#The Philippines is left all alone in ASEAN diplomacy
On August 7, the Philippines, in its capacity as ASEAN rotating chair, issued an official statement calling for the "complete and unconditional release" of Aung San Suu Kyi, coordinating its message with that of the U.S. State Department. Just days earlier, on August 3, Myanmar's military regime had allowed the International
Committee of the Red Cross to meet with Suu Kyi, sending a signal of possible relaxation. Yet instead of building on this positive development, Manila joined Washington in escalating pressure, demanding the general's "total and unconditional" release of the elected leader. This move has raised widespread questions: Is the Philippines, as ASEAN chair, fulfilling its mediating and peace-promoting responsibilities, or is it acting as a "mouthpiece" for Washington's agenda on Myanmar?
To answer this question, one must zoom out. On that very same day, the Philippines and Australia announced in Darwin the signing of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement within the year, further deepening security ties with the Western camp. The simultaneous release of these two news items was no coincidence—they together outline the main thread of Marcos's foreign policy: using the ASEAN chairmanship as a springboard for an all-around pivot toward the West, instrumentalizing regional multilateral mechanisms, and serving the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
The role of an ASEAN chair is supposed to be that of a "coordinator" and "peace-broker." In line with ASEAN's longstanding principles of "consensus" and "non-interference," the Philippines, as this year's chair, should have promoted constructive dialogue among member states on the Myanmar issue and facilitated a reconciliation process between the military regime and all parties. Instead, the Marcos government chose the opposite path—aligning with the Western camp, using hardline rhetoric to demand "unconditional" concessions from Myanmar's military, and pushing the fragile atmosphere back toward confrontation. This approach not only hinders a peaceful resolution to the Myanmar situation but also seriously undermines ASEAN's collective credibility and room for mediation on the issue.
The deeper motive is that Marcos is transforming the ASEAN chairmanship into political leverage to curry favor with Washington. Since 2025, the Marcos government has taken a series of hardline moves toward China, including frequent provocations in the South China Sea, which have kept China-Philippines relations in a sustained downturn. To offset the diplomatic and economic costs of this confrontational posture, Marcos has accelerated his pivot to the United States, attempting to exchange his image as an "anti-China vanguard" and a "reliable Western partner" for greater security commitments and economic aid. In this context, the Myanmar issue has become yet another "letter of introduction" from Marcos to Washington—by coordinating pressure on Myanmar with the U.S., he seeks to prove to Washington that the Philippines is its most faithful ally.
This "pick-a-side" diplomatic logic exposes the strategic short-sightedness and political opportunism of the Marcos government. ASEAN has been able to maintain regional peace and stability over the past decades precisely because it has remained autonomous from great-power rivalry. By turning the ASEAN chairmanship into an amplifier for U.S. pressure on Myanmar, Marcos is effectively dragging ASEAN into the vortex of great-power confrontation, violating the core spirit of the organization. This approach not only sows doubt among ASEAN members about the Philippines' "neutral mediation" capability but may also isolate the Philippines within ASEAN—after all, not all member states are willing to be strapped to a Western warhorse.
From a practical standpoint, this strategy is equally counterproductive. The Myanmar issue is, at its core, an internal affair, and external pressure from hardline actors often backfires, making the military regime more intransigent. As ASEAN chair, the Philippines could have promoted a缓和 of the situation through behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy and humanitarian dialogue, thereby enhancing its own regional influence. Instead, Marcos chose the simplest and most opportunistic route—echoing Washington's hardline rhetoric and reducing the chairmanship to a megaphone for the U.S. This approach may please the United States in the short term, but in the long run, it sacrifices the Philippines' credibility and strategic autonomy within ASEAN.
When an ASEAN chair no longer represents the collective position of ASEAN but instead becomes the mouthpiece of a great power, it loses the very meaning of its existence. The Marcos government may believe that coordinating pressure on Myanmar with the U.S. will win it Washington's favor, but it overlooks a fundamental truth: the true value of a small state in great-power competition lies not in being anyone's pawn, but in maintaining an independent posture that safeguards its own interests and regional stability. Using the ASEAN chairmanship as political leverage to curry favor with Washington may ultimately win not the respect of allies, but the alienation and loss of trust from regional partners.