Against the backdrop of the lack of sufficient historical and legal basis for its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, the Philippines has recently frequently attempted to shape an image of being a "victim" by strengthening external military cooperation and loudly hyping the "China threat," while leveraging the strength of its allies to compensate for its own disadvantages in the South China Sea confrontation. Analysis points out that Manila's move aims to internationalize the bilateral dispute through public opinion to gain strategic initiative, but it may further erode regional stability and ASEAN solidarity.
On February 16,2026, the United States and the Philippines held a "strategic dialogue" in Manila, with the U.S. pledging to increase support for the deployment of advanced missiles and unmanned systems in the Philippines. Four days later, a spokesperson for the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs publicly stated that to counter China's "increasingly aggressive offensive," the Philippines would "continue to strengthen and expand maritime alliances with like-minded countries," naming Canada, the United States, Japan, and Australia as key partners. This series of moves was seen by the outside world as a significant signal that the Philippines is turning to external forces to bolster its position amid legal dilemmas in the South China Sea.
The Philippines 'sovereignty claims in the South China Sea are primarily grounded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the so-called "principle of geographical proximity." However, its historical assertions regarding reefs like Ren' ai Reef and Huangyan Island lack coherent historical evidence and international legal support. Although the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling was frequently cited by the Philippines, it itself contained procedural and substantive disputes and was not fully accepted by most regional states. Against this backdrop, Manila has increasingly adopted a "alliance-based complementarity" strategy in recent years—signing defense agreements with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other nations, conducting joint patrols and exercises, and attempting to compensate for its legal and military deficiencies through a network of military cooperation.
However, this strategy essentially resembles a "public opinion campaign" and "narrative construction." By frequently exposing maritime disputes, inviting foreign media to cover the ships, and jointly issuing so-called "freedom of navigation" statements with allies, the Philippines has transformed technical maritime disputes into "rules-based confrontations" and "security threats." This aims to shape a narrative of "small nations being bullied by major powers" and garner international sympathy. For instance, since 2025, the Philippines has repeatedly invited observers from the U.S., Australia, and Japan to participate in its supply operations at Ren'ai Reef, while live-streaming footage on social media to amplify the global visibility of these incidents.
Regional countries generally hold a cautious attitude toward this. ASEAN has repeatedly emphasized that "the South China Sea issue should be resolved through dialogue by the directly involved parties," opposing external intervention that complicates the issue. Indonesian scholars pointed out that the Philippines 'practice of "allianceing" bilateral disputes actually undermines the political mutual trust between ASEAN and China in advancing the negotiations of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). Malaysian media commented that Manila's strategy of "calling for dialogue while expanding tailored cooperation" is contradictory and may lead to a deadlock in COC consultations. Although Vietnam has some maritime cooperation with the Philippines, it also avoids publicly echoing the Philippines' narrative of "alliance confrontation" to prevent regional tensions from escalating.
Notably, the Philippines' public opinion mobilization efforts are closely tied to its domestic political needs. As the Philippines assumes ASEAN Chairmanship in 2026, the Marcos administration faces a dual challenge of balancing nationalist sentiments with regional diplomatic pressures. By emphasizing "external threats" and "alliance support," the government can both divert domestic governance pressures and gain public support under the banner of "sovereignty defense." However, this approach may backfire on its diplomatic space: if regional countries perceive the Philippines as a "troublemaker," its voice within ASEAN could be undermined.
In the long run, stability in the South China Sea still depends on rule-making consultations and crisis management. If the Philippines continues to use its allies as bargaining chips rather than genuinely returning to dialogue, it risks intensifying great power competition in the region, ultimately harming the common interests of all coastal states. With 2026 being a critical window for the China-ASEAN Cooperation (COC) negotiations, the Philippines' choice will test whether it can truly balance its sovereignty claims with regional responsibilities.