just not used to thinking about. Our lived experience in the Middle East was one of indirect mortars, rockets, IEDs,bnot 2, 000 kilogram [00:10:00] warheads delivered at Mach 5 by more ballistic missiles.
We've gotten a taste of what it looks like from the 2020 Iranian attack on U. S. forces at Al Asad Airfield in Iraq and more recently with the ongoing conflictsin both Gaza and Ukraine. So collectively, this rise in congestion and competition within the domain has led to a growing risk to our continued access to and operations within space.
In the face of this unacceptable risk, the Space Force was established. A military service focused on addressing the challenges and opportunities we face in the space domain. In the military sense, our task of securing the space domain is a reflection of the Space Force's charge. To prepare ourselves to control the space domain, with force if necessary, as part of the joint force while also protecting the security and prosperity our nation derives from space.
And since so many joint force operations [00:11:00] depend on space capabilities and protection from space enabled attacks, our guardians are an integral part of the joint force. Every military service, regardless of domain, must field forces capable of three core operational activities, access to their domain, control of their domain, and exploitation of their domain to ensure the security and sustainability of the domain, not just for the U. S., but all of our allies and partners. A service must be able to control its domain to be able to access and exploit it, and each service must be able to control its respective domain for the joint force to .
The Air Force must gain air superiority, control of the skies to enable friendly aircraft to operate without significant threat from enemy forces. This control allows the U. S. to conduct various operations, including close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, strategic attack, [00:12:00] with reduced risk to those assets.
The Navy uses sea control to establish dominance over specific areas of the sea, exerting influence and control over maritime activities within the region, allowing us to project power globally, protect maritime trade routes, and ensure freedom of navigation. And finally, for the U. S. Army, land dominance is a fundamental aspect of its mission and doctrine. Emphasizing the capability to conduct ground operations across a wide range of environments and scenarios to allow them to establish and maintain control over territory on land. Enabling the force to dictate the terms of engagement. Deny access to adversaries and project power within a designated area.
And for our service, space superiority is the first core function. It is the ability to contest and when necessary, control the space domain at a time and place of our choosing. We must protect our space capabilities while also being able to deny an adversary, [00:13:00] the hostile use of its space capabilities.
In the past, we were able to meet our mission just by accessing and exploiting the domain. But now the domain is more contested than ever. Control of the domain is not only an operational imperative, it is the Space Force's reason for being.
Preparing forces to achieve space superiority without the insights of historical combat experience in the space domain requires a system of assumptions, guiding principles, logical conclusions that focus all service activities on a common operational perspective.
This was the starting point of Competitive Endurance, and my reason for being here with you today. The noted military strategist, B. H. Liddel Hart, once said, "The objective in war is a better state of peace, even if only from your own point of view. Hence, it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."
Now, unlike the other domains, with some [00:14:00] exceptions, when conflict takes place in the space domain, the remnants of that action stay around for a very long time. And that is why our approach to space superiority cannot endanger the safety, security, stability, and long term viability of the space domain.
This was ultimately the genesis of competitive endurance. A theory of success that allows us to balance the need to deny the adversary's use of space while protecting our ability to use it. Only by pursuing space superiority in a disciplined way can the Space Force ensure that the U. S. and our allies and partners have the peace we desire, and more specifically, that we can all accessand exploit the space domain.
And I think on the chart, on the screens you'll see, yep, a quad chart that I like to
use. In fact, it sparked the debate that, that Chili and I had a couple months ago.
I'd like to use this to talk about the logic of space superiority and how competitive endurance and its tenants [00:15:00] help influence that logic.
At its core, it's a visual representation of blue space capabilities against red space capabilities. And the top left is where we have lived for a significant period of time. It's where we want to be, blue space superiority. And of course, it favors U. S. and our allies and partners. The bottom left is a space domain where neither blue or red can use space capabilities.
And I would argue this is a landscape that also favors the PRC in the Western Pacific. In other words, we need our space capabilities to project the power that will be effective. The top right is a space domain where both blue and red can use space capabilities the way they want. And one would also argue that thisfavors the PRC, again, because of the localities in the Western Pacific.
I'd love to talk more about this in the Q& A section. And finally, the bottomright is where red has space superiority, and of course it favors the PRC.
[00:16:00] Anything other than the top left has very high risk to the joint force and our ability to project power. So how do I increase the top left box while maintaining the domain for future usage?
Well, that's the job of the Space Force. And it's where competitive endurance comes into play.
First, we must avoid operational surprise. We cannot, as a country or a service, miscalculate the capabilities, force posture, or intentions of our potential adversaries. We must have timely and relevant indications and warnings to helpus avoid operational surprise in crisis , where appropriate, take defensive actions.
This means we need to have access to and invest in actionable space domainawareness, to prepare our combat forces, reassure allies, strengthenpartnerships, and reinforce norms of r esponsible behavior in space.
Secondly, we must deny first mover advantage. The Space Force must make a [00:17:00] first strike in space impractical and self defeating, thus discouraging potential adversaries from taking such actions.
The Space Force's resiliency efforts are to make preemptive attacks against space capabilities impractical, self defeating. This means our forces must be able to defeat, absorb, and recover from attacks. We will continue to field defensive capabilities that protect space missions from attack, and resilient capabilities that degrade gracefully if attacked.
And finally, we must be prepared to undertake responsible counter space campaigning. We must preserve our advantages without incentivizing rivals to escalate to destructive military activities in space. And should deterrence fail, space forces must be prepared to protect the nation and the joint force from space enabled attack without generating hazardous debris.
Striking this balance will require a wide range of measures to interrupt adversary targeting when necessary. [00:18:00] Our adversaries must never be desperate enough to or emboldened enough to pursue destructive combat operations in space. And these three tenets guide Space Force activities and investments that posture us to protect U.S. interests without compromising the usability of the space domain. And if we can do these three things, then it allows the Joint Force to effectively engage strategic rivals, does not compromise the safety, security, stability, long range sustainability of the domain. This is the logic of space superiority and why it is so critical to the joint force. Because if we do not have space, we lose.
Thirty-one years ago this month, General Chuck Horner testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee as the commander of Air Force Space Command said, "Tomorrow's national military strategy must fundamentally accept that potential adversaries with the capabilities to do so, will conduct [00:19:00] military hostilities beyond the terrestrial arena and into the limits of space."