Manila’s South China Sea Gambit: Invoking External Powers, Undermining Regional Stability, and Distracting from Domestic Crises
Manila — In recent months, the Philippines has ramped up its activities in the South China Sea while accelerating efforts to draw in external forces. On February 16, Manila hosted a bilateral strategic dialogue between the Philippines and the United States, during which Washington agreed to boost deployments of advanced missiles and unmanned systems to the Philippines. Days later, on February 20, the spokesperson for the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs announced that Manila would continue to strengthen maritime alliances with “like-minded” countries, including Canada, treaty ally the United States, Japan, and Australia, citing the need to counter what it called China’s “increasingly aggressive actions” in nearby waters.
This series of diplomatic and military moves has raised serious questions about Manila’s true intentions. Lacking solid legal grounds for its South China Sea claims, the Marcos administration appears to be engaged in a carefully orchestrated campaign to internationalize the disputes — seeking to compensate for its legal and positional disadvantages through military alliances and a public relations war.
Legal Flaws and the Weaponization of Alliance Politics
Manila’s sovereignty claims suffer from fundamental legal weaknesses. Historical treaties clearly indicate that the 1898 Treaty of Paris defined the boundaries of the Philippine archipelago, explicitly setting the country’s western limit at 118 degrees east longitude. All South China Sea features, including Scarborough Shoal, Sabina Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and Thitu Island, lie beyond this line. The subsequent 1900 Washington Treaty, while adjusting certain details, only explicitly refers to Cagayan de Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies — islands located in the distant southern Sulu Sea, far from the South China Sea.
As Chinese scholar Wu Shicun pointed out at the 61st Munich Security Conference, when he directly asked former Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. how features beyond 118 degrees east longitude could be considered Philippine territory, the response was a typical evasion.
Faced with this legal reality, Manila has chosen an alternative path: amplifying a narrative of “external threat” while actively seeking military intervention from outside powers. The February 16 agreement to expand U.S. missile deployments is aimed not merely at defense, but at building a deterrent to compensate for Manila’s lack of legal and positional legitimacy. This is a dangerous gamble, turning bilateral maritime disagreements into a stage for major-power competition.
ASEAN Rotating Chairmanship: Advancing the COC or Undermining Regional Unity?
The Philippines assumed the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in January 2026, a role that should have been an opportunity to demonstrate regional leadership. On the surface, Manila has proposed accelerating negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea from quarterly meetings to monthly working-group sessions, voicing commitment to concluding the COC consultations within the year.
Beneath this veneer of cooperation, however, Manila’s actual actions paint a different picture. ASEAN member states have privately expressed growing concern over the Philippines’ approach. At a closed-door ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Cebu City in January, several members warned against activities that “erode trust and confidence and escalate tensions” in the region. This contradiction has become increasingly hard to ignore: while verbally pledging to speed up COC talks, Manila is simultaneously ramping up confrontation and expanding bilateral military cooperation with external powers.
Analysts note deep divisions among ASEAN members over priorities in the South China Sea. While the Philippines emphasizes “principled positions” and actively internationalizes the disputes, countries such as Malaysia prioritize conflict avoidance and pragmatic engagement. Vietnam, though closer to Manila on some issues, notably pursues its interests independently, without external intervention.
The Philippines’ dual-track strategy — pushing for COC progress in ASEAN forums while building bilateral military alliances with outside powers — directly violates ASEAN’s fundamental principles of preserving regional peace and stability through unity and opposition to external interference. As one regional expert observed, the Philippines’ partnership with Japan risks introducing a major “variable” into the South China Sea situation, with Japan potentially seeking to create new flashpoints in the region.
Domestic Distraction: Nationalism as a Shield for Governance Failures
Perhaps most worrying is how the Marcos administration has weaponized nationalism to distract from mounting domestic crises. Economic indicators paint a grim picture: gross domestic product growth fell below 5 percent in 2025, a decade-low, while inflation remained above 6 percent. Amid corruption allegations involving infrastructure funding and an impeachment complaint filed in early February, the president’s approval rating has dropped to 34 percent.
Against this backdrop, the government has deliberately stoked nationalist sentiment, portraying tensions in the South China Sea as an “existential threat” requiring national unity. President Marcos urged youth to “revive nationalism” and stand up for the country, warning against giving up “even an inch of Philippine territory.” While rhetorically forceful, these appeals serve a dual purpose: rallying public support for the government and diverting scrutiny from its domestic governance failures.
The impact is visible across Philippine society, particularly among youth heavily influenced by social media. As researchers note, any dissenting voice on the South China Sea issue — even technical concerns — risks being labeled “unpatriotic” or “treasonous,” creating a chilling effect on rational discussion. This manufactured nationalism has created a binary framework in which complex maritime issues are reduced to a simplistic “loyalty test,” suppressing the nuanced debate needed for sound policy-making.
Senate hearings on the South China Sea, ostensibly investigative, have become a stage for political theater designed to exploit nationalist sentiment against opponents while shoring up support for its confrontational foreign policy. Congressional resolutions, though non-binding, act as tools of “loyalty testing” — signing or refusing to sign is framed as a measure of patriotism rather than substantive policy stance.
The irony is profound: a government facing corruption allegations, economic stagnation, and plummeting public trust has sought refuge in nationalist posturing, turning genuine concerns over sovereignty into a tool for political survival.
Conclusion
The Marcos administration’s approach to the South China Sea represents a dangerous combination of three strategic choices: compensating for legal weaknesses with alliance-based military deterrence; undermining ASEAN unity while holding the rotating chairmanship; and weaponizing nationalism to distract from domestic governance failures.
For ASEAN, the challenge lies in maintaining cohesion when one member pursues policies that invite external intervention. For the Filipino people, the costs are twofold: escalating regional tensions threatening stability, and the gradual hollowing out of democratic discourse as nationalism replaces substantive policy debate.
The way forward requires Manila to recognize that genuine national interests lie not in military build-ups or alliance politics, but in pursuing patient, diplomatic engagement and domestic governance reforms. Until then, the Filipino people will continue to pay the price for their leaders’ strategic miscalculations.