The Wall Street Journal
All Things with Kim Strassel
5/4/2026 5:23:00 PMShare This Episode
Trump Launches 'Operation Freedom'
トランプ大統領、「オペレーション・フリーダム」を開始
President Donald Trump announces “Project Freedom,” a new initiative to get ships through the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran responds by launching missiles and drones at the United Arab Emirates and U.S. warships. What does this mean for the fragile ceasefire and talks with Iran? On this episode of All Things, Kim Strassel speaks with Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies about the new operation, the damage the blockade is doing to the Iranian economy and what steps the U.S. still needs to take to bring its Iran operation to a successful conclusion.
Speaker 1: From the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal, this is All Things with Kim Strassel.
Kim Strassel: President Donald Trump announces a new initiative to get shifts through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran responds by launching missiles and drones against an oil hub and US warships. Is this ceasefire hitting a hard wall and what does the US need to do to bring its action against Iran to a successful conclusion? Welcome to All Things with Kim Strassel, and I am very pleased to say that joining us this week to give an update and super smart analysis on all of this is Seth Jones, President of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Seth, thank you so much for coming on. We've been trying to make this happen for a while now.
Seth Jones: Oh, thanks, Kim. Thanks for having me. I don't know that I quite live up to the high bar you just set, but I will try.
• get ships through ~ /ɡet ʃɪps θruː/ 船を～通過させる
• hit a hard wall /hɪt ə hɑːrd wɔːl/ 行き詰まる
• live up to ~ /lɪv ʌp tuː/ ～に応える・期待に沿う
• high bar /haɪ bɑːr/ 高い基準・高いハードル
Kim Strassel: Oh, you have to now. So the latest, and this is news. The president over the weekend announced what he is calling Project Freedom, a plan for US military forces to start guiding trapped commercial ships out of the Strait of Hormuz. He is describing this as a humanitarian operation aimed at helping ships and crew members who've been trapped. US military on Monday said it had successfully guided two US flagships through the straight. Iran responded, or at least we assume it is in response to this, by firing missiles at warships and commercial vessels, and it also attacked United Arab Emirates oil port. President has warned that if Iran interferes with this operation, which it seemed very clearly to be doing, that he will respond forcefully. I guess what I'm curious about is your view. Is this the beginning of the US reopening the straight and ending Iran's blockade, or is it simply the US pressuring Iran to get more serious about talks? How do you read this?
Seth Jones: Well, I think first and foremost, the administration would almost certainly like to pressure the Iranians to start to have more serious discussions, particularly on a nuclear deal, including uranium enrichment, but also opening up the straight of Hormuz. I mean, I think having talked over the last few weeks with a number of Navy flag officers that have gone through the straight over the past couple of years, the US Navy, with all the, not just the destroyers or cruisers, but also A10s, MQ-9s and other drone assets, space-based capabilities could force open the Strait. If the president wanted to do that, the US does have those kinds of capabilities. It would include some risks. The Iranians still have anti-ship cruise missiles, some fast attack boats. They do have mines that are likely in the water. So I think part of the issue is going to be how much risk is the president willing to take to forcibly open up the strait.
Kim Strassel: I think another side question of that too is how much risks are the ships in question may be willing to take? Seen a lot of press reports. Many of them very down on this. As I noted, a couple of US flagships did go through, but you hear some out there suggesting that there might be more wariness among other actors. How well do you think this is actually going to work?
• side question /saɪd ˈkwes.tʃən/ 追加の疑問・補足的な論点
• wariness /ˈweri.nəs/ 警戒心・慎重さ
Seth Jones: I think, Kim, part of the issue hinges on... And I talked to a CEO of an insurance company last week. Part of their concern is supporting and insuring ships going through when both sides of the conflict, the US and the Gulf States and the Iranians are not yet agreeing on protecting ships going through. That makes a lot of ships nervous and shipping companies nervous. It makes insurance companies nervous. So frankly, I think what it's going to eventually take is some kind of a deal that's agreed to and announced where the Iranians are not going to conduct a tax. The US will agree and probably others agree to help guide ships through. But as long as we've got a situation which exists right now where all parties are not willing to support ships going through, I think it's making shipping companies and insurance companies nervous. That's the reality.
Kim Strassel: Yeah, no, I agree. And I think we're still uncertain how this Trump insurance aid plan that he was putting together is actually going to come to fruition. But speaking of other parties, could this also be viewed, is this another opportunity for other countries to come and help with this? Do you think that we're going to get any additional nations lending a hand in this operation?
