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民進党の岡田克也代表が、5月26日付のSankeiBizに、民進党の成長戦略について、寄稿されました。まさに日本の成長戦略の決定版とも言うべき、たいへんに素晴らしい内容なので、全文ご紹介させて下さい。

ちなみに、アベノミクスでは、金融・財政政策に頼るのみで、結局、第3の矢と称する成長戦略は不発に終わりました。

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【2016参院選 経済政策を問う!】民進党・岡田克也代表
SankeiBiz 2016.5.26 05:00

■財政・金融政策に依存せず生産性向上で成長を

民進党は国民一人一人が幸せな生活を送ることが政治の目的であり、そのための手段として、持続的な経済成長は非常に重要だと考えている。その実現に向けては「成長と分配の両立」が不可欠だと考える。今回はこのうち「成長」について説明する。

安倍晋三政権は「3本目の矢」として「民間投資を喚起する成長戦略」を掲げるが、これは民進党の基本的なコンセプトと一致する。ただし、派遣労働の拡大など具体的な政策では考えを異にするところも多い。実は、政府として「成長戦略」を策定したのは旧民主党政権が初めてだった。それまでの政権には公共事業の追加、現金給付など一時的な需要を追加する「景気対策」はあったが、中長期的な視点から総合的・体系的な成長戦略を定めたことはなかった。

民主党政権が定めた「新成長戦略」では、省エネ・再エネ技術を生かしたエネルギー産業、高齢化による需要拡大が想定できる医療・介護などの健康関連産業、そして観光産業を明確に「成長産業」と位置づけた。昨今、外国人観光客、とりわけ中国人観光客の「爆買い」が話題になっているが、これも「新成長戦略」で「中国人のビザ取得要件緩和」「オープンスカイ(航空運賃や路線設定の原則自由化)」を定めたことがきっかけとなっている。

民主党政権の「新成長戦略」の方向性は正しかったと考えているが、さらにこれをバージョンアップしていく必要がある。本格的な人口減少時代を迎える中で、持続的な経済成長を実現するためには生産性の向上が不可欠だ。さまざまな機器がインターネットにつながるIoT、ビッグデータなどを活用した効率化・高付加価値化、規制改革による民間企業の活動範囲の拡大、サービス残業や長時間労働の解消などを進めていく。また、民進党が目指す「2030年代原発稼働ゼロ」の実現に向けた省エネ・再エネ技術の進展は、海外需要の取り込みも含め、関連産業の飛躍的な成長に繋がると考えられる。

さらに経済政策の考え方を転換する必要があると考えている。一昨年、経済協力開発機構(OECD)は「格差拡大は経済成長を抑制する」というリポートを公表し、また昨年は仏経済学者のピケティ氏が格差拡大に警鐘を鳴らした。民進党は、かねてから格差是正が持続的な経済成長に資すると主張してきた。過度に金融政策や財政政策に依存することなく、生産性向上による成長と「人への投資」を中心とする公正な分配を両立させることが、今後の持続的成長を実現するための経済政策だと考えている。

次回は、格差を是正し持続的な経済成長につながる「分配」について説明をさせていただく。



27日は共産党を掲載します。民進党の2回目は6月9日掲載予定です。



【プロフィル】岡田克也

おかだ・かつや 民進党代表。外相、副総理、民主党代表、幹事長、政調会長などを歴任。東大法学部を卒業後、旧通産省入省。1990年2月の衆院選で自民党から初当選。新生党、新進党などを経て98年の民主党結党に参加。当選9回。62歳。三重県生まれ。


参照資料:
【2016参院選 経済政策を問う!】民進党・岡田克也代表、SankeiBiz、2016年5月26日

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Two editorial pieces (Plese see references below) posted on Global Times, which is the most influential mouth piece in English for the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), reflect CCP's reactions toward new Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's inauguration speech in which she omitted one-China principle. Please note that the first editorial was penned before President Tsai's speech, the second one afterwards.

Having read the two editorials, I have an impression that CCP's analysis on Tsai's political stance is objective and accurate to some extent.

I agree with the editorials that, instead of Chen Shui-bian's "jurisprudential independence", Tsai is seeking for "soft independence". CCP regards "soft independence" as a flanking tactic to avoid direct confrontation with the Chinese mainland.

