〜 Decisions of the 1970s and the Reality of Taiwan Today 〜
How past political choices are confronting us in the 21st century — reflections on Taiwan, the One China policy, strategic ambiguity, Hong Kong, and the U.S.–Japan alliance.
I write this as a Japanese politician currently outside office, to share candid reflections on how political decisions made in the 1970s are now bearing down on us as the realities of the 21st century.
Precisely because I am not holding power today, I believe it is important to speak honestly about how earlier political strategies and judgments are now returning to us as concrete challenges that must be confronted in our own time.
The large-scale military exercises conducted by China around Taiwan should not be viewed as isolated regional maneuvers. They must be understood within a broader strategic context—one that tests how far the international community will tolerate changes to the status quo imposed by force.
The United States, through its National Security Strategy and related policies, has emphasized a more selective approach to global engagement, including a renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere. This is, of course, a legitimate expression of American sovereignty.
At the same time, from the perspective of allies, it is necessary to consider how such strategic signals are perceived internationally. This reassessment of America’s global posture did not begin recently. Since at least the George W. Bush administration, successive U.S. governments—Republican and Democratic alike—have spoken of reducing overseas commitments and redefining America’s role in global security.
Over time, many countries, experts, and even allies have interpreted this as a gradual shift away from the role of global security guarantor. Whether intended or not, this perception is now being tested by authoritarian and revisionist actors.
In this context, Taiwan has become a global litmus test.
Taiwan has not sought confrontation. Taiwanese society is not belligerent. It has consistently prioritized peace and the stability of the status quo. Yet despite this, we see growing military pressure designed to probe how much coercion the world will tolerate.
These actions are not limited to conventional military domains.
In cyberspace—an invisible yet decisive arena—China is also testing the limits of international restraint. There are credible indications that networks in Japan are being exploited as stepping stones for cyber operations targeting third countries, including the Philippines. From the perspective of those countries, such attacks can appear as if they originate from Japan itself.
This underscores a critical reality: cyber threats now directly affect trust among allies and partners. They are no longer abstract or distant concerns.
At this point, it is essential to clarify what is meant by the “One China policy.”
China’s own position—often referred to as the “One China principle”—asserts that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing all of China. This is China’s national claim.
Democratic countries do not share this position.
Japan and other democracies have acknowledged that China holds such a view and have stated that they “understand and respect” it. However, this language does not constitute legal recognition of Taiwan as part of China, nor does it represent acceptance of China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan.
In fact, no democratic leader accepts “One China” in the same legal and political sense asserted by Beijing.
What democracies have consistently shared is a different principle: Taiwan’s future must not be determined by force, and any change to the status quo must be peaceful.
In this sense, the One China policy has functioned not as an endorsement of China’s claim, but as a diplomatic framework designed to avoid legally fixing Taiwan’s status while opposing coercion.
Closely related is the concept of strategic ambiguity, which has long shaped policy toward Taiwan. Strategic ambiguity refers to deliberately refraining from specifying how one would respond in a Taiwan contingency, in order to balance deterrence and escalation control.
Here, the experience of Hong Kong offers a sobering lesson.
Hong Kong was not governed by ambiguity. It was governed by explicit commitments. The Sino-British Joint Declaration—a legally binding international treaty registered with the United Nations—promised “one country, two systems” and a high degree of autonomy.
Yet those commitments were not upheld in practice.
This demonstrated a harsh reality: even clear international agreements can be overridden by power if they are not backed by effective deterrence and political resolve.
Recent diplomatic developments further highlight this pattern. In early January 2026, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a phone call with his South Korean counterpart, criticized what he called “certain political forces in Japan” for “reversing history,” in response to parliamentary discussions in Japan regarding a potential Taiwan contingency.
What deserves attention is not merely the remark itself, but the method. Rather than engaging directly with the substance of the Taiwan security debate, China sought to reframe the issue as a historical grievance and to encourage South Korea to distance itself from Japan.
This represents a familiar form of diplomatic pressure: shifting the discussion from security and international law to history and emotion, with the aim of fragmenting democratic alignment.
How South Korea responds to such pressure will be an important indicator for the future of stability in East Asia.
That is why the question facing us today cannot be avoided.
This time, will it be different?
Will declarations to “protect Taiwan” and “defend freedom and democracy” be supported by credible action and deterrence?
Or will we witness a repetition of what happened in Hong Kong?
Ambiguity can sometimes stabilize situations. But it also carries the risk of being interpreted as non-intervention.
If that misinterpretation accumulates and leads to changes imposed by force, the challenge is not merely regional—it strikes at the foundation of the international order.
Defending freedom and democracy requires cost and resolve. Above all, it requires judgment by those who best understand the value of human life and peace.
Here, I wish to express my sincere respect and gratitude to the United States, Japan’s ally. The U.S.–Japan alliance has supported not only Japan’s security, but the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the international order for decades. For that role, I am deeply thankful.
At the same time, as an ally, I strongly hope that the United States will continue to demonstrate—through words and actions—that changes to the status quo by force will not be tolerated.
Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are not only Asian issues. They are a test of whether the international order will continue to function.
Japan stands ready to work with the United States, balancing dialogue and deterrence, to uphold a free and open international order.
These developments only reinforce my sense that we are now living in a moment where political choices must be explained not only with logic, but with responsibility to future generations.
Decisions made in the 1970s are now confronting us as the reality of the 21st century. As a Japanese politician—even while outside office—I believe it is necessary to face that reality honestly.
Update (January 2, 2026, JST)
Following the publication of this essay, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement criticizing China’s recent military exercises around Taiwan as “unnecessarily escalating tensions.” The statement reaffirmed U.S. support for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by force or coercion.
This development underscores that the concerns discussed above are not isolated views, but are shared at the official policy level of the United States.
Additional Update (January 2, 2026, JST)
On the same day, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan and President Donald Trump held a telephone conversation, during which they reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.–Japan alliance and exchanged views on the Indo-Pacific regional situation amid China’s recent military activities around Taiwan.
They also agreed to proceed with concrete preparations for Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit to the United States this spring, underscoring the importance both leaders place on close coordination at the highest level.
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this essay.
I wish you all a peaceful and meaningful start to the new year.
Yasuhide Nakayama Japanese politician
About the Author
With some hesitation, but for the sake of clarity for readers outside Japan,
I should note that I am a Japanese politician who has served as
State Minister of Defense,
State Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of Japan.
Through these roles, I have been directly involved in diplomacy and national security policy, with particular focus on East Asia and the Middle East, including issues related to counterterrorism and regional stability.
In addition, I currently serve as a member of the board of directors of FFRI Security, Inc., a Japan-based cybersecurity company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Growth Market, which develops domestically produced cybersecurity technologies.