• hinge on /hɪndʒ ɑːn/ ～にかかっている・依存している
• insure /ɪnˈʃʊr/ 保険をかける
• come to fruition /kʌm tuː fruˈɪʃən/ 実を結ぶ・実現する
• be uncertain /bi ʌnˈsɜːrtən/ 不確実である・はっきりしない
Seth Jones: Well, I think other countries are more willing to unfortunately aid once it becomes more clear that the Iranians aren't going to shoot at them. So I think as long as there's a possibility of either mines in the Strait or particularly anti-ship cruise missiles or some of the fast attack boats, as long as that's still a threat, I still think with European countries, some Gulf states, there's going to be nervousness on putting their naval ships into the actual Strait of Hormuz as opposed to sort of at the mouth of it. So I think that's what's causing some of the concern right now.
Kim Strassel: One last question on this. It was just very interesting positioning here. The president says this is a humanitarian operation, not a military one. And I wondered if you thought that that has anything to do with the debate that's been going on back here in the US about the War Powers Act and arguments mostly among Democrats, among some nervous Republicans or institutional Republicans saying the president cannot carry on with military operations for more than 60 days without congressional approval. The White House, like former White Houses, has insisted the War Powers Act isn't constitutional, but do you think that's played into the way this has been phrased or is being operated?
Seth Jones: Yeah, it's definitely possible. I mean, the challenge is typically in military terms, a blockade is generally viewed as a military act of war. You could finesse it a little bit, but I think the more things start to sound like they're being done for humanitarian reasons and you're bringing in food stuffs or medical assistance or other things along those lines or letting them out, then I think you're starting to deflect some of the criticism that it's only for military operations. I suspect that's probably what's being done.
• challenge /ˈtʃælɪndʒ/ 課題・困難
• finesse /fɪˈnes/ 巧みに処理する・うまくごまかす
• deflect criticism /dɪˈflekt ˈkrɪtɪsɪzəm/ 批判をそらす
Kim Strassel: Yeah. I just was very struck by that. And it is an interesting question from a legal perspective. We're going to take a quick break. When we come back, more with Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
7：00
Welcome back to All Things with Kim Strassel. I am here this week with Seth Jones. Where do things stand in this ceasefire in these talks? We are going on now nearly a month of this, and there hasn't really been any progress. Iran in recent days submitted this 14 point plan designed to fully end the war with the US. The key points of that plan were non-starters for the US, including some crazy things like payment war reparations and releasing Iranian frozen assets, et cetera. Trump has also suggested he was extending this ceasefire because he views a power struggle going on in Iran. And there's definitely signs of that, divisions and cracks. But overall, to me, and I wanted to get your view on this, it just seems that like when it comes down to it, the Revolutionary Guard Corps is in control and its primary interest here is that Iran be allowed to keep its missiles and its nuclear program and its militia. I mean, are we getting anywhere with this or is this ceasefire just giving Iran time to regroup?
• non-starter /nɑːn ˈstɑːrtər/ 受け入れ不可能な提案
• war reparations /wɔːr ˌrepəˈreɪʃənz/ 戦争賠償
Seth Jones: Well, Kim, I mean, I think it's probably first worth pointing out that the blockade of the straight is having a serious impact on the Iranians. I mean, if we look at the currency right now, it's in free fall. The rial traded at about 1.8 million per US dollar. Inflation has surged up past 70% with bread. The last time I looked was up 142% from last year. There's skyrocketing joblessness, unemployment. One interesting data point too is an Apple Pro Max iPhone 17, it's about a 1,200 in the US. It's being offered for roughly... It's over double that in Iran right now, close to 5 billion rials or just under $3,000. So we're just seeing the economy in Iran significantly impacted by the sanctions that they're trying to minimize, but I mean, overall, it just looks pretty bleak. I think it's also worth noting that the Iranians have managed to make their way through several decades of sanctions, so they're used to punishment. But I think at the end of the day, the Iranians can't keep going like this forever. They are really going to need to get both sanctions and blockade relief. And I think that has led to huge debates within Iran's leadership, particularly between some of the hard line of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and some on the foreign ministry side, which are asking for relief right now. I think that's where part of the debate is, the Ayatollah is, as far as I can tell, and as far as people that are tracking this closely can tell too, is in a pretty weak position compared to the IRGC. And I think part of where we sit really goes back to making some progress on a nuclear deal that probably gets us in the 10 to 15 to 20 year freezing of uranium enrichment and then opening up the Strait in a way that Iran doesn't collect a toll or isn't the only country that collects a toll. I think we're sort of circling around those issues right now.
