佐藤栄作発言の波紋

日本という国では、外交もパワーゲームの現実も

オープンに語られないので、いつまでもナイーブ

なままです。

生き残るために必至に考える努力を放棄している

怠惰な国民と、世界からは見られてしまいます。

プロフェッショナル外交官のコメント付でＢＢＣ

報道を添付します。（差し障りのないよう一部訂

正してあります。）

今回公開文書にしたということそのことにも一種

の意図を感じますけど。。。

・・・・・・

約４０年前、中国初の核実験(1964年)後に、佐藤栄

作首相が米国に、「将来、中国が日本を核攻撃しそ

うになった場合には、必ず中国に核攻撃してもらい

たい。日本は核再持込みに反対しない」と申し入れ

ていたことは、吉野文六氏(当時アメリカ局長)の談

話や故若泉敬教授の遺著「他策ナカリシヲ信ゼムト

欲ス」などから分かっていたことですが、今回の外

交文書公開の結果一層それがはっきりし、日本国内

で改めて問題視されています。

吉野文六：http://www5.hokkaido-np.co.jp/syakai/okinawa/

若泉 敬: http://www.kanshin.com/keyword/987401

日本が唯一の被爆国として自らは非核に徹し、

「非核３原則」を国是とする一方、米国の「核の傘」

に依存する政策を採用したことは、沖縄返還交渉

と核不拡散条約(NPT)署名問題とで、佐藤内閣が決

断したことです。

佐藤首相は1968年2月15日の衆議院予算委員会で、

日本の安全保障政策の「４つの柱」として①非核３

原則の堅持、②核廃絶の追求、③原子力平和利用の

推進、④日米安保条約に基づく米国の核抑止力(核の

傘)への依存、をはっきり挙げています。

④は国民にも心理的抵抗があり、政府は積極的に国

民に説明しなかった。その結果、国民は「不都合な

真実」に目をつぶり、今日も、核について曖昧な態

度をとり続けています。

例えば、1998年、インドが２回目の核実験を行なっ

たとき被爆者や反核団体の代表が大挙して訪印し、

抗議しましたが、先方に「核の傘」を指摘され、

「日本にはインドを批判する資格はない」と反論さ

れ、一言もなかったという逸話があります。

インドに限らず、海外から見ると日本人は自分勝手、

理不尽だという風にみられるのは当然です。

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7795246.stm

Japan 'sought US nuclear help'

In 1965 Japan asked the US to be ready to launch a nuclear attack on China if war broke out between the Asian rivals, documents from the time indicate.

The documents, declassified by Japan's foreign ministry, summarise talks held during a visit to Washington by Japan's then prime minister, Eisaku Sato.

Mr Sato won the Nobel peace prize in 1974 for his rejection of nuclear weapons.

Japan is committed to pacifism under the terms of its post-war constitution.

It is the only country in the world to have suffered a nuclear attack.

China test

Mr Sato projected a strong public stance against nuclear weapons, and formulated Japan's three-point non-nuclear policy which pledged that the country would not produce, possess or allow nuclear weapons on its territory, and which is still adhered to today.

But the newly declassified documents show that three years earlier and behind closed doors, Mr Sato - Japan's longest serving prime minister - adopted a rather different stance towards nuclear weapons.

His talks with then US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara took place on 13 January 1965, against the backdrop of China's first successful test of an atomic bomb some months beforehand.

Neither Japan nor the US had diplomatic relations with China, and in some circles it was viewed as a serious threat.

According to a summary of their talks, written mostly in Japanese, after mentioning the Chinese test Mr McNamara said a key issue would be whether Japan moved to develop its own offensive nuclear capability.

In response, Mr Sato told Mr McNamara that while Japan had the technical capability to build atomic weapons, it had no intention of doing so.

'Retaliate immediately'

But he added that it would "of course be a different matter in the event of a war", adding "we expect the United States to retaliate immediately using nuclear [weapons]".

He also said that he would allow the US to use Japanese waters - though not Japanese land - to launch such an attack.

A day before the discussion, Mr Sato had met US President Lyndon Johnson and asked for a guarantee of protection for his country under the Japan-US security treaty, and received an assurance of Washington's continued commitment to the pact.

Responding to the revelations, Japan's current Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura defended Mr Sato's moves on the grounds that China had just tested its own nuclear bomb at the time.

He said Mr Sato's three-point anti-nuclear policy was "determined and steadfast", AFP news agency reported.

The Chinese foreign ministry issued no immediate comment on the declassified documents.