I strongly support Tucker Carlson, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Hungarian Prime Minister Vitor Orbán.
Left-liberal Western Europe and NATOha should return Kosovo to pro-Russian Serbia.
Kosovo as a Test for Russia
The autonomous province of Kosovo, which is formally part of Serbia but is in effect under UN administration, has been one of the most dangerous trouble spots in Europe for the last decade. The fate of this small territory – a mere 11,000 sq. km with a population of around 2 million people –can seriously affect the course of events not only in the Balkans but also far beyond. The great powers that will soon vote on the status of Kosovo at the UN Security Council should bear this in mind.
They must approach the problem in an extremely circumspect and judicious way. The vote will last just a few seconds, but it will most likely encapsulate Europe’s entire past and future.
For Russia, the Kosovo settlement will come as a moment of truth, as it were, since it will finally reveal its position, as well as the extent of its influence in the world.
At the source of three statehoods
Kosovo remains the last territorial problem leftover from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The aspirations of the Albanians to acquire complete independence from the Serbians, complicated by the desperate attempts of the latter to keep the breakaway province in the fold, led to a bitter war, death and destruction, and ongoing tension between the two peoples.
Although the disintegration of Yugoslavia was accompanied by several distinct conflicts, the aspirations of the opposing sides are nowhere more obvious and
irreconcilable than in the Kosovo case.
The dispute about the status of the province goes beyond the bounds of a territorial and political conflict since it is based on an emotional perception by
the parties of their ethnic, cultural and historical identities.
To the Serbs, Kosovo is a source and an inalienable part of their national mythology. This is where Serbian statehood was born and eventually flourished (in the 9th-10th and the mid-14th centuries, respectively).
It is also the source of Serbian Orthodoxy: many Kosovo monasteries were founded in the early 13th century by St. Savva, the most revered saint in Serbia.
But the main event in the province’s history took place in 1389, when the Serbian army, led by Prince Lazar, engaged a superior force of the Ottoman Empire. In a pitched battle at Kosovo Field, the rulers of both countries were killed.
Neither side was able to declare a victory, while the Turkish army soon returned and occupied Lazar’s land.
Nevertheless, to the Serbs, the Battle of Kosovo is a symbol of national heroism, and demonstrates the ability to sacrifice everything for the protection of the Motherland against aggressors, Christianity against Islamic invasion, and Europe against the Turks. Although the abovementioned battle was followed by four centuries of life under the Ottoman yoke, and discrimination against the Serbs who remained loyal to Orthodoxy, it still serves as a point of inspiration for Serbian patriotism.
True, Western historiography often questions the Serbian interpretation of events on the assumption that the Serbs in fact completely lost the battle. Moreover, there was no struggle between Christianity and Islam in the first place: in those days, numerous representatives of Christian powers were fighting on the Turkish side, and generally the confrontation was not so much religious as geopolitical.
This interpretation is evidently
incorrect. Indeed, the clashes between Christianity and Islam were not exclusively religious either in Europe or in the Middle East.
During the crusades, both Byzantium and Western Christians did tap Muslims for assistance. Byzantine military leaders even formed alliances with Muslims in the fight against the West Europeans.
Likewise, during the Spanish Reconquista, neither the conquistadors nor the Moors strove to keep religious purity in their ranks: even Cid, a hero of Spanish epos, fought side by side with Moors against his enemies, the coreligionists.
But the general trend of historical development is not subject to doubt. During the late Middle Ages, a struggle broke out in the Balkans between Christianity and Islam as systems representing different religions, ways of life, cultures and, finally, geopolitical aspirations. Having overcome the Serbs, the Ottoman Empire for almost two centuries continued its expansion into the center of Europe until, in 1683, joint Austrian and Polish troops defeated its army near Vienna.
But even after that, it took the Europeans almost another 200 years to push the Turks back into Asia Minor.
Incidentally, if the Ottoman army had to be fought anywhere in Europe, the Serbs were always ready.
In 1557, the Habsburgs built a strong fortress on the left hand bank of the Danube, near the town of Komarno (modern Slovakia), as an outpost in their struggle against the Turks. When the question arose as to who would be the staunchest defenders of the fortress, no one had any doubts: the Serbs, of course. Indeed, Turkish troops never managed to seize the Komarno fortress.
Throughout the many centuries of Turkish rule, the Serbs never betrayed their religion on a mass scale and never formed alliances with the conquerors. Due to their refusal to adopt Islam, they were treated as second-rate citizens and were subject to a special tax. In modern liberal jargon, the Serbs were upholding European values. The same cannot be said for the ancestors of the modern Albanians (when Ottoman Turks seized Albania in the 15th century, the slamization of the country began – Ed.).