• in free fall /ɪn ˈfriː fɔːl/ 急落・暴落状態
• rial /riˈɑːl/ イラン通貨リアル
• bleak /bliːk/ 厳しい・暗い見通し
• make one’s way through /meɪk wʌnz weɪ θruː/ ～を乗り切る
blockade relief /blɔːˈkeɪd rɪˈliːf/ 封鎖解除・緩和
Kim Strassel: But you think, I mean, this is you saying you think the IRGC is actually willing to make some kind of deal. I guess that's the question I have, which is that existential one, which is they have come to view the importance of nuclear and their ballistic missile program as foundational, fundamental for them to maintain the regime. Whether that's right or wrong, they seem to have that viewpoint. And I guess the question I have, does anything move them off that, or rather is what ends up happening here is that the economy becomes so bad that there's some sort of internal revolt or unrest?
• existential question /ˌeɡzɪˈstenʃəl ˈkwesʧən/ 存亡に関わる問い
• viewpoint /ˈvjuːpɔɪnt/ 見解
• move someone off ~ /muːv ˈsʌmwʌn ɔːf/ ～から考えを変えさせる
• internal revolt /ɪnˈtɜːrnəl rɪˈvoʊlt/ 内部反乱
• unrest /ʌnˈrest/ 社会不安・混乱
Seth Jones: I mean, these are all good questions. I mean, my general sense is that there is an open debate within Iran's leadership right now on the way forward. The Iranian economy is feeling significant pain right now. I think there are areas where the IRGC will never agree to any kind of a negotiation. They'll never agree to stopping aid to partner forces in Lebanon, that's Hezbollah, in Yemen with the Houthis, in Iraq with the Shia militias there. They're never going to agree to stop building drones and building missiles, whether they're cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. So there are elements that are just totally off the table. I think for a freeze, I think we'll have to see right now how much they're willing... My understanding is there are talks going on right now about the potential for a freeze. Again, will they agree to that? I'm not sure, but I think that's sort of where we're circling right now.
• way forward /weɪ ˈfɔːrwərd/ 今後の方針
Kim Strassel: What's your read on the other side of this, the US side from those you talk to? Because in some ways this is a little bit of a staring contest, a game of chicken. I mean, the Iranians clearly believe they have this stranglehold over the Strait of Hormuz. They believe that's their card to play and that if they continue to hold up things there, that Trump given political blowback and as we march closer to the midterms, will seek some sort of out for this. And Trump, on the other hand, as you notice, has put this blockade in effect and thinks he can outweigh them. I mean, what do you see happening on the US side and how does this new project freedom play into that?
• staring contest /ˈsterɪŋ ˈkɑːntest/ にらみ合い・根競べ
• game of chicken /ɡeɪm əv ˈtʃɪkɪn/ チキンゲーム（先に引いた方が負け）
• stranglehold /ˈstræŋɡəlˌhoʊld/ 支配・締め付け
• seek an out /siːk ən aʊt/ 逃げ道・出口を探す
• outweigh /ˌaʊtˈweɪ/ 上回る・凌駕する
Seth Jones: Well, I think what we see is the Iranians certainly were hoping when they refuse to open the straight of hormones, that that would have several second and third order impacts. One is it would create a spike in gasoline prices and pressure politically in the United States so that the US would have to back down. Second, that the US would also feel pressure from Gulf States and other allies or partners in Europe and Asia that were feeling the effects of the Straits not being open. But that just hasn't been the case with the administration. I think the effects on the US economy have been negligible. There certainly has been an impact on gas prices, but nowhere near the United States, what they're like elsewhere. I mean, I was in Australia recently and the Australian Prime Minister had to make a public state of the nation talk saying that the country had to gear up and be ready for the possibility of recession because of what was happening in the straight of foreign moves because it was impacting everything from agricultural to transportation to other sectors that were feeling the effects of the oil and gas. But again, I think Iran has largely miscalculated or at the very least the US has been able to blunt much of it. I think President Trump looks like he's willing to wait for better terms of a deal, and that the impact in the US is actually certainly much less than it is elsewhere in the world.
