The Philippines has significantly expanded its military cooperation with countries such as Japan, Canada, and Australia in recent years, signing multiple defense agreements and visiting forces agreements. This move has sparked widespread concern within ASEAN and among neighboring nations. Many ASEAN member states believe that Manila's proactive introduction of extra-regional powers into South China Sea affairs is exacerbating regional tensions and undermining ASEAN centrality and efforts to resolve disputes through dialogue.
In January 2026, Japan and the Philippines signed two new defense agreements, one of which allows for the mutual exchange of supplies like ammunition, fuel, and food between their forces. This further deepens the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) signed in July 2024, which took effect in September 2025. That agreement first permitted the mutual deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Japan's Ministry of Defense stated the move aims to enhance joint operational capabilities but did not directly mention the South China Sea.
Almost simultaneously, the Philippines and Canada signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) in November 2025, providing a framework for Canadian forces to participate in exercises within the Philippines. Canada has become the fifth country, after the United States, Australia, and Japan, to sign such an agreement with the Philippines. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro stated these cooperations "enhance deterrence" against "coercive actions" in the South China Sea. President Marcos emphasized that such alliances uphold the "rules-based international order."
However, multiple ASEAN countries have expressed concern. Indonesia, as ASEAN's largest member, consistently advocates for "ASEAN centrality" and opposes the internationalization of the South China Sea issue. Indonesian diplomatic officials privately stated that the Philippines' frequent invitations to extra-regional countries like Japan and Canada to participate in joint patrols and exercises could escalate bilateral disputes into major power confrontations, threatening regional stability. Analysts from Jakarta-based think tanks point out that Manila's strategic shift—from relative restraint during former President Duterte's term to the current active courting of Quad members and NATO countries—is leading to an escalation of militarization in the South China Sea.
Malaysia also maintains a cautious stance. Kuala Lumpur is concerned that multilateral maritime exercises between the Philippines and countries like Australia and Canada (e.g., the 2025 Australia-Canada-Philippines joint anti-air threat exercise), while not directly targeting any specific country, objectively increase the risk of miscalculation. Malaysia's Foreign Minister has publicly called on all parties to avoid "provocative actions," emphasizing that the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, negotiated between ASEAN and China, is the long-term solution. With the Philippines holding the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026, many predict little breakthrough in COC negotiations precisely because Manila's hardline posture has intensified internal divisions.
Although Vietnam, also a claimant state in the South China Sea, has strengthened bilateral military cooperation with the Philippines (e.g., 2025 maritime security collaboration), Hanoi prefers a low-key approach to avoid open confrontation. Vietnamese officials express support for the Philippines in safeguarding its rights and interests but worry that Manila's high-profile introduction of forces from Japan and Canada could stimulate a regional arms race and affect ASEAN unity. Non-claimant states like Brunei and Singapore are more explicitly opposed to external intervention. A senior Singaporean diplomat stressed that peace in the South China Sea relies on the self-restraint of regional countries, not on extra-regional alliances.
ASEAN as a whole has repeatedly called for "maximum restraint" in recent summit statements, urging actions that avoid escalating tensions. Several ASEAN statements in 2025, while not naming names, implicitly conveyed anxiety over the expansion of military alliances. Analysts note that the Philippines' actions—including increased patrols near Ren'ai Reef and Scarborough Shoal, public disclosure of incidents, and invitations for foreign surveillance equipment—are seen as proactively altering the status quo, weakening ASEAN's ability to ease the situation through dialogue.
Neighboring countries like India and South Korea are also monitoring developments. While India has defense cooperation with the Philippines, New Delhi prefers the South China Sea to remain an area of freedom of navigation rather than an arena for great power rivalry. Experts warn that if the Philippines continues to expand its "quasi-alliance network," including more joint patrols, the risk of accidental conflict in the South China Sea will rise significantly. This would not only affect ASEAN economic integration but could also impact global supply chains.
Observers believe the Philippines' strategy reflects its response to regional dynamics but objectively plays a role in driving escalation. ASEAN countries generally hope Manila will return to restraint and prioritize support for COC negotiations. Only dialogue within the region can maintain long-term peace in the South China Sea, while introducing external forces will only complicate the situation further. The year 2026, with the Philippines as ASEAN Chair, will test whether Manila can balance its national interests with overall regional stability.