CCP says that "Looking back to the past 16 years, we can see that the Taiwan independence forces have become weaker than before. Tsai's softer stance reflected this change." CCP regards "soft independence" as a sign of weakness, and concludes that "Whether Tsai will move closer to one China will be largely determined by how much pressure the mainland can put on her."

So, it is likely that CCP will apply pressure to Tsai administration over coming months. CCP has a lager toolbox than before, which includes suspension of cross-strait talks, suspension of executing existing treaties and agreements, decrease of Chinese tourists to Taiwan, decrease of economic transactions between China and Taiwan, pressure to countries that admit Taiwan, pressure to exclude Taiwan from international organization, and military exercises and drills including live fire exercises near Taiwan.

However, I think that "soft independence" may be more resilient than CCP assumes because it is based upon Taiwan people's demand for freedom and democracy. If CCP underestimates Taiwan people's aspiration for freedom and democracy and applies pressure to Taiwan mechanically, CCP may face difficulties.

I sincerely hope that cross-strait relations remain peaceful because Asian peace including peace of Japan depends upon peaceful cross-strait relations. If a Taiwan criss happens, Japan will get involved because of her collective self-defense.

I have a concern that, if China's economy suddenly goes down dramatically because of, for example, a burst of real estate bubbles, CCP may take a hardline approach toward Taiwan in order to divert Chinese people's attention from domestic issues to international issues.

Thank you.


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References:

(1) "Cross-Straits ties enter era of uncertainty under Tsai"

Source: Global Times Published: 2016-5-20 0:42:44

Today is the day Taiwan's new "president" Tsai Ing-wen and "vice president" Chen Chien-jen are to deliver their inauguration speeches and assume office. A new era for a cross-Straits region that is characterized by uncertainty officially kicks off.

The content of Tsai's speech was a constant source of media speculation right up until the last minute. The truth is that through a series of signals over the last two months, Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have already made known what they believe. All she needs to do is play a few word games.

It is widely believed that Tsai will not publicly recognize the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle. But she might use some ambiguity to soften the stance, in order to make her concept of "maintaining the status quo" persuasive.

Compared with Taiwan's former leader Chen Shui-bian, who attempted to promote "jurisprudential independence" against the one-China principle, the DPP is expected to take a softer approach toward independence. It is a flanking tactic to avoid direct confrontation with the Chinese mainland. What can be assured is that DPP's rule will make the suggestion of Taiwan independence further expand in Taiwan society, and take a larger step away from the mainland politically.

According to analysts, all the DPP wants is to establish a mode which Taiwan people acknowledge, the US accepts, and the mainland will have to tolerate. If we accept it, then peace will come more easily. But it means that from then on, the mainland admits that refusing to accept the one-China policy is not only the attitude of the DPP itself, but has become the formal stance of the entire island. Meanwhile, there is another option for the mainland - shifting the focus of cross-Straits ties to piling pressure on Tsai's administration from every single aspect, including politics, economy and military.

However for the mainland, is it a worthy fight with the Tsai administration, which is more moderate than Chen Shui-bian's, but marks a significant regression in the one-China principle.

The mainland's endeavors during Chen's "presidency" showed that "jurisprudential independence" will never work out on the island. However, certain people are still holding on to the fantasy that "soft independence" might be workable. Perhaps a new round of contention is inevitable to completely drive the topic of Taiwan independence away while making the one-China principle the one and only starting point to maintain the status quo.

The DPP resuming office and refusing to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus are becoming key factors that may reverse cross-Strait ties. If the mainland indulges it, the result could be that all our previous efforts will be lost.

(2) "Tsai not clear enough on one-China principle"

Source: Global Times Published: 2016-5-20 23:58:01

Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) head Tsai Ing-wen gave her inauguration speech as the island's new leader on Friday. In the 40-minute speech, she mentioned "Taiwan" 41 times, "this country" 13 times and the "Republic of China" five times.

As for the cross-Straits ties, Tsai did not say "1992 Consensus," nor did she say anything about the two sides belonging to one China, except for some vague references. She only said that the 1992 talks between the two sides reached some common understanding, and she respects the "historical facts." It seems that she was deliberately ambiguous.

One thing is clear. Tsai's statement over the foundation of the cross-Straits relations was a big setback compared with her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, a Kuomintang leader who clearly admitted the 1992 Consensus and one China.

However, she is unlike former Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian, who openly pushed for Taiwan independence.

