North Korea deserves applause: it has helped to accomplish in 10 days what US officials had failed to accomplish in almost four years of diplomacy: a unanimous United Nations Security Council resolution that not only condemns its missile launches this month and demands that Pyongyang "suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programs", but that also deplores North Korea's nuclear-weapons aspirations.
Much has been made in media coverage of UNSC 1695 about the fact that it does not cite Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which makes measures enforceable by armed action, if necessary).
But this was no watered-down resolution. If one compares the initial "hardline" Japanese draft with the considerably toned-down initial Chinese/Russian proposal for a "presidential statement", the final product is no middle-ground compromise; it is surprisingly tough and comprehensive.
While we may never know the details of the Chinese diplomatic mission to North Korea that preceded the resolution's passage, one could safely guess that Pyongyang was as defiant and disagreeable in private as it has been in public about its sovereign right to conduct "military exercises for self-defense".
The 15 Security Council members clearly thought otherwise. In addition to demanding an end to all ballistic-missile activities, the resolution "requires" all member states to prevent missile-related goods and technology from being transferred to North Korea and also "requires" all member states to "prevent the procurement" of such goods from that country, while banning the "transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK's [North Korea's] missile or WMD [weapons of mass destruction] program".
While the terms "embargo" or "sanctions" are not used, the intent is crystal-clear: no sales of missiles or missile-related technology to North Korea and no purchases of such weapons from them as well.
While the missile launches provided the catalyst for Resolution 1695, its reach is more comprehensive. It specifically addresses North Korea's nuclear-weapons ambitions, "deploring ... its stated pursuit of nuclear weapons in spite of its Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] and International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguard obligations". It also reaffirms the May 2004 UNSC Resolution 1540, which obligates all member states, under Chapter VII, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.
The resolution also expresses the Security Council's "grave concern about DPRK's indication of possible additional launches" and "underlines, in particular to the DPRK, the need to show restraint and refrain from any action that would aggravate tension". For its part, Pyongyang "strongly denounces and fully condemns the UNSC resolution", calling the action "completely unreasonable and brigandish behavior". An official Foreign Ministry statement says North Korea "will not be bound to [UNSC 1695] in the least".
It remains to be seen whether Pyongyang will make good on its threat to conduct more tests or if this surprising display of unity and resolve by the Security Council will have a sobering effect on the Hermit Kingdom. For its part, the resolution notes that the council "decides to remain seized of the matter", suggesting that even stronger action could be forthcoming in the face of future acts of provocation by North Korea.
For the moment at least, the Security Council appears willing to take a firm, unified stand on a serious proliferation issue, sending a message not only to Pyongyang but perhaps to Tehran as well.
The resolution also calls for the resumption of the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue and "strongly urges" Pyongyang to return to the talks "without preconditions". There has been talk in diplomatic circles about the convening of an "informal" session of the talks to address the latest crisis, with the understanding that North Korea's much sought-after direct discussions with the United States could take place along the sidelines of such a meeting.
If China and the other members of the six-party process, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the US as well as North Korea, are serious about using this incident to kick-start the broader denuclearization process, then Beijing should set a date for an informal six-party session and the others should commit to coming, regardless of whether Pyongyang agrees to attend. It would then be up to North Korea to decide whether it wants to participate in the solution or simply remain the problem.
Ralph A Cossa (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com) is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS.