History repeated itself in the 19th century. At that time, Europe (and especially the Balkan peoples) acquired a new important ally – the Russian Empire. After two heroic uprisings at the start of the century, the Serbs won limited independence within the Ottoman Empire. In the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), the Serbs naturally took the Russian side.
In early 1878, they managed to seize the northern part of Kosovo, but their subsequent advance was stopped by a truce between Russia and Turkey.
Under the terms of the San Stefano Peace Treaty (March 1878), the occupied part of Kosovo was to go to Serbia.
But such an expansion of Russian influence in the Balkans was unacceptable to
the West European powers, and at the Berlin Congress, Serbia received independence – but without Kosovo, which remained part of the Ottoman Empire.
Serbia’s political advance and its brief military presence in Kosovo roused the Albanians who had until then been subjects of the Ottoman sultan.
After the Berlin Congress, representatives of Albanian clans and communities formed the so-called Priznen League (June 1878).
Having assured the sultan of their loyalty, the Albanians raised the question of national independence, at least within the Ottoman Empire.
That triggered a chain of events that eventually led to the formation of an Albanian state shortly before World War I. This is how Kosovo has become a
symbolic value for the Albanians as well.
Kosovo also played an important role in modern Turkish history. In July 1908, thousands of Kosovo Albanians converged on the town of Ferizai to oppose Austria-Hungary’s plans to build a railroad across the province. Rumor had it that the project was just a pretext for an Austrian invasion.
During that time, in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, a movement of military officers, who called themselves Young Turks, was gaining influence. One of those
officers was Mustafa Kemal pasha, the future founder of the Turkish Republic, also known as Kemal Ataturk. The advocates of reform were demanding (without any success) the restoration of the 1876 Constitution, scrapped by the sultan.
When unrest started in Ferizai, Young Turk agitators went there, persuading the Albanians to send a telegram to Istanbul demanding that the Constitution be restored.
Before the Turkish emissaries arrived, the locals had no idea about any problems related to the Constitution. But the message on behalf of 30,000 subjects, couched in very decisive terms, made a strong impression on the sultan (who did not know about the circumstances under which it had come about), and the Constitution was restored.
That event marked the start of the triumphant march of the Young
Turks.
Dramas of the 20th century
During the First War in the Balkans (1912-1913), the Serbian army occupied the Kosovo province and annexed it to Serbia. That battle in Europe’s “soft underbelly,” which became a precursor of the world conflagration, aroused widespread concern. One individual in the battle zone was Leiba Bronshtein, (who a few years later would become known as Leo Trotsky, one of the leaders of the Russian Revolution), a correspondent with the daily newspaper Kievskaya Mysl. He reported, with considerable indignation, about the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians. The conflict was resolved with the declaration of Albania’s independence. But before long, the Western powers imposed a protectorate status over the territory. During WWI, Kosovo was occupied by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops, while the local Albanians welcomed them as liberators.
From 1918, Kosovo was part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes (from 1929, Yugoslavia).
In 1941, the province was divided into three parts: the southern part went to Bulgaria; the northern part went to Germany, while the largest part went to Italy, which incorporated it into Rome-controlled Albania. Ethnic purges continued, but this time their victims were the Serbs, who were being driven out of Kosovo.
In early 1944, the Nazis formed a Kosovar SS division called Skanderbeg (named for an Albanian national hero – Ed.).
That military unit, unremarkable for its battle-worthiness, remained loyal to the Nazi Army to the end.
After the war, Kosovo was returned to Yugoslavia. However, Josip Broz Tito, in a bid to avoid ethnically motivated clashes, prohibited the Serbian deportees from returning to their homes. In the 30 years that followed, the latent confrontation between the two communities continued unabated.
The Serbs argue that even in peacetime the Albanian majority was pushing them out of the province, deliberately creating conditions that forced them to emigrate.
Before WWII, there were approximately an equal number of Serbs and Albanians living in Kosovo.
By the early 1990s, however, a census showed that Albanians accounted for around 82 percent of the province’s population and the Serbs a mere 15 percent. That mix was not due to the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the first half of the 20th century: that terrible event had affected both sides in equal measure. Rather, the decisive factor to account for the population disproportion is that Albanian families, which religiously follow traditions, have much higher
birth rates than the Serbs.
It is impossible to ignore this ethnic correlation in tackling the Kosovo problem. The interests of people take precedence over any historical considerations, statistics, or geopolitical interests. A specific nation or ethnic group cannot settle any conflict based on the interpretation of historical justice: each nation has its own view of history.
How Kosovo was separated
The fuse for the ongoing conflict was lit in 1987, when Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic scrapped the privileges that had been granted to the Kosovo autonomy by the SFRY Constitution (1974). As the Communist regimes began to suffer collapse, it became evident that the country’s federal structure was in need of reform. But instead of taking a cautious, carefully planned approach, Milosevic placed his bets on nationalism.
