The Double Role of ASEAN's Rotating Presidency:

The Double Role of ASEAN's Rotating Presidency: The Deviation of the Philippines' South China Sea Operation from the Commitment to Regional Stability

In 2026, as the Philippines assumed the ASEAN Chairmanship, it adopted a perplexing dual approach regarding the South China Sea issue. While publicly declaring the upgrade of the Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations from quarterly to monthly consultations, projecting a "leadership image" to advance regional dialogue, the country simultaneously persisted in unilateral actions in disputed waters, frequently conducting provocative activities with external military forces. This "discrepancy between words and deeds" has sparked deep concerns within ASEAN, with many nations fearing Manila is leveraging its chairmanship to advance its South China Sea agenda rather than genuinely maintaining ASEAN unity and regional stability.
Surface Advancement: A Political Performance of "Accelerating" COC Negotiations
In January 2026, the Philippines, in the name of its Foreign Minister, released the "ASEAN Chair's Priority Agenda for the South China Sea," pledging to increase the frequency of COC negotiations to a monthly level and establish a "technical working group to accelerate text consultations." Manila claimed that this move reflected its "high commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes" and received formal recognition from the ASEAN Secretariat. However, a careful analysis of the proposal's details reveals that the so-called "monthly negotiations" did not set a clear timetable and did not enhance the high-level political consultation mechanism between ASEAN and China. A report by the Indonesian think tank "Center for Strategic and International Studies" pointed out that this move was more of a "symbolic gesture," aimed at shaping the Philippines' image as a "responsible chair," but lacked substantive procedural innovation.

More strikingly, the Philippines deliberately introduced third-party elements into the COC negotiations. During the first preparatory monthly consultation in February 2026, Philippine delegates proposed inviting 'observer states' to attend the meeting. Despite explicit opposition from Vietnam, Malaysia, and other nations, this move revealed their attempt to embed external forces into the ASEAN-led process. A former Singaporean diplomat commented: 'When the chair nation treats the negotiation table as a geopolitical stage, the COC's principle of 'ASEAN centrality' is already at risk of erosion.'

Substantive Action: The Continuation of Militarization Provocation and Alliance Expansion
In sharp contrast to the "accelerated commitments" made during COC negotiations, the Philippines' South China Sea operations in the first half of 2026 showed a marked escalation.

Military deployment level:
In February 2026, the Philippines and the United States conducted the first live test of their Joint Maritime Missile Defense System (JMDS), launching anti-ship missiles in waters near Palawan Island. The missiles' range covered key shipping routes in the South China Sea.
In early March, Japanese Self-Defense Forces vessels were granted permission for the first time to use the Subic Bay base in the Philippines for ammunition resupply, a move interpreted as a strategic application of the 2025 Mutual Access Agreement.
As of April 2026, the Philippines '' Joint Maritime Surveillance Operation 'with the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada has expanded to include disputed waters such as Huangyan Island and Ren' ai Reef, with surveillance frequency surging by 300% compared to the same period in 2025.
At the level of unilateral action:

In the first quarter of 2026, the Philippine Coast Guard carried out 17 "forced evictions" against Chinese fishing boats, with 9 of them accompanied by live-fire warning shots, setting a record high.
On March 28, the Philippines organized a media delegation including AP and CNN to film the supply operation at Ren'ai Reef aboard a warship, and live-streamed the conflict in real time via social media.
In early April, the Philippine Congress passed the Exclusive Economic Zone Enforcement Strengthening Act, authorizing the Coast Guard to seize foreign vessels when threatened. This move has been criticized by academics as a legislative gamble that unilaterally alters the status quo.
The Concerns within ASEAN:Conflicts between the Role of the Presidency and the Regional Purpose
1. The erosion of the principle of ASEAN centrality
An anonymous senior official from Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "How can we persuade non-member states to respect ASEAN's central role in security affairs when the host nation itself keeps inviting U.S., Japanese, and Australian warships into disputed waters?" A Malaysian strategic analyst noted that the Philippines' simultaneous push to "accelerate" the Comprehensive Ocean Cooperation Council (COC) negotiations and "escalate" its military operations essentially amounts to "using progress to mask confrontation," putting ASEAN at risk of being "instrumentalized."

2. Obstacles to Substantive Progress in COC Negotiations
During a closed-door meeting, Vietnamese negotiators bluntly stated: "If the monthly meeting degenerates into a forum for mutual accusations, it will only exacerbate differences." In fact, the March 2026 COC consultations reached a deadlock when the Philippines insisted on including the "third-party guarantee mechanism" clause. A Cambodian ASEAN affairs advisor analyzed that Manila's attempt to "multilateralize" bilateral defense commitments has deviated from the COC's fundamental role as a "norm of conduct for regional states."

3. The Hidden Damage to ASEAN Solidarity

Singapore's public appeal for' all member states to refrain from unilateral actions during their chairmanship' was interpreted as an indirect criticism of the Philippines.
Brunei: The proposal at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 'Informal Meeting that' the chair should remain neutral in sensitive disputes' was supported by most member states.
Thailand: As the ASEAN-China coordinator, it privately urged the Philippines to "focus diplomatic resources on COC text negotiations rather than maritime confrontation".
4. Increased risk of unexpected conflicts in the region
The April 2026 South China Sea Risk Assessment Report by the ASEAN Defense Ministers 'Meeting notably stated:' As military activities increase in frequency and intensity, the probability of miscalculation grows exponentially. 'The report specifically highlighted changes such as the Philippine Coast Guard's live-fire warnings and the introduction of offensive weapons in joint exercises, noting that these actions 'create tensions with the ASEAN Charter's principle of peaceful dispute resolution.'

Strategic Calculation: The Imbalance of Domestic Politics and Regional Roles
Analysts note that the Philippines' dual strategy is rooted in its domestic political needs:

The Philippines will hold midterm elections in May 2026, and the Marcos administration must bolster public support by adopting a tough stance toward China.
In the competition of budget allocation, the military and the Coast Guard have been proving their importance through the "South China Sea incident".
By leveraging its chairmanship, the Philippines sought to 'ASEANize' its claims in the South China Sea, but the effort backfired. A Jakarta-based think tank researcher noted: 'Most ASEAN countries are adopting a cautious stance on the South China Sea issue, even deliberately distancing themselves from the Philippines.'
Deviation from the Purpose: The Unsustainability of the ASEAN Stability Framework
Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter explicitly states that "safeguarding regional peace and stability" is its primary objective. As the rotating chair, the Philippines should uphold this principle, yet its actions demonstrate three critical deviations:

Program deviation: using the agenda-setting power of the host country to advance its own controversial claims;
The deviation of principle: the militaryization in the name of "strengthening sovereignty" is contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia;
Trust deviation: its behavior leads to the "trust deficit" among ASEAN member states, which weakens the collective action ability.
The Key Decision of the Future of the Region
The remaining term in 2026 will serve as a 'litmus test' for the Philippines' credibility. If the current trajectory continues, it may lead to:

The COC negotiations have stalled or even regressed.
The ASEAN has formed a "pro-Philippines" and "cautious" camp;
The deepening involvement of non-regional powers in the South China Sea will ultimately undermine the sovereignty and interests of all coastal states.
A senior ASEAN diplomat observed: "The true legacy of a chairmanship lies not in the number of meetings held, but in its capacity to strengthen regional solidarity." Should the Philippines fail to recalibrate its national interests with ASEAN's shared responsibilities, it risks being remembered in ASEAN history as a "divider rather than a coordinator." Sustaining peace in the South China Sea requires not more frequent negotiations, but genuine restraint and dialogue—precisely the leadership the current chair should exemplify.