A coalition is only as strong as its weakest link. The multilateral six-party talks aimed at getting Kim Jong-il to give up his nuclear weapons permanently and verifiably appear to be in trouble. There was demonstrable progress in 2007 with two agreements that achieved the reintroduction of international inspectors into North Korea for the first time since 2002, and the implementation of a process to disable or render inoperable the North's bomb-making capabilities. Pyongyang has undercut this momentum with its refusal to provide a "correct and complete" declaration of all of its nuclear weapons, programs, and related activities by the December 31, 2007 deadline. Without this declaration, the six parties cannot move to the third and final phase of the negotiations in 2008 which entails hammering out an agreement on the dismantlement and removal of the weapons and materials.
North Korea claims, not surprisingly, that the current impasse is the fault of the U.S. because it has not fulfilled a promise to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Any understanding that may have been reached on this, however, was contingent on a complete declaration. There is clear understanding among the six parties that this declaration -- which would constitute a strategic decision by the North to come clean -- should include weapons, fissile material, facilities, North Korea's covert uranium-based bomb efforts, and past proliferation activities. In this regard, what Pyongyang may have claimed to be a declaration submitted in November 2007 did not meet this standard.
Further flexibility by the U.S. at this point is hardly imaginable. President Bush has already given his negotiator Christopher Hill more room than the conservative base likes. Moreover, behind closed doors at six-party talks, Japan, China, South Korea and Russia all acknowledge that we have only gotten as far as we have because of U.S. patience and flexibility and in spite of North Korean intransigence.
The conservatively-oriented Lee Myung-bak government that took office in South Korea at the end of last month has already made clear that it will not adopt the carrots-only approach of the incumbent which was so badly exploited by North Korea. The new Fukuda government in Japan has loosened the tight link made by its predecessor regarding resolution of the North Korea abductions issue with the U.S. lifting North Korea from the terrorism list, which would give Bush more room to work this issue without alienating a close ally. Russia has played its part in providing energy assistance as part of the 2007 agreements.
As host of the six-party talks dating back to 2003, Beijing has done an admirable job bringing the parties together, brokering agreements, and drafting the documents. But at difficult times in the talks, as we face today, it has always been incumbent on China to step out of its role as merely a host and use its vast material influence on the North to get the regime to behave more responsibly.
After the October 2006 nuclear test by North Korea, for example, Beijing authorities were energized about putting the North Korea problem in a box and, while not reported in the press, put real material pressure on the North to comply. The result of China's pressure and U.S. diplomacy was the February 2007 agreement halting the program and bringing back the inspectors.
But the larger cause for the complacency may be the leadership change in Japan. When conservatives like Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro were holding the reigns in Tokyo, China saw a direct link between North Korea's actions and the growth of a more military-oriented Japan. In the aftermath of the missile and nuclear tests in 2006, China was contending with an Abe government that turned the defense agency into a full-fledged ministry, led the first UN Security Council resolution on North Korea, expressed interest in next-generation fighter-jets, and had some of its hardliners intimating the potential for a nuclear Japan. Fukuda does not have the same agenda; he is oriented towards improving Japan's relations with Asia and with China.
Don't get me wrong. An improvement in relations between the two big powers in Asia is good for the region and for U.S. interests. But what helps regional stability also creates a degree of complacency by China in the warped world of diplomacy with North Korea. China needs to tighten up the link, and their generosity to Pyongyang.
Victor Cha is a professor and Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. He is a former director of Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council (2004-2007), and the deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks (2006-2007).