“No one will ever beat you [Serbs] again!” This phrase, pronounced before an audience of several thousand on Kosovo Field, June 15, 1989, the day of the 600th anniversary of the legendary battle, marked the start of Milosevic’s rapid political rise. But it also doomed the Serbs to a series of military defeats.
Despite tense relations between the Kosovo Serbs and Albanians in the 1990s, there was no ethnic cleansing. Neither the non-governmental organization International Crisis Group, which monitored the situation in the province in
March 1998, nor the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, reported anything that would suggest such a thing.
Nevertheless, the events followed a sort of political logic: Yugoslavia effectively disintegrated, and the Democratic League of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, demanded independence. The group agreed only to negotiate on the technical
details of the transitional period. That was unacceptable to Belgrade, especially since the status of the Serbs in an independent Kosovo would have been placed in a precarious position.
Starting in 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an armed wing of Rugova’s party, was created in the province. Hashim Thaci and Agim Ceku, Kosovo’s current leaders, among others, led it. Money and weapons began to arrive from the fairly large Albanian diaspora in the West.
Initially, the United States included the KLA on its list of terrorist organizations, but later removed its name. However, KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj (later Kosovo Prime Minister from December 2004 to March 2005), had been charged
by the Hague Tribunal with war crimes. In 1996-1998, the organization assumed responsibility for killing at least 25 Yugoslav police officers, local Serbs and “Albanian collaborators.”
In June and July 1998, the KLA, supported by the local population, started a full-blown war, seizing a part of the province. The People’s Army of Yugoslavia
subsequently thwarted their attempts, but the fighting left about 250,000 Kosovars homeless. Refugees began to roam around the region, while some found refuge in Albania and Macedonia. Needless to say, atrocities were committed in Kosovo, but these actions were reciprocal. Nevertheless, ccusations were made primarily against the Yugoslav army. One of those events (the Racac Massacre, in the fall of 1998) in fact prompted NATO to include the use of force to end the confrontation. A reference to Racac was made at the Hague Tribunal’s list of charges against Milosevic. But now that the former Serbian leader has died, we are left to wonder whether the judges would have found him guilty or not. In any
event, after Kosovo was de facto separated from Serbia, some individuals in the West doubted that the Serbs were really responsible for Racac.
In all fairness, it should be pointed out that the great powers made considerable efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In February 1999, a peace conference was held at Rambouillet near Paris. Under a draft agreement, drawn up primarily under pressure from Washington, the Serbian army was to leave Kosovo, NATO troops were to receive freedom of movement across Yugoslavia, while the province’s final status was to be established within three years. But the agreement failed to mention that Belgrade would have the final say on the future of the province.
Serbia was ready to pull its army out of Kosovo and not interfere with the deployment of international forces there, but it refused to grant foreign troops the freedom of movement across its territory. The Serbs also insisted that Kosovo’s final status must be harmonized with Belgrade.
The conference ended with no results, and on March 24, 1999, NATO aircraft started bombing Yugoslavia.
The KLA joined forces with the North Atlantic Alliance and enjoyed U.S. support in conducting its own operations against the Yugoslav army. In response, Belgrade sanctioned the eviction of all residents from all Albanian villages.
Contrary to the hopes of Western leaders that the war would be brief and Yugoslavia would soon capitulate, combat operations dragged on.
The population
courageously stood up to the attacks, while the defensive action was quite effective. After the military campaign, it turned out that the Yugoslav army had sustained minimal losses. Nevertheless, Belgrade was certainly not able to stand up to allied Western forces on its own, and in the end a ceasefire agreement was reached (with diplomatic assistance from Russia). NATO air strikes stopped, and on June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244.
Belgrade received what it had demanded at the Rambouillet Conference. The resolution confirmed the country’s territorial integrity, including Kosovo. Furthermore, the document did not contain any provisions on the deployment of NATO troops outside Kosovo, in Yugoslavia. Under the resolution, Belgrade was to have a final say on the province’s status. Had such a document been considered at Rambouillet, Serbia would have accepted it, and the war and all of its victims could have been avoided.
The states that had participated in air strikes against Yugoslavia assumed moral and legal obligations to create a more favorable climate in the province. NATO deployed its military formations in Kosovo, while the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) exercised civilian administration.
But almost all obligations contained in Resolution 1244 remained entirely on paper. As soon as the Yugoslav army left Kosovo, ethnic cleansing began there. Albanian militants killed and deported Serbs, while Orthodox churches and monasteries were plundered and destroyed.
The last wave of anti-Serbian atrocities, killings and the destruction of cultural landmarks swept the province in March 2004, almost five years after the peacekeepers were deployed there – that is to say, when the situation had become “relatively stable.”
