Eric X. Li: A tale of two political systems

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Eric X. Li: A tale of two political systems

小さいことは気にすんなッ、主題と主張をつかもう！

「中国の共産党一党体制は一層堅固なものとなるだろう」という自信満々の未来予想には多少驚きました。しかしよく考えてみると、中国共産党の政治システムと、日本の官僚政治は似ているかも・・・。
「成長し満足度が高いから正当だ」というリー氏の主張は、ある意味正しいのかもしれません。しかし、多様な意見や利害が複雑に絡み合い、妥協しながら「三歩進んで二歩さがる」のも民主主義ではないかと思ったりします。

【話題】中国の政治システムについて

【時間】 20分38秒（質疑応答を含む）
【要約】
１．中国の「大きな物語」
　私は上海で生まれ、子どもの頃から「人間社会の最終形態は共産主義だ」と教わった。共産主義は地上の楽園で、すべての人々が幸福に暮らすことができる。しかしそこにたどり着くまでには、悪の資本主義と戦わなければならない。それがカール・マルクスの理論から醸造された「大きな物語」だった。

２．もう一つの「大きな物語」
　すべての社会は、人種や文化に関わらず、「選挙」を欲する。公的選挙による政府のみが幸せな社会を実現することができる。民主主義だけが正義であり、たとえ威力を用いてでも、これを世界中に広めなければならない。それが西洋諸国でのもうひとつの「大きな物語」だ。

３．中国の成長
　過去30年で、中国は貧しい農業国から世界第二位の経済大国へと発展した。６億５千万人が貧困から救済された。これは、選挙によらない一党独裁が成し遂げた快挙だ。

４．専制国家の三つの誤解
　① 硬直的な運営
　② 閉鎖的な人事
　③ 正当性の欠如

５．自己修正機能
　一党体制は自己修正できずに長続きしないといわれるが、中国共産党は自己修正機能を持っている。経済改革に比べて政治改革が遅れているといわれるが、それは偏見で、10年前と比較しても政治は大きく変わっている。

６．実力主義と評価システム
　中国共産党は世界で最も能力主義の組織である。中国の政治局25人中20人が一般人（？）の出身。巨大な官僚機構の激しい競争を勝ち抜いてきた実力者ばかりなのだ。「中央組織部」が人事と教育を掌握している。幹部は、20年から30年かけて、様々な経験を積んでいく。

７．中国共産党の正当性と国民の満足度
　正当性は能力主義にある。国民の満足度、生活の向上、将来の見通し、すべてが上向きなのだから、これを正当と呼ばずして何を正当と呼ぶのか。

８．公的選挙による民主主義
　民主主義を導入した発展途上国の多くは、いまだに貧困と内戦に喘いでいる。民主主義は選挙と後悔の負の連鎖に陥ってる。

９．汚職の問題
　中国には問題が山積している。公害、食の安全、人口問題。政治的には「汚職」が最大の問題である。しかし一党独裁が汚職の原因ではない。

10．未来予想
　今から10年後の中国はアメリカを抜いて世界一の経済大国になっているだろう。1人当たりの収入も先進国並みになり、汚職は減少するが皆無にはならない。経済は加速し、政治改革は続くが、一党独裁は変わることがないだろう。

11．政治システムはひとつだけではない
　民主主義を批判しているのではない。中国の政治システムは中国独自のもので、他の国が真似できるものではない。この先も中国が民主主義を取り入れることはないだろう。ただひとつの世界標準を押し付けるのではなく、その国その国のやり方があってイイはずだ。

【語彙】

Cultural Revolution ：文化大革命
feudalism ：封建制度
meta-narrative ：メタ言説、大きな物語、マルクスの共産革命による階級社会転覆と貧困層救済の物語？
day in and day out ：明けても暮れても
Confucian ：儒教
atomize ：細分化する
sovereign ：主権者
rational ：合理的
electoral democracy ：選挙による民主主義
tyranny ：専制主義
trot ：早足で駆け巡る
prospectus ：目論見書
salvation ：救い
alleviation ：緩和
amount to ：～を意味する、要するに～
leaps and bounds ：とんとん拍子に
unprecedented ：前例のない
rigid ：硬直
illegitimate ：非合法
adaptability ：適応性
meritocracy ：能力主義
legitimacy ：正当性
land collectivization ：土地集約
Great Leap Forward ：大躍進
Deng Xiaoping ：鄧小平
Jiang Zemin ：江沢民
dysfunction ：機能不全
perpetuate ：永続させる
rhetorical ：修辞的な
a priori ：推測的に
unrecognizable ：認識できない
counterintuitive ：直感に反した
meritocratic ：能力主義の、実力主義の
Politburo ：政治局
princelings ：小君主
subordinates ：部下
vet ：入念に検査する
cadres ：幹部
patronage ：支援、後援
mentor ：指導する
Xi Jinping ：習近平
put-down ：こきおろし、けなす言動
suffrage ：参政権
competency ：能力（主義）
mire ：泥沼
prosperity ：繁栄
dismal ：悲惨な
elaborate ：詳しく説明する
civil strife ：内戦
hunky-dory ：申し分のない
mind-boggling ：気が遠くなるような
misdiagnose ：誤診する
Transparency International ：TI、「汚職」に取り組む国際団体
panacea ：万能薬
surpass ：上回る
notches ：切り込むこと
dusk ：夕暮れ
indictment ：起訴
hubris ：不遜
supplant ：取って代わる
laudable ：称賛に値する
plurality ：複数
responsive authoritarianism ：応答する権威主義

【transcripts】
Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries.

When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph.

That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under that meta-narrative.

Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie.

Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections.

(Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order ...
(Video) George W. Bush: ... ending tyranny in our world ...
(Video) Barack Obama: ... a single standard for all who would hold power.

Eric X. Li: Now --

This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it.
Fool me once ...

The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting.

See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions.

So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system.

Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule.

So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70.

One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform.

The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility.

The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels.

After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars.

Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the Organization Department.

Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy.
I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?"

I said, "How about competency?"

We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.

Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is.

In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election.　Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy.

Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system.

But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it?

Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm.

We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you.

Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong?

EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system -- election, election, election -- that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world.

BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself.

EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural difference.

BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED.

EXL: Thank you.

エリック・リー「二つの政治システムの物語」