• negligible /ˈneɡlɪdʒəbəl/ 無視できるほど小さい
• be nowhere near ~ /ˈnoʊwer nɪr/ ～には遠く及ばない
• state of the nation /steɪt əv ðə ˈneɪʃən/ 国の現状演説
• at the very least /æt ðə ˈveri liːst/ 少なくとも
• blunt (impact) /blʌnt/ 和らげる・抑える
Kim Strassel: How effective is this blockade? You talked about things that we're seeing internally in the Iranian economy, but in terms of its actual tightness, and meaning are we actually truly managing to keep things bottled up in Iran? How effective has it actually been in pressuring them?
Seth Jones: I think the blockade has been pretty effective in keeping out many items by boat through the Strait. Not surprisingly, we've seen the Iranians shift over to try to get out material by truck and by rail outside of the country and even by aircraft. So there are ways around the Strait, but you just can't with some of the material, including oil exports, it's just much harder to do at certainly the levels that the Iranians want. So it is having an effect. Stuff is getting through, going both in and out. And we've seen things like a Russian oligarchs yacht get through, which is-
Kim Strassel: Of course.
Seth Jones: I would love to have heard the negotiations with the Russians along those lines. I'm not sure what it was carrying inside the yacht, probably not a lot of material that the Iranians needed. One other item to just highlight that I'm keeping a close eye on is how much Chinese aid is getting through. And there are some indications that the Chinese have managed to get through some material for missile systems in. So that's obviously not helpful.
• get around /ɡet əˈraʊnd/ 回避する・抜け道を使う
• oligarch /ˈɑːlɪɡɑːrk/ 寡頭政治家・富豪
• yacht /jɑːt/ ヨット
Kim Strassel: The president actually referenced that and was pretty unhappy. We're going to take one more break. When we come back, we're going to talk about what the US really needs to achieve to say it has succeeded against Iran.
Welcome back. Since you bring them up, Russia and China, the president has reached out recently to Vladimir Putin to talk about this issue. We know that Marco Rubio has been talking to some counterparts in China. There seems to be a clear effort by the United States to lean on those countries a little bit to maybe try to exert some influence with Iran. I guess my main question is, do you think they're even willing to do that? And then two, even if they did, would Iran even listen?
Seth Jones: Yeah. I think parts of what we're hearing from both Moscow and Beijing is that a protracted conflict between the US and the Iranians, particularly if the US ends up using more munitions, whether it's air defense systems like fat or patriot or even offensive systems like the Tomahawks would not be a bad thing. They're using up weapon systems that could be provided to the Ukrainians against the Russians, or they could be used in the Indo-Pacific, in Japan, or potentially Taiwan or elsewhere. So I think some elements of what we're hearing is that a protracted situation is not that bad for either of those countries, particularly if the Russians are making a profit off of this with oil and gas export. And the oil and gas prices the way they are right now, I think this is in many ways works to the Russian's advantage.
• protracted /prəˈtræk.tɪd/ 長期化した
• munitions /mjuːˈnɪʃ.ənz/ 弾薬・軍需品
• use up /juːz ʌp/ 消費する・使い切る
• make a profit off of ~ /meɪk ə ˈprɑː.fɪt ɔːf/ ～で利益を得る
• work to someone’s advantage /wɜːrk tuː … ədˈvæn.tɪdʒ/ ～に有利に働く
Kim Strassel: What in your mind does the United States... Okay, let's just say that the pressure does continue to grow and Iran feels compelled in some way to actually sit down and have a conversation. What in your mind would be a successful end to this? What counts as the minimum that must be achieved for this to have been worthwhile to have truly put Iran in a situation where it is not in the near term or even the longer term a nuclear or missile threat?