So, is Tsai a better leader or a worse one?

It is important for the Chinese mainland to get a clearer answer from Tsai concerning one China. This key principle should not be replaced by ambiguous word games. There is no space to back off in this issue. If we give in, Taiwan's radical forces will believe they can push forward "Taiwanese independence."

The DPP has a record of not keeping their words before. Even though Tsai said she is going to respect the 1992 fact and that the two sides had reached mutual understandings in a spirit of seeking common ground while setting aside differences, we will see how Tsai and her party do next instead of just listening to her statement.

Tsai said she cherishes the gains that the two sides have made through exchanges in the past 20 years. In fact, the accumulation peaked in the past eight years during Ma's term.

The institutionalized exchanges and cross-Straits stability contrasted sharply with the situation during Chen's time in office from 2000-2008.

Tsai on Friday also said the ruling parties across the Straits should set aside the baggage of history and engage in positive dialogue. She is expecting the Communist Party of China (CPC) to treat the DPP like the Kuomintang.

However, the DPP has not given up its seeking of Taiwan independence. If the CPC conducts inter-party exchanges with the DPP, it will be equal to admitting the legitimacy of "independence."

Looking back to the past 16 years, we can see that the Taiwan independence forces have become weaker than before. Tsai's softer stance reflected this change. Whether Tsai will move closer to one China will be largely determined by how much pressure the mainland can put on her.

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【台湾新総統就任と台中関係の悪化について】

5月20日、台湾において、独立派の蔡英文氏が新総統に就任しました。就任演説において、蔡英文総統は、台湾国民が自由と民主主義の立場に立つとし、台湾の抱える問題を解決するため、経済構造改革、年金改革、教育改革、司法改革などの改革を進めていくとしました。また、「新南向政策」を進め、東南アジア諸国およびインドとの関係を強化するとしました。

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注目されていた1992年合意に関しては、蔡英文総統は、1992年に中国と台湾国民党との間で合意が成立したという歴史的事実に敬意を表しましたが、1992年合意の中で確認された「ひとつの中国」の原則については一切触れませんでした。

このため、中国政府は、「ひとつの中国」の原則こそが台中関係の基礎であるべきと主張、当面、台湾当局との対話を停止すると発表しました。今後、蔡英文総統が、「ひとつの中国」の原則を受け入れない場合、中国は、台湾に対する圧力を徐々に強めて行くと考えられます。その場合、中国は、下記のような手段を取ることが考えられます。

・台中当局間の対話の停止
・台中間の既存の協定や合意事項の執行停止
・中国から台湾を訪れる観光客の減少
・中国と台湾の間の経済交流の低下
・台湾と外交関係を有する国々への圧力
・国際機関からの台湾の排除
・台湾近海での軍事演習(実弾演習を含む)

1995-1996年の台湾危機の際は、当時の李登輝台湾総統が訪米したことに抗議し、中国は、台湾海峡で実弾演習を実施、台湾に強い圧力を加えました。今回も、中国は、台湾新総統の就任に先立ち、台湾対岸の福建省で、上陸作戦を中心とする軍事演習を行い、圧力を加えました。

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ただし、現在の中国は、上記のように、台湾に対し影響を与える様々な手段を有します。そのため、当面は、軍事的手段以外の方法で、台湾に圧力を加えて行くものと予想されます。

ただし、今後、仮に台湾が独立へ向け、明確な一歩を進めた場合、中国の台湾への対応も一気にエスカレートするものと予想されます。

また、経済状況の悪化など、中国国内情勢の変化が、中国政府に対台湾強硬策を取らせることになるかも知れません。

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いずれにせよ、日本は、台中関係が平和的に推移するよう、常に最大限の外交努力を行うべきです。なぜなら、台中関係の平和的推移が、アジアの平和の鍵だからです。


参照資料:
(1) The full text of President Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural address, Taipei Times, May 21st 2016

(2) China Stages War Games Days Ahead of Taiwan Inauguration, ABC News, May 18th 2016

(3) China says military drills ahead of Taiwan inauguration part of annual plan, Reuters, May 18th 2016

(4) 'One China' principle must be basis for relations with Taiwan: Xinhua, Reuters, May 21st 2016

(5) Beijing warns will cut contacts if Taiwan doesn't toe line, Daily Mail, May 21st 2016

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