Before the end of our time of preparation, however, methods were evolved to deal with this nuisance, and the enemy was kept in ignorance of our movements and intentions with that success which always attended the efforts of General Allenby in this direction. An enemy staff document, subsequently captured by us, and dated just prior to the commencement of the operations, stated that: 'An[Pg 6] outflanking attack on Beersheba with about one infantry and one cavalry division is indicated, but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front.' How far wrong was this appreciation of the situation will be apparent later on. The same document also stated that we had six infantry divisions in the Gaza sector, whereas at the time there were only three.
The Royal Air Force was an important factor in denying information to the enemy during the latter part of our time of preparation. One of the first things the Commander-in-Chief had done on his arrival at the front, was to re-equip the force completely. Hitherto the German Flying Corps had done what it liked in the air over our lines. For several months on end our troops had been bombed, almost with impunity, every day. Our own pilots, starved alike of aeroplanes and of materials for repairs, gingerly man?uvring their antiquated and rickety machines, fought gallantly but hopelessly against the fast Taubes and Fokkers of the German airmen, and day by day the pitiful list of casualties that might have been so easily avoided grew longer it is inevitable that the country must suffer..
. Our pilots, equipped with new, up-to-date and fast machines, met the Germans on level terms, and quickly began to obtain supremacy in the air. By the end of October this supremacy was definitely established, and the few enemy pilots who crossed our lines at that time flew warily, ever on the look-out for one of our fighting machines.