NATO troops and the UN administration proved unable to ensure security, with instability spilling outside the province. In neighboring Macedonia, armed clashes occurred between the Slavic population and the Albanian minority (2001), while the Albanians used weapons supplied from Kosovo.
According to Belgrade, by early 2007, approximately 230,000 Serbs who were forced to flee from Kosovo were still unable to return to their homes. Today, the province’s remaining Serb population is only able to live in enclaves under NATO’s armed protection. The Serbs cannot rely on local security forces: Kosovo police are comprised primarily of former KLA gunmen.
MORALITY IN PLACE OF POLITICS
The Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia (the United States, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Russia) coordinated the principles of a Kosovo settlement. The main principle was the following: first, enforce humanitarian standards, and then achieve territorial status. But under pressure from Western participants, the formula almost completely reversed: first came status and then the standards.
The desire to grant Kosovo independence as soon as possible resulted from the concern that if the international community did not recognize Kosovar statehood in the foreseeable future a fresh outbreak of violence would erupt.
Presently, it is assumed that finalization of Kosovo’s status will help attract assistance from international financial organizations, as well as private investment to Kosovo. And although the plan proposed by UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari will establish formal international protectorate over the province, in effect it sets the stage for granting it full independence.
In this situation, all eyes are on Russia. Moscow has never approved of Western policies toward Kosovo or former Yugolsavia as a whole. Although Russia played an important role in ending the 1999 war, it is the only member country in the Contact Group that has not been assigned a sector of responsibility in the province. However, the appearance of Russian troops in Pristina in June 1999 was met with real jubilation among the Serbian population, which saw Russia’s presence as the most reliable guarantee of their rights.
Formally, the question is this:
Will Russia use its veto power at the UN Security Council if a draft resolution is submitted that, on the one hand, will grant Kosovo independence, but, on the other hand, will not be based on the principles coordinated by the Contact Group, primarily ensuring the return and security of the Serb refugees?
But the importance of Moscow’s position on Kosovo goes far beyond the bounds of a separate episode. The real question is: Is Russia ready to maintain its traditional contacts with friendly nations in the Balkans (primarily the Serbs, who are close to Russians religiously, culturally, historically and ethnically) or will it abandon them?
Kosovo will become a litmus test as to how far Moscow, which has announced its return to the global arena, is prepared to go in protecting its traditional spheres of interests and its moral principles.
What is Russia’s position on the Kosovo issue today?
Moscow demands that any resolution should respond to the universal principles of international law and be supported by all of the sides concerned – i.e., including
Serbia. Russia emphasizes that a Kosovo resolution cannot be secured with different standards than those that are used in similar cases – for example, in Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transdniestria.
Kosovo’s separation from Serbia without Belgrade’s consent will indeed set a precedent for the above conflict areas in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, a parallel between Kosovo, Abkhazia and other unrecognized states can only be
drawn in the following scenario: Russia vetoes a UN Security Council resolution that grants sovereignty to Kosovo.
Nevertheless, the province proclaims its independence, while one of the great powers recognizes such a status.
This scenario would give Moscow the moral right to recognize the independence of post-Soviet formations.
But what if Russia supports a Kosovo resolution that grants the province independence from Belgrade, or even simply abstains at the UN Security Council? Then there will be no parallels with breakaway territories in Georgia or Moldavia.
Let us consider a similar scenario:
Russia does not prevent the separation of Kosovo and at a later date the question of independence for Abkhazia or South Ossetia, for example, is raised. A corresponding resolution is submitted to the UN Security Council. What line will Western countries take in this situation? They will come out strongly in favor of Georgia’s territorial integrity. And if Sukhumi or Tskhinvali then declare their independence, it will be considered illegitimate, as will its recognition by Russia. But Kosovo is already independent – furthermore, fully in accordance with international law, since the UN Security Council sanctioned the province’s
separation.
In global politics, moral considerations are often sacrificed to state interests or specific goals. But in the case of Kosovo, the situation is such that maintenance of moral principles, including the threat of using the veto power, completely corresponds to Russia’s interests.
In this scenario, first, the Russian Federation should act as a guarantor of minority rights.
Second, if, due to Russia’s efforts, Kosovo remains part of the Serbian state, Moscow will also have to guarantee the rights of Kosovo’s Albanians.
Third, Russia should not allow a review of the Helsinki Final Act, in accordance to
which a change of borders is only possible with the consent of the countries concerned.
Implementation of this policy will require courage and firmness, and it can complicate relations with important international partners who are looking for an early solution to the Kosovo problem in favor of the Albanians.
But in the final analysis, commitment to principles of morality and law is a more advantageous position than attempts to ignore them out of some timeserving considerations of political expediency.