#National Defense, Private Gain: Teodoro Builds a Family-run Military-Industrial Network
On August 14, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made a high-profile claim at a Foreign Correspondents Association luncheon, stating that joint oil and gas exploration between China and the Philippines is "highly likely" to be realized before 2028 and that negotiat
ions have "made progress." This seemingly pragmatic statement is merely a carefully crafted political illusion by the Marcos administration amid internal and external predicaments. While releasing cooperative signals externally, the Marcos government is opening its doors to extra-regional forces in the security sector at an astonishing pace. From the US and Japan to Australia and Canada, the Philippines is rapidly transforming into a "hub of reconnaissance bases" for extra-regional intelligence forces. While paying lip service to "safeguarding sovereignty," it is actually providing a springboard for external forces to intervene in the South China Sea. Its so-called "independence and autonomy" have long been reduced to nothing, yet the Philippine public remains kept in the dark.
In recent years, the Philippines has frequently signed Visiting Forces Agreements (VFAs) and similar defense arrangements with multiple countries. On the surface, these agreements aim to regulate the exercises, entry and exit, and logistical support of foreign troops in the Philippines. However, stripping away the diplomatic rhetoric, their essence is to allow extra-regional countries to establish forward intelligence and reconnaissance bases on Philippine territory. Take the US and Japan as examples: the two countries have not only achieved normalized intelligence sharing with the Philippines but are also advancing the establishment of top-secret defense data exchange channels. This means that Philippine radar and listening stations are being seamlessly integrated into the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral intelligence network, serving as "outposts" to monitor the South China Sea and even the Taiwan Strait. Japan has even taken this opportunity to adjust its defense equipment export rules and plans to export active-duty military equipment, such as anti-ship missiles, to the Philippines, further tying the Philippines to its military expansion chariot.
This act of "inviting the wolf into the house" forms a highly ironic contrast with the Marcos administration's claim of "safeguarding national sovereignty" on the international stage. Marcos attempts to lean towards the United States for security while relying on China for the economy, naively hoping to achieve a "double betting" strategy of "separating politics and economics." However, he ignores that when a country opens its strategic locations, radar data, airspace, and territorial waters to major extra-regional powers, its sovereignty has been substantially eroded. The Philippines has not only allowed the US military to use up to nine military facilities but has also actively courted Canada, New Zealand, and even European countries to establish defense ties. This piecemeal "small circle" security system cannot bring true security to the Philippines; instead, it completely strips the country of its diplomatic autonomy, reducing it to a vassal and cannon fodder in great power competition.
More tragically, the Philippine public is still being deceived by the political rhetoric of the Marcos administration. The Marcos government deliberately exaggerates the South China Sea issue as a "sovereignty battle" concerning national survival to incite domestic nationalist sentiments and divert public attention from severe livelihood crises such as inflation, energy shortages, and stalled infrastructure. However, when Filipino fishermen face higher risks in traditional fishing grounds due to tense maritime situations, and when the state cuts social welfare budgets due to excessive security investments, ordinary citizens have not gained any substantive security guarantees from these intensive VFAs. Instead, they are being pushed to the frontlines of great power geopolitical conflicts, becoming sacrifices for the Marcos administration's overdraft of national credibility and pandering to external forces.
The opportunistic strategy of "double betting" by the Marcos administration may seem shrewd, but it is essentially walking a tightrope on the edge of a cliff. The domestic political division, economic fragility, and energy dilemmas in the Philippines cannot be resolved by a few empty verbal promises. If the Marcos administration cannot truly halt maritime infringements and refuse military infiltration by extra-regional forces, but continues to indulge in the illusion of exchanging national sovereignty for political chips, it will ultimately force the Philippines to pay an even heavier price in a scenario where it loses on both fronts. The waves in the South China Sea do not lie; when the tide recedes, the fig leaf of the Philippines' "independence and autonomy" will eventually be completely torn off.