この資料の英訳です。
An
Overview of the Multitude of Problems with the New National Stadium Project*
By
Takashi Moriyama, architectural economist
1.
The Problem of the Competition
Since
only the recipients of internationally renowned awards were allowed to apply
for the design competition of the new National Stadium, a very limited number
of architects could meet this condition. The Architectural Institute of Japan
(AIJ) Prize was not included in the “internationally renowned awards,” so it seems
that the judging committee intentionally excluded Japanese architects. In
addition, applicants had just two months to complete their proposals after submitting
an application to participate. Within this limited time, it was impossible for
them to fully examine and understand the site. Since very little information
about the cultural and historical context of the site was provided, it was
difficult for applicants, especially foreign architects, to consider the unique
character of the district. Additionally, several famous foreign architects on the
judging committee never visited Japan to participate in the official discussions
that decided the winner. Therefore, it is impossible to say that the judging
committee held exhaustive discussions. The minutes of the meetings of the
judging committee and the advisory council have not yet been disclosed, so we
cannot know how and why they chose Zaha Hadid’s design for the new National
Stadium. Tadao Ando, chairman of the judging committee, has continued to decline
comment. The other members of the committee have also remained unaccountable.
2.
The Problem of Scale
The
scale of Hadid’s design is unreasonably massive in scale. The existing bowl-shaped
stadium includes a stand of seats added for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, which
means that it is already much bigger than the original scale. The stadium’s
walls, however, do not exceed 30 meters high, and the tallest floodlight is 54
meters high. The Hadid design for the new stadium more than doubles the height,
at 70 meters high. According to the site plan, it will be far bigger than the
existing stadium and subsume the land currently occupied by the Nihon Seinenkan
Building and Meiji Park. Since there is insufficient right of way between the
new stadium building and the streets around the site, the monstrous walls of
the new stadium will loom over the streets. The new stadium will cause irreparable
damage to the environment and skylines of the verdant, open spaces that
currently exist around the stadium.
3.
The Problem of the Landscape
The
new stadium will destroy the landscape of the Meiji Jingu Gaien (Outer) Park,
which represents the historical continuity and cultural value of modern Japan.
The park was founded by citizens to commemorate Emperor Meiji and Empress
Shoken after their deaths. The stadium site is next to the center of the park,
where the Shotoku Memorial Museum stands. Along with the Naien (Inner) Park,
the Outer Park has been a cherished green space for Tokyoites for over 100
years. During the past century, innumerable citizens have donated money and
offered voluntary services to construct and maintain the Shotoku Memorial
Museum, the gingko tree-lined street in front of it and the forest surrounding
it. The park can be regarded as a traditional “Chinju-no-mori,” a grove where a
god for the local people resides. This is why the park was designated by the
city of Tokyo as a historic area for landscape preservation in which the height
of buildings has been restricted. Last year, however, the designation was
lifted for the sake of constructing the new stadium.
4. The
Problem of the Architectural Design
There
are a multitude of problems to overcome before constructing the new stadium,
including drafting the master plan drawing, basic design documents and construction
documents as well as estimating construction costs, to name a few. Because the master
plan drawing was far from detailed, the process of drafting the basic design
documents has fallen behind schedule. Since it has been found that the roof
design of the new stadium will not be able to support the weight of snow in
winter, the designers (Nikken Sekkei, Nihon Sekkei, Azusa Sekkei and ARUP Japan)
are still drafting the basic design documents, which should have been released
by the end of March 2014. The delay in delivery of the basic design documents is
caused by the scale of the stadium’s framework, which is equivalent to a huge cantilever
bridge. The scale is enormous – as huge as Minato Ohashi Bridge in Osaka. It is
extremely challenging for the designers to create a basic structural design that
will provide sufficient structural strength to support the stadium.
5. The
Problem of Construction
Because
the basic design has not yet been completed, it is impossible to precisely calculate
the construction costs. The competition did not require consistency in terms of
structural engineering, so what we have now is just a design sketch with
3-dimentional CG imaging. This is quite unusual. Since the sketch does not describe
the structural methods, materials or construction methods at all, it is
impossible to estimate construction costs. In addition, since there is insufficient
space at the site for construction crews to store materials or assemble
structural parts during construction, the streets around the site will have to be
shut to all traffic for a certain period. Moreover, since Japan’s construction
industry has suffered from a serious shortage of workers, craftsmen and
materials due to rebuilding in the Tohoku region, construction costs will soar far
higher than planned.
6. The
Problem of Management
It is
said that one of the reasons for constructing the new stadium is that the IOC
requires the accommodation of 80,000 people at the opening ceremony of the 2020
Tokyo Olympic Games. However, the IOC does not require this as an absolute
condition for holding the Games. Rather, the IOC advocates a compact Olympic
Games. In fact, the new stadium design is functionally ineffectual as a sports
facility. Despite its huge scale, it does not include a warm-up track, which is
essential for holding international track and field events. This is a critical
flaw. In addition, although the authorities expect that revenues from renting
the stadium for concerts and events after the Olympic Games will cover the
running costs, it will become increasingly difficult to hold any event that attracts
80,000 people in Japan, a country whose population is rapidly shrinking.
7. The
Problem of Construction Costs
When the competition committee solicited designs from architects for the new stadium, the construction costs were estimated at 130 billion yen. However, the costs for the selected design have been estimated at 300 billion yen. Although the authorities announced that costs had been reduced to 170 billion yen by cutting 20% of the scale of the facility, this figure is not creditable, since no detailed design plan has been disclosed. Along with the construction of the new the Japan Sports Council (JSC) headquarters building, the total budget has soared to 197 billion yen. As for running costs, the estimated expenditure is 4.6 billion yen per year, while the estimated revenues are 5.04 billion yen. The breakdown of revenues includes 1.21 billion yen from renting the stadium for entertainment events and 0.52 billion yen for conventions. However, no one knows if the estimate will prove to be accurate. In addition, the problem of designing a retractable roof, which is necessary for holding entertainment events, has not been resolved. Annual revenues of 5.04 billion yen are only 2.6% of the investment of 197 billion yen; annual profits of 0.44 billion yen are just 0.2 %. If revenues from entertainment events fall to one-half, the stadium will see huge losses of 0.2 billion yen every year after 2020.
*
This handout was made for the symposium held on May 12, 2014
J.K & K.S さん、ありがとうございました。