11/9
［社説］18歳以下への一律10万円給付はやめよ
2021/11/9
10万円給付金など経済対策の提言で首相官邸を訪れた公明党の竹内政調会長=8日午後
いったい何を目的にした政策なのか、さっぱり分からない。公明党が実現を強く求めている、18歳以下の子どもを対象に一律10万円を配る給付金のことである。
この給付金は公明党が衆院選公約で「未来応援給付」として掲げたものだ。新型コロナウイルス禍の長期化で特に子育て世帯が大きな影響を受けているとして、2兆円かけて0歳から高校3年生までのすべての子どもに配るという。近くまとめる政府の経済対策に盛り込むよう求めている。
2020年度の非正規労働者は2066万人と前年度から97万人減った。減少分の7割が女性だ。育児をしながら飲食・宿泊業などでパートや契約社員として働いていたが、コロナで雇い止めにあった女性らが含まれるのだろう。
だがコロナ禍で打撃を受けたのは子育て世帯だけではない。年収が200万円に満たない非正規労働者で20～40代の単身者は100万人を超えている。飲食店などでのアルバイトがなくなった大学生にも厳しい状態に置かれた人がいるはずだ。18歳以下という年齢の線引きには妥当性がない。コロナで経済的に困窮した人を支援するなら、年齢ではなく所得の状況で対象者を決めるべきだ。
所得制限をかけずに一律給付すれば、自治体の事務作業が軽減されて速やかに給付できるとの主張がある。だが日本の就業者数は21年4月から増加に転じ、非正規雇用も底を打ちつつある。ワクチン接種が進んだことで経済活動は今後拡大するだろう。経済の先行きがみえず一刻も早い支援が必要だった昨年とは状況が異なる。
助けが必要な人になかなか政府の支援が届かないのは行政のデジタル化の遅れに原因がある。安易なバラマキではなく、マイナンバーに所得情報をひも付け、非常時に迅速に支援できるようにする改革にこそ、公明党や自民党は力を注ぐべきではないか。
消費を喚起する経済対策として給付金を位置づけるなら、なおさら所得制限が必要だ。前回の10万円一律給付は多くが家計の貯蓄に回った。貯蓄に回す余裕がない人たちに給付対象を絞り込まないと同じ展開になりかねない。
少子化対策としても1回限りの現金給付の効果は限定的だ。安定した財源を確保して、保育サービスの充実などで育児と仕事が両立する環境をつくるほうが大きな効果が得られるはずだ。
Summary:
Those who have suffered from the coronavirus pandemic aren’t always families with small children. The number of a single household below 2 million yen income has amounted to over 1 million. Students working at restraints as a part timer have been left devastated. Nothing makes a difference in drawing a line under 18 years old. What makes a difference is not how old they are, but how poor they are.
What made sending money delayed mainly comes from government negligence of digitalization. We recommend the government to reform the way to send the money by taking digitalization on this occasion.
The US must prove it no longer seeks to change China’s system: Global Times editorial
By Global Times
Published: Nov 08, 2021 10:03 PM
US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan Photo: AFP
US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in an interview with CNN broadcast on Sunday that one of the US' errors of previous approaches to policy toward China was a belief that through US policy, the Chinese system will fundamentally transform. Yet this is not the object of the Biden administration. Sullivan mentioned that "The goal of America's China policy is to create a circumstance in which two major powers are going to have to operate in an international system for the foreseeable future." He added that the environment should be "more favorable to the interests and values of the US and its allies and partners."
As national security advisor, Sullivan said the US government is no longer trying to transform China's system. This can be regarded as a step in a positive direction for Washington. At the same time, we need to see the Democratic administration focuses on ideology a lot. Sullivan made such a statement not because the US has lost the will to "transform China," but because the US has reluctantly accepted a reality: To transform China is something that the US cannot achieve.
Transforming the world is the basic political thinking of the US, which corresponds to its deep-rooted security concept. In other words, the US is keen to change the systems and behaviors of other countries. In addition to its Christian missionary mentality, it is more important to eliminate external threats, and increase the US' security and interests by this means.
The Soviet Union collapsed this way during the Cold War with the US. As a result, the US has dominated the world as the sole superpower. This is a typical example of the US succeeding in reinventing an adversary. But more typically, instead of becoming a partner of the US and Europe by accepting the basic framework of Western institutions, Russia has been further attacked by the US because Russia is too powerful.
Politically, Japan has been completely Westernized and has maintained US military presence on its soil for a long time. Its rapid economic rise last century shocked Washington, and the "Japan threat" became another major concern of US elites. The US took action and cracked down on Japan's competitiveness. This period of history tells people how much the US refuses to accept strategic challenges from the outside world.
Behind the US' attempt to "transform China" is Washington's consistent prejudice against socialism. Apart from that, the US' fundamental goal is to dismantle the engine of China's emergence, and break up China's mobilization and unity. If the US could succeed, such an approach could best consolidate US hegemony at the lowest cost.
However, from the Trump administration, the US has become more and more frustrated with such propositions and tactics. It has especially lost confidence in achieving the goal through an engagement strategy. So the US started to shift its strategy toward containment against China, initiated by the Trump administration and continued and completed by Biden's team. Managing "intense competition" has become a new slogan of the Biden administration.
The political elite in the US will not accept the Chinese system. They actually just acknowledged the reality that China's system cannot be shaken externally, so instead, they tried to figure out what they can do to undermine the constant vitality that the Chinese system infuses into the country's development, to eventually crumble the system. This is what the Biden administration means by "intense competition."
While we are not hoping for Washington's strategic goodwill, we can still make use of Sullivan's statement in a positive way. After all, such a statement would help ease China-US relations, and we should ask the US to put that statement into action and reduce its political interference in China's internal affairs.
Not pursuing to transform China's system is a way for the US to shrink back from difficulties after acknowledging them. What has prompted the US to make such an adjustment is China's continued success and its increased political confidence that goes along with it. As China will continue to maintain its willpower and momentum of growth, the US' ambitions to encircle and suffocate China will be dismantled, and China's strong development will help continue the country's strategic initiative.