５日に国会の福島原子力発電所事故調査委員会（黒川清委員長）が最終報告書をとりまとめたことは、マスコミ報道があったのでご存じの方も多いと思います。先に出された、東電、民間、政府（中間とりまとめ）のどの報告書よりも、震災に対する脆弱性（これは現在あるどの原発でも同じ。阪神大震災に耐えられる原発は皆無である）を認識しながら先送りを続けたこと等々について東電と国の責任について厳しく言及しています。
全文６００ページもあるので読まれた方は、あまりおられないとは思います（私も読んでいません）。ですから、インターネットでながれるまで、私も知らなかったのですが（おそらく報道されていない）、この報告書には黒川委員長の英文のメッセージ（※）があり、そこでは、今回の事故は「日本文化の根深い慣習」に起因するメイド・イン・ジャパンの危機であったとされています。（原文は it was a crisis “Made in Japan” resulting from the “ingrained conventions of Japanese culture）
すなわち、その根本的な原因を、日本人の「反射的な従順性」「権威を疑問視しない気質」「『計画を守ることに固執すること』への献身」「集団主義」「島国根性」と断じているのである。（原文はIts fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.）
「一億総懺悔」ではありませんが、拳々服膺するべきものがあるように思います。
最後に、黒川委員長の日本文のメッセージを一部引用させていただきたいと思います。
「『「変われなかった』ことで、起きてしまった今回の大事故に、日本は今後どう対応し、どう変わっていくのか。これを、世界は厳しく注視している。この経験を私たちは無駄にしてはならない。国民の生活を守れなかった政府をはじめ、原子力関係諸機関、社会構造や日本人の「思いこみ（マインドセット）」を抜本的に改革し、この国の信頼を立て直す機会は今しかない。この報告書が、日本のこれからの在り方について私たち自身を検証し、変わり始める第一歩となることを期待している。」
※以下の通りです。
Message from the Chairman
THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI of March 11, 2011 were natural disasters of a magnitude that shocked the entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response. How could such an accident occur in
Our report catalogues a multitude of errors and willful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11. And it examines serious deficiencies in the response to the accident by TEPCO, regulators and the government.
For all the extensive detail it provides, what this report cannot fully convey – especially to a global audience – is the mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster. What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.”
Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.
Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for this accident, the result may well have been the same.
Following the 1970s “oil shocks,” Japan accelerated the development of nuclear power in an effort to achieve national energy security. As such, it was embraced as a policy goal by government and business alike, and pursued with the same single-minded determination that drove Japan’s postwar economic miracle.
With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion. At a time when Japan’s self-confidence was soaring, a tightly knit elite with enormous financial resources had diminishing regard for anything ‘not invented here.’
This conceit was reinforced by the collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy, by which the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend the interests of his organization. Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their paramount duty to protect public safety.
Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents.
It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant.
This report singles out numerous individuals and organizations for harsh criticism, but the goal is not—and should not be—to lay blame. The goal must be to learn from this disaster, and reflect deeply on its fundamental causes, in order to ensure that it is never repeated. Many of the lessons relate to policies and procedures, but the most important is one upon which each and every Japanese citizen should reflect very deeply.
The consequences of negligence at
As the first investigative commission to be empowered by the legislature and independent of the bureaucracy, we hope this initiative can contribute to the development of Japan