An extract from the war memoirs of prime Minister David Lloyd George, 1918
The fact of the matter was that the British Army itself did not realise the extent and effect of the triumph they had won that day.
They were thinking in the terms of past offensives when a gain of a few kilometres in an attack was as much as they could hope to accomplish, and experience had taught them the dangers of advancing too far, because the Germans invariably rallied brought up their reserves and counterattacked with verve and skill.
They had not yet understood that they were confronted to-day with an enemy who had lost much of his dash and combative strength.
The reports of the battle received by the Cabinet from the front showed how little even the victors understood the immense effect of the triumph they had won.
The actual ground captured was not extensive. The effect of the victory was moral and not territorial. It revealed to friend and foe alike the break down of the German power of resistance.
More finally even than by the French counter-offensive of July 18th, were the Germans driven by the British stroke of August 8th, to realise that all hope of victory had passed. After the July defeat whilst they came to the conclusion that their offensive had finally failed, they still hoped to reorganise their army effectively for an impenetrable defence. After the Amiens battle even this seemed impossible.
Ludendorff admits:"The 8th August demonstrated the collapse of our fighting strength and in the light of our recruiting situation, it took from me any hope of discovering some strategic measure which would reestablish the position in our favour…An end must be put to the war."