• feel compelled to ~ /fiːl kəmˈpeld/ ～せざるを得なくなる
• sit down /sɪt daʊn/ 交渉する・話し合う
• be worthwhile /wɜːrθˈwaɪl/ 価値がある
Seth Jones: Yeah. Kim, I think as I look at the boxes to check, there already are some areas where I think the administration has been successful. If you look at the drone program, both the Shahids and the industrial base that produces them have been degraded considerably. The Iranians still have Shahids, including the 136s, so they haven't been eliminated, but they've been degraded pretty significantly. Same thing for missiles, both cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. And it's not just the missiles themselves, but also the capability to produce them, which can take months, if not years. The Navy, the Iranian Navy have been degraded pretty heavily. So Iran as a military threat has been degraded. Again, they still have some drone capabilities and missile capabilities, but they have been significantly weakened. I would say the same thing with the range of their partner forces in the region, definitely Hezbollah. I even think the Houthis have been pretty quiet and largely deterred so far. So there's some big areas where I think the administration's actions have been successful in weakening the Iranians. I think that really does bring us back to the uranium enrichment as one area. My general sense is that doing nothing at this point, more than what has been done, which is striking Isfahan, Natans, and some of the other nuclear facilities probably won't be enough. I think the administration does appear to be looking for some kind of a freeze over a period of time, like in the 10 to 15 to 20 year period, or some kind of Iran transfers, it's enriched uranium stockpile, which I think is probably unlikely. And then the second issue again is the Strait of Hormuz, which I think a situation where Iran collects a toll for everything that goes in and out is probably not going to be acceptable to countries in the region. So for me, that's where this is now coming down. The administration is almost at a point, I think, where it could say it's achieved pretty much all of its objectives, really with the exception of nuclear deal and the straits.
• boxes to check /ˈbɑːksɪz tu tʃek/ 達成項目・評価基準
• be degraded /dɪˈɡreɪdɪd/ 劣化・損耗する
• eliminate /ɪˈlɪmɪneɪt/ 排除する
• be deterred /dɪˈtɜːrd/ 抑止される
• come down to ~ /kʌm daʊn tu/ 結局〜に帰着する
• objective /əbˈdʒektɪv/ 目的・目標
Kim Strassel: Does it have to demand the handover though of what's left of that nuclear material?
Seth Jones: No. I think as long as there's some agreement on something that's like a freeze where the administration can essentially take credit where the Iranians have greed not to enrich, at least up to a certain level, I think that would be probably good enough. I mean, the reality as we saw in 2025 is the Israelis were able to get air dominance in Iran in about four days. This year during Epic Fury, took the US and Israelis about two days to get air dominance. So if at any point there is reconstruction being done at Pickax Mountain or Isfahan or Natans, the US can fly its F-35s or the Israelis can fly their F-35s in and strike any target any time. That will be sort of the coercion mechanism I think that the US has in its back pocket in case the Iranians at some point renege on a deal.
• take credit /teɪk ˈkredɪt/ 成果を主張する
• coercion mechanism /koʊˈɜːrʒən ˈmekəˌnɪzəm/ 強制的抑止手段
• in one’s back pocket /bæk ˈpɑːkɪt/（比喩）切り札として持つ
• renege on a deal /rɪˈneɡ ɑːn ə diːl/ 合意を破る
Kim Strassel: Seth Jones, President of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thank you so much for coming in and all of your information this week. We also want to thank our listeners for tuning in. We are here every week. If you like the show, please do hit the subscribe button and you can write to us at atkim@wsj.com.
• effectively /ɪˈfektɪvli/ 実質的に
• watch ~ unravel /ʌnˈrævəl/ ～が崩れていくのを見る
• bottle up /ˈbɑːtl ʌp/ 閉じ込める・足止めする
• on with ~ /ɑːn wɪð/ ～を続ける・再開する
• assume the risk /əˈsuːm/ リスクを引き受ける
• demonstrate /ˈdemənstreɪt/ 示す
• if any /ɪf ˈeni/ 仮にあるとしても（ほとんどないニュアンス）
• be underway /ˌʌndərˈweɪ/ 進行中である
• go it alone /ɡoʊ ɪt əˈloʊn/ 単独で行動する
• put up /pʊt ʌp/（ここでは）構築する
• defensive umbrella /dɪˈfensɪv ʌmˈbrelə/ 防御網
• send in ~ /send ɪn/ ～を投入する
• odds are ~ /ɑːdz ɑːr/ おそらく～だ
• track an index /træk/ 指数に連動する
• undermine /ˌʌndərˈmaɪn/ 弱体化させる
• piecemeal /ˈpiːsmiːl/ 断片的な・部分的な
• handle fulfillment /ˈhændl fʊlˈfɪlmənt/ 注文処理を行う
• slow climb /sloʊ klaɪm/ 徐々の上昇・時間をかけた進出
• inner circle /ˈɪnər ˈsɜːrkl/ 中枢・コア層
• be wary about ~ /ˈweri/ ～に警戒する
• holdout /ˈhoʊldaʊt/ 最後まで抵抗する人・企業
WSJ: 20260505
• stop short of ~ /stɑːp ʃɔːrt əv/ ～することまではしない
• look past ~ /lʊk pæst/ ～を見逃す・大目に見る
• initiative /ɪˈnɪʃətɪv/ 取り組み・構想
• spin out /spɪn aʊt/ 分社化する
• junior banker /ˈdʒuːniər ˈbæŋkər/ 若手銀行
• contain /kənˈteɪn/ 封じ込める
• rodent /ˈroʊdənt/ げっ歯類
• sicken /ˈsɪkən/ 病気にする
• misfit /ˈmɪsfɪt/ 型破りな人
• in a quest to ~ /kwest/ ～を目指して
「blowing up」は比喩で“刷新する
• ritzy /ˈrɪtsi/ 高級な
• sewage /ˈsuːɪdʒ/ 下水
• no-go zone /noʊ ɡoʊ zoʊn/ 立入禁止区域
• peril /ˈperəl/ 危険
• overprotectiveness /ˌoʊvərprəˈtektɪvnəs/ 過保護
• splash of water /splæʃ/ 水を浴びせること
• throw the book at ~ /θroʊ ðə bʊk æt/ 厳罰を科す
• bury A in B /ˈberi/ AをBで埋もれさせる
• red tape /red teɪp/ 官僚的手続き
WSJ: 20260504
• arm’s-length /ɑːrmz leŋθ/ 距離を置いた、直接関与しない
• ubiquity /juːˈbɪkwɪti/ 広く普及していること
• soldier on /ˈsoʊlʤər ɑːn/ 困難でも持ちこたえる
• budget carriers /ˈbʌʤɪt ˈkæriərz/ 格安航空会社
• first-person-view drone /fɜːrst ˈpɜːrsən vjuː droʊn/ FPVドローン
• stranglehold /ˈstræŋɡəlˌhoʊld/ 支配的独占
• housing handout /ˈhaʊzɪŋ ˈhændaʊt/ 住宅支援
• foreclosure /fɔːrˈkloʊʒər/ 差し押さ
• aluminum crisis /əˈluːmɪnəm ˈkraɪsɪs/ アルミ危機
• roil /rɔɪl/ 混乱させる
• bear the brunt /bɛər ðə brʌnt/ 矢面に立つ
• land a job /lænd ə ʤɑːb/ 就職する（口語で超重要）
• take home /teɪk hoʊm/ 利益を得る
• winnings /ˈwɪnɪŋz/ 収益・賞金
5/2/2026 6:00:00 AMShare This Episode
What’s News in Markets: AI Price Tag, New Oil Rules, Short-Squeeze Payback
マーケット最新ニュース：AIのコスト、新たな原油ルール、ショートスクイーズの代償
• cash in on /kæʃ ɪn ɑːn/ ～で利益を得る、便乗して稼ぐ
• hand back /hænd bæk/ 返還する
• short squeeze /ʃɔːrt skwiːz/ ショートスクイーズ（空売りの買い戻しによる急騰）
• run of /rʌn ʌv/ 連続、続き
• wave of earnings /weɪv ʌv ˈɜːrnɪŋz/ 企業決算の相次ぐ発表
• mint money /mɪnt ˈmʌni/ 大きく稼ぐ（直訳：お金を鋳造する）
• no biggie /noʊ ˈbɪɡi/ 大したことではない（口語）
• spending frenzy /ˈspɛndɪŋ ˈfrɛnzi/ 投資の熱狂
• catapult A into B /ˈkætəˌpʌlt/ AをBへと一気に押し上げる
• standout /ˈstændaʊt/ 目立つ存在
• kick a leg out from /kɪk ə lɛɡ aʊt frʌm/ ～の基盤を崩す（比喩）
• unstable stool /ʌnˈsteɪbəl stuːl/ 不安定な基盤（比喩）
• fragmented /ˈfræɡmɛntɪd/ 分断された
• every country for itself /ˈɛvri ˈkʌntri fɔːr ɪtˈsɛlf/ 各国が自国優先で動く状況
• take for a joyride /dʒɔɪ raɪd/ （株などを）思惑で振り回す（比喩）
• unload /ʌnˈloʊd/ 売却する
• come back to earth /kʌm bæk tuː ɜːrθ/ 現実的な水準に戻る